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This thesis consists of three essays linked together by the methodology of meta-regression 
analysis. The first two essays address a long standing question of interest to both economists 
and policymakers which is whether taxes exert an important influence on economic growth 
and, if they do, how large this effect might be. To answer this question, I study two different 
setups. The first involves OECD countries and the second studies U.S. states. The last essay 
studies the performance of the FAT-PET-PEESE (FPP) procedure, a commonly employed 
approach for addressing publication selection bias in meta-regression analysis studies in 
economics and business. 
In my first meta-regression analysis, I combine results from 42 studies containing 713 
comparable estimates, all which endeavour to estimate the effect of taxes on economic 
growth in OECD countries (Chapter 2). I then switch from an institutionally and culturally 
diverse setup to a setup in which there is a set of common institutional features, U.S. states. I 
integrate 966 estimates derived from 29 studies investigating the effect of taxes on economic 
growth in the U.S. states (Chapter 3). The objective of these two studies is to answer the 
following questions: (Q1) What is the overall, mean effect of taxes on economic growth?; 
(Q2) Are some taxes (e.g., personal income taxes) more distortionary than others (e.g., value 
added taxes)?; (Q3) Is there any empirical evidence to support the conventional wisdom that 
“distortionary taxes” used to fund “unproductive expenditures” are especially harmful for 
economic growth?; and (Q4) What are the factors causing researchers to encounter different 
or even contradictory results? My results for OECD countries suggest that there is publication 




of taxes on economic growth is statistically insignificant and negligibly small. An increase in 
unproductive expenditure funded by distortionary taxes has a significant negative effect on 
growth. I find weak evidence to support the idea that some taxes are more distortionary than 
others. Lastly, several factors are present that can explain discrepancies among the reported 
estimates, such as estimation methods, types of standard errors, whether the original study 
was published in a peer-reviewed journal, the publication date, and so on. I find the following 
outcomes in the study of taxes in U.S. states: estimates in the literature are characterized by 
statistically significant negative publication bias. Once I control for publication bias, the 
overall effect is not particularly meaningful since it lumps together different kinds of tax 
policies. With respect to particular types of taxes, I could not find enough evidence to support 
that taxes on labour are more growth retarding than other types of taxes. Evidence regarding 
other types of taxes is mixed. Finally, as with results for OECD countries, there are several 
factors that appear to explain discrepancies among the reported estimates for U.S. states. 
In the Chapter 4, I conduct a Monte Carlo analysis to evaluate the performance of the FPP 
procedure in detecting and correcting for publication bias. The main three objectives of 
applying FPP procedure are: (i) Funnel Asymmetry Testing (FAT) to test whether the sample 
of estimates is influenced by publication selection bias; (ii) Precision Effect Testing (PET) to 
test whether there is a genuine non-zero true effect of estimates once the publication bias is 
accommodated and corrected; and (iii) Precision Effect Estimate with Standard Error 
(PEESE) to obtain an improved estimate of the overall mean effect. I simulate two common 
types of publication bias. These are publication bias against insignificant results and 
publication bias against wrong-signed results (according to associated theory). I run these 
simulations in three different environments, Fixed Effects, Random Effects, and Panel 




unrealistic environment of “Fixed Effects”, when there is one true effect and sampling error 
is the only reason why studies produce different estimates. However, once I study its 
performance in more realistic data environments, where there is heterogeneity in the 
population effects between and within studies, the FPP procedure becomes unreliable for the 
first two objectives, and is less efficient than other estimators when estimating overall mean 
effects. Further, hypothesis tests about the overall, mean effect cannot be trusted. These 
results call into question the efficacy of using the FPP procedure to test and correct for 
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The rapid growth in research publications has often not made scientific research more 
illuminating, but on the contrary, this exponential growth has made our understanding of the 
world and the people in it more confusing. The major problem arises when conflicting and 
contradictory results are reported in similar studies of the same research question. 
Conventional narrative reviews may deal with aggregating different studies which have 
matching findings to some extent. However, those reviews use a “vote counting” method to 
summarize the results available in the literature and may advocate certain results according to 
the reviewer’s points of view. Moreover, they are not normally easily reproduced by other 
scholars.  
To overcome these and other shortcomings, the technique of meta-analysis was 
introduced by Glass in 1976. Meta-analysis is the statistical analysis of estimates from 
multiple studies that are concerned with measuring a similar “effect”. By “effect” I mean the 
relationship between the main predictor and the dependent variable in primary studies. Two 
main goals of meta-analysis are (i) to reach a single conclusion about the size and 
significance of that effect, and (ii) to clarify the causes of variations of estimates of the effect 
across studies.  
Thus, this method can offer a consistent reproducible guide to the reader to make sense 
of the rapidly expanding research literature on a given topic. Furthermore, by looking at 
study-variant characteristics, meta-regression analysis studies are able to provide additional 
insights to existing knowledge. This method has long been applied in various fields including 
medicine, psychology and education. In recent years, however, it has become an increasingly 
popular research tool in economics and business. Figure 1.1 represents a time series bar chart 
that lists all Web of Science journal articles in economics and business that have the word 





Figure 1.1: Number of Articles in Economics and Business Listed in Web of Science 
with “Meta-Analysis” in the Title 
Note: Web of Science categories are: Economics, Business Finance, Business, Management, Criminology 
Penology, Urban Studies, and Social Sciences Interdisciplinary (813 articles).  
 
There are several objectives in using the meta-analysis method. Some of which are as 
follows: 
 Summarizing and integrating results from many original studies. 
 Analysing differences in the results among studies. 
 Overcoming small sample sizes of individual studies to detect the precise effects of an 
intervention, especially once a larger sample size is required. 
 Increasing precision in estimating effects. 
 Diagnosing and correcting misspecification bias in the original studies. 
 Determining if new studies are needed to further investigate an issue. 
 Generating new hypotheses for future studies. 
The six basic steps of conducting high quality research to meet the above outlined 




 Defining a research question. 
 Conducting a literature search as comprehensive as possible to find all the relevant 
studies on a given topic, and including not only published papers but all the studies 
conducted by government advisors, research firms, policy think thanks and interest 
groups. 
 Data coding to extract information from the divergent results. 
 Calculating effect sizes which measure the relationship or association between the 
variables of interest. 
 Explaining the differences in effect sizes. 
 Identifying new areas of research, since conducting a meta-analysis highlights which 
parts of the topics need further research. 
 
Like all empirical studies, meta-analysis starts with defining a research question. 
However, the main feature of meta-analysis is that it requires an exhaustive search of not only 
peer-reviewed journal papers but also unpublished papers on a given research question to 
identify the most relevant studies.1 As such, this literature search includes an electronic 
search along with a complementary manual search. A set of inclusion/exclusion criteria is 
explicitly defined to narrow down the search for relevant studies. Being transparent in this 
way allows other researchers to replicate a meta-study.  
The population of studies is identified by conducting both a traditional backward 
citation search strategy as well as a forward citation search strategy on the core studies 
collected in the previous stage. Backward citation refers to all the resources available at the 
                                                          
1 Most meta-regression analyses conducted in economics only consider peer-reviewed or published literature 
due to the general belief that those studies have a higher quality compared to the other types of outlets, since 




end of core studies which have influenced the authors’ thinking whereas forward citation 
indicates all the papers citing these core studies after their publication.  
Another useful strategy to retrieve more relevant studies is to contact the leading 
authors who have conducted studies in the same research area. The main purpose of doing 
that is to identify any other unpublished papers written by these authors since the meta-
analyst is often unaware of their existence. It is also useful in identifying any other papers 
written by relatively new scholars such as PhD students who are working on the same 
research question. All relevant studies collected in this manner are then read carefully for 
acceptability according to the pre-set criteria created by the researcher. 
Once the literature search is completed, the next step is to identify important 
characteristics of studies and then code them. This step can be the most difficult and time 
consuming part of ameta-regression analysis. Two main issues in terms of coding are what to 
code and how to code. As stated by Ringquist (2013), three levels of information including 
search, study, and effect need to be considered for coding studies: 
1. Search-level information: This includes all primary specifications assigned to each 
paper to identify for double checking at a later stage or for any replication purposes. 
Papers are given a unique ordinary number according to the authors’ names 
(alphabetical order) to identify each relevant study. Other coding categories include 
the publication year, the name of the first three authors and the databases used for the 
relevant study. 
2. Study-level information: This involves reading each paper in its entirety to exclude 
irrelevant studies which initially appear to be potentially relevant. This means that this 




includes a full bibliographic citation including authors’ name, publication date, 
publication status or some other specifications like the academic discipline of the 
outlet. These categories might be especially helpful in terms of estimating the 
presence of publication bias. It can also be used to study the evolution of a topic over 
time.  
A complication when coding at the study-level is the existence of different formats of a single 
study. The standard practice in this situation is to choose the published version of the study. 
However, if all the available formats are unpublished then the preference is the latest version 
of the study.  
3. Effect-level information: This part of coding is the most time consuming part as it 
involves exercising different levels of personal judgement. The most essential part of 
the coding is all the information which allows the meta-analyst to calculate effect 
sizes, such as regression coefficients, standard errors, t-statistics/p-values, which are 
extracted from the tables in the text or even the appendices. If the writer just reports 
the coefficients, but no other statistical details such as t-statistics or p-values, then the 
paper should be dropped from the final sample. 
Almost every single study in economics will generate multiple effect sizes. Keeping a record 
of them all is crucial in conducting a comprehensive meta-analysis. For quality assurance 
purposes, the search and data coding procedure for a Meta-Regression Analysis (MRA) study 
in economics should follow the MAER-NET protocol (Stanley et al., 2013). 
The next step after the coding of studies is to analyse the data. Doing so requires a 
standardized measure of association between two variables of interest (the explanatory 
variable and the response variable) such as effect size. The effect size is a measure of a 




Several different effect types are available in meta-analysis research and include estimated 
elasticities, regression coefficients, odds ratio, partial correlation coefficients, and Fisher’s Z-
transformed partial correlation coefficients (see Hunter and Schmidt, 2004).  
Due to inconsistencies of measurement units for regression variables available in the 
literature, many meta-analysts prefer to convert all the estimates into a common and 
comparable measure called the Partial Correlation Coefficient (PCC). The main advantage of 
using the PCC is that it is a unitless measure and can easily be compared across different 
estimates within a study and also between studies. The regression coefficients on the other 
hand are ideal measures for effect size as they refer to economic effect than statistical effect. 
Unfortunately, they are not independent of units of measurements. Therefore, they are not 
comparable unless the meta-analyst makes sure all the studies use the same scale (Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2013).  
The final step in conducting a meta-regression analysis is to identify which 
characteristics can explain the large variation among the reported estimates. This also tells us 
how future studies can be better designed than existing studies.  
All of the above mentioned steps lay out the standards of good MRA practice. But 
when it comes to application, “judgement calls” are inevitable and the steps are not as 
straightforward as suggested earlier. Further, some commonly used procedures in analysing 
the coded data have not received much scrutiny, which calls into question how valid they are 
in practice. 
In addition to undertaking meta-regression analysis studies, my thesis is also concerned 
with identifying possible shortcomings in current practice. The first part of my thesis involves 
studying the effects of taxes on economic growth. Apart from naturally being a topic which is 




example, how to deal with dynamic effects, different units of measurement, and the presence 
of multiple, possibly conflicting simultaneous effects as a result of the composition of fiscal 
policy. The second part of my thesis is concerned with the issue of publication bias. In 
particular, I am interested in studying the performance of the FAT-PET-PEESE (FPP) 
procedure, a commonly employed approach for addressing publication selection bias in the 
economics and business meta-regression analysis literature.  
In the first two essays, the effects of taxes on economic growth in OECD countries and 
U.S. states are examined, respectively. The last essay studies the performance of the FAT-
PET-PEESE (FPP) procedure. Thus, while the three essays included in this dissertation 
examine separate topics, they are linked together by the methodology of meta-regression 
analysis.  
Over the decades, there have been hundreds of studies estimating the effects of taxes on 
economic growth. Despite the fact that many studies use similar data and study many of the 
same states or countries, and time periods, estimates vary widely. The result is a lack of a 
consensus on whether taxes have an important influence on economic growth and, if they do, 
how large the effect might be. There are many possible reasons for this state of affairs. Tax 
policy is necessarily a two-sided activity. This is because taxes are used to fund expenditures 
and/or reduce deficits. As a result, tax effects are always net effects, and will differ depending 
on how the tax revenues are spent. Relatedly, different types of taxes may have different 
consequences for economic growth, as may different types of expenditures. For example, a 
distortionary tax on personal income used to fund transfer payments may be expected to have 




productive infrastructure.2 Further, the empirical models used to estimate tax effects may 
measure short-, medium-, or long-run effects depending on particular ways that regression 
equations are specified. For these and other reasons, even studies that use similar data can 
produce dissimilar estimates of tax effects. 
In an attempt to provide a clear picture of the research papers investigating the effects 
of taxes on economic growth given the inclusion criteria, I conduct two meta-regression 
analyses. The first, contained in Chapter 2, is “Taxes and Economic Growth in OECD 
Countries: A Meta-Regression Analysis”. In this study, I use meta-regression analysis 
methods to evaluate the results of 42 studies and 641 individual estimates of the effect of 
taxes on economic growth in OECD countries. The second meta-regression analysis, 
presented in Chapter 3, is “Taxes and Economic Growth in U.S. States: A Meta-Regression 
Analysis”. As in the previous study, I employ meta-regression analysis techniques to 
synthesize 868 individual estimates derived from 29 studies investigating the effect of taxes 
on economic growth in U.S. states. The first two studies address a number of difficult coding 
issues including: implications of government budget constraints for interpretation of tax 
effects; units of measurement for economic growth rates and tax rates; implications of 
equation specifications that measure short-run, medium-run, and long-run effects; length of 
time period (annual data versus multi-year periods); as well as several others.  
One of the main concerns in the meta-regression analysis literature is publication 
selection bias. Publication selection bias occurs when papers that are “published”, either in 
journals or that advance to the stage of publicly available working papers or reports, do not 
accurately represent the underlying empirical research.  Publication selection bias occurs 
                                                          
2 Distortionary taxes are those distorting the private sector’s incentive to invest such as taxes on personal income 
and property. An example of non-distortionary tax would be taxes on consumption. Accordingly, government 
expenditures are devided into two categories productive versus unproductive expenditures. If an expenditure are 
included in private production function, then it is assumed as productive expenditures such as educational 




because there is a tendency amongst researchers, reviewers, and editors to submit or accept 
the manuscripts for publications based upon the direction or strength of the results. As the 
data for meta-regression analysis consists of estimated effects from the literature, if that 
distribution is distorted, so will the conclusions that derive from them. Thus, a crucial 
component of a meta-regression analysis is to detect and correct for publication bias.  
In my third essay explained in Chapter 4, “How Well does the FAT-PET-PEESE 
Procedure Work?”, I study the performance of the FAT-PET-PEESE (FPP) procedure in 
presence of publication selection bias. This is a commonly employed approach for addressing 
publication bias in the economics and business meta-regression analysis literature. The FPP 
procedure is generally used for three purposes: (i) to test whether a sample of estimates 
suffers from publication bias, (ii) to test whether the estimates indicate that the effect of 














Chapter 2. Taxes and Economic Growth in OECD 







The effect of taxes on economic activity is one of the highly contested research areas in 
macroeconomics. Many studies have examined the effects of taxes on economic performance 
such as Agell, Lindh, and Ohlsson (1997); Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti, and Asea (1997); 
Fölster and Henrekson (1999); Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999); Daveri and Tabellini 
(2000); Bassanini and Hemmings (2001); Bleaney, Gemmell, and Kneller (2001); Fölster and 
Henrekson (2001); Afonso and Furceri (2010); Alesina and Ardagna (2010); and Arnold et al. 
(2011). But against expectation, there is no consensus among economists on whether taxes 
have any influential effect on economic growth, and if they do, how large the effect might be. 
While theory may not provide enough guidance on the ultimate effect of taxes on growth, so 
that the issue becomes an empirical one, the empirical results have a number of complications 
that make it challenging to draw general conclusions. 
 There are many possible reasons for the existence of a lack of consensus. Let’s first 
see why there is no clear a priori theoretical prediction about the effects of taxes on economic 
growth. In the neoclassical growth model introduced by Solow (1956), fiscal variables such 
as taxes and spending may have transitional effects on output levels but they have no impact 
on the rate of economic growth in the long run. The steady-state growth rate is driven by 
exogenous factors such as the rate of technical progress and population growth. However, the 
endogenous growth model introduced by Barro (1990) and King and Rebelo (1990) 
challenged the traditional neoclassical growth model and predicted that long-run growth will 
be affected by productive expenditures and distortionary taxation. As taxes have no 
permanent effects on per capita GDP growth in the neoclassical model, most researchers 
assume that the endogenous model can better explain growth. Further, the reported growth 




Barro and Sala-i- Martin, 1992; Futagami et al., 1993; and Deverajan et al., 1996) but the net 
effect of taxes on growth also depends on how public spending and deficits are financed 
(Kneller et al., 1999; Bleanet et al., 2001; Gemmell et al., 2009). For example, a distortionary 
tax such as a progressive personal income tax used to fund unproductive expenditure such as 
transfer payments may have a different growth effect than the situation in which the same 
distortionary taxes are used to fund productive expenditure on public infrastructure. 
Like the theoretical literature, empirical studies provide ambiguous results on the 
growth effects of tax policy due mainly to the lack of a uniform frame of reference. The 
difficulty in finding robust evidence of the effect of taxes on growth may be explained by 
several methodological choices, such as what countries to include, how to measure taxes and 
economic performance, the problem of omitted variables, particularly the exclusion of 
different types of expenditures, differences in the inclusion of control variables, the selection 
of estimation methods, and the duration of estimated tax effects. For these and other reasons, 
it is hardly surprising that these conflicting results exist.  
Since the literature lacks any visible patterns, conventional narrative reviews can be 
used to compare estimates across studies and therefore highlight the reasons for the 
heterogeneity observed. However, these reviews suffer from the following shortcomings: (i) 
they reflect the reviewers’ points of view and can certainly vary from one reviewer to 
another; (ii) bias might be an inherent part of these kinds of reviews; (iii) no clear 
inclusion/exclusion criteria are typically reported and therefore they cannot be replicated by 
other scholars; (iv) there is no objective standard for how to weight alternative estimates, and 
(v) as a result, they cannot be relied upon to provide clear and concrete guidance to policy 




To overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings and in order to be able to provide a 
clear picture of the existing literature investigating the effects of taxes on economic growth in 
OECD countries, I apply a meta-regression analysis (MRA). An MRA is a quantitative 
method for reviewing research of the existing literature in order to aggregate the empirical 
findings on a given research question. One of the main advantages of an MRA is that it 
allows one to disentangle various factors causing the conflicting results among researchers 
(Stanley, 2001). M-As have been used in the sciences and other disciplines, and MRAs have 
been used predominantly in economics.  
To do so, I collect the estimates from this literature and carefully track the factors that 
can cause heterogeneity across studies and then by the use of this technique, I am able to 
compare and synthesize the estimates across the different studies.  
This study aims to answer the following questions by applying a meta-regression 
analysis: (Q1) What is the overall, mean effect of taxes on economic growth? (Q2) Are some 
taxes (e,g., personal income taxes) more distortionary than others (e.g., value added taxes)? 
(Q3) Is there any empirical evidence to support the conventional wisdom that “distortionary 
taxes” used to fund “unproductive expenditures” are especially harmful for economic 
growth? (Q4) What are the factors causing researchers to encounter different or even 
contradictory results? As part of this research, I check for publication bias, by which I mean 
some estimates are disproportionately under-reported either due to statistical insignificance or 
for reporting the “wrong-direction” according to the associated theory (Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2012; Havranek and Irsova, 2012). I calculate an “overall tax effect” after 
accommodating and correcting for publication bias. It is worth mentioning that any measure 
of the “overall tax effect” on growth is not informative enough mainly because it 




compare estimated tax effects from two types of policies: (i) tax effects that are theoretically 
predicted to have a negative impact on economic growth versus (ii) tax effects that are 
theoretically predicted to have a positive impact on economic growth. The differences 
between these two sets of estimated tax effects will provide a measure of the impact of tax 
policy on economic growth. 
To answer the aforementioned four research questions, this study collects 713 
comparable estimates of tax effects on economic growth in OECD countries derived from 42 
primary studies. According to a final sample of 641 estimates, I find strong evidence that the 
empirical literature suffers from negative publication bias. In other words, there is a tendency 
to over-report negative estimates. Once I control for this bias, I then calculate that the 
“overall effect” of taxes on economic growth is small and statistically insignificant. However, 
as mentioned earlier, this “overall tax effect” is not very informative because it includes 
estimated effects from different kinds of fiscal policies. 
After accommodating and correcting for publication bias, once I turn to analysing 
different types of tax policies, I find evidence that the composition of fiscal policy matters. 
For example, increases in productive expenditures and/or government surpluses funded by 
non-distortionary taxes have a statistically significant, positive effect on economic growth. 
However, increases in unproductive expenditures funded by distortionary taxes and/or 
deficits have a statistically significant, negative effect on economic growth. These differences 
in the policy compositions may explain the heterogeneity reported among the literature. 
Further, I find weak evidence that progressive taxes on personal income are more growth-
retarding than other types of taxes. Evidence regarding other types of taxes is mixed. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains how I 




tax effects can produce different estimates. Section 2.4 represents my empirical results, 
addressing the above-mentioned research questions. Section 2.5 summarizes the main 
findings of this research. 
2.2. Selection of Studies and Construction of Dataset 
This meta-regression analysis collects estimated tax effects derived from all the studies 
estimating the following specification: 
𝑔 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑡𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,                                                                                                      (2.1) 
where 𝑔 is a measure of economic growth, 𝑡𝑟 is a measure of the tax rate, and the data are 
taken from OECD countries. I conducted a comprehensive research strategy including both 
electronic and manual search procedures. It is worth noting that studies estimating interaction 
and/or non-linear transformation of tax effects, such as the “growth hills” of Bania, Grey and 
Stone (2007) and also studies estimating interactive terms, such as Deskins and Hill (2010) 
are not included in this MRA mainly because if there is an interactive term in the model, the 
total effect is an outcome of both the term and its interaction. In these cases, the meta-analyst 
rarely has the data necessary to calculate the marginal effects and their respective standard 
errors. 
The electronic search used three categories of keywords: (i) “TAX” keywords (ii) 
“ECONOMIC GROWTH” keywords, and (iii) “OECD” keywords in the following 
combination: “TAX” and “ECONOMIC GROWTH” and “OECD”. A variety of keywords 
were substituted into each of the three categories. All the potential alternatives are reported in 
Appendix 2.1. I searched several keyword combinations in various electronic search engines 
such as EconLit, Google Scholar, JSTOR, Web of Science, Scopus, RePEc, EBSCO, and 




The abstracts and conclusions of these studies were then read carefully to eliminate any 
studies that did not meet the inclusion/exclusion criteria. To be included in this meta-
regression analysis each study needs to: (i) report an estimate of a growth equation with a tax 
variable; (ii) focus on a full set or a subset of OECD countries (e.g., EU15, G7, EU 
members); and (iii) provide standard errors (or the statistics through which standard errors 
can be computed) associated with each regression coefficient. Backwards and forwards 
citation search strategies were then applied to identify any additional relevant original 
studies. This produced a list of 51 studies, some of which were multiple versions of the same 
study, and included peer-reviewed journals, conference proceedings, reports released by 
government agencies, think tanks and research firms, theses and dissertations, and working 
papers and other unpublished or grey literature. 3 
The list including all the studies collected until that period was emailed to 64 scholars 
who had written at least one research paper on the topic of taxes and economic growth in 
OECD countries. The researchers were asked to assist me in identifying any additional 
research papers of their own or Masters/PhD students who are working with them.4 The 
responses I received from the researchers resulted in a revised list of 54 studies.5 
Each study in the revised list was then read thoroughly to see whether they were 
eligible according to the inclusion criteria defined at the earlier stage. The dependent variable 
had to be a measure of GDP growth. Alternatively, the dependent variable could be the level 
of income, as long as the lagged dependent variable was included in the specification. The 
growth equation had to include at least one tax variable that was measured in units of percent 
                                                          
3 When reported estimates differ in multiple versions of the study, the peer-reviewed journal articles is 
considered as a benchmark. However, if there are additional estimates in previous versions of the study, I kept 
track of the outlet of the study, coded, and then pooled the estimates across versions. 
4 The letter along with the bibliography of the core studies emailed to the prominent authors in this research is 
available in Appendix 2.2 and Appendix 2.3. 




of income. Studies in which the “tax variable” consisted of all revenues, such as the ratio of 
total revenues to GDP, were not included.  This is because they lump together tax and non-
tax revenues. The countries included in a given regression equation had to consist of a full set 
of OECD countries, though they could be restricted to a subset of OECD countries – all, G7, 
EU-15 or a larger set of EU member nations. Further, all studies that included only a single 
country were dropped from this meta-study. To be included, estimates had to include multiple 
countries. The reason being that it was felt that aggregating the growth experiences across 
multiple countries provide the greatest opportunity to generate externally valid results. They 
also offer more degrees of freedom which improves the efficiency of the economic estimates. 
All estimated tax effects had to report standard errors or associated t-statistics/p-values. 
Finally, only studies written in English were included. I closed my search on 13 January 
2016. The final sample of 42 studies is listed in Appendix 2.4.6 
Once the final set of estimates was determined, I then went through each 
equation/estimate and coded a set of regression and study characteristics (more details 
provided in the next section). The coding was done independently by at least two coders with 
a careful reconciliation of any discrepancies or inconsistencies.7 All search and coding 
procedures followed the guidelines for the reporting of MRA studies (Stanley et al., 2013). 
2.3. Factors that Cause Tax Estimates to Differ Across Studies 
The government budget constraint. To estimate the precise effects of taxes on economic 
growth it is important to address a number of issues. The first and foremost is how to deal 
with the government budget constraint: 
0 = 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 − 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠                                           (2.2)      
                                                          
6 Appendix 2.5 clarifies the steps which is undertaken to reach to the 42 final studies.  
7 The two plus coders includes myself, a PhD student recruited as a research assistant, and Prof. Reed to provide 




The following specification is obtained by dividing both sides by 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒: 









),                                                    (2.3) 




The regression coefficient can be misinterpreted easily if one ignores the role of the 
government budget constraint. The main argument is that the regression coefficient on α1 in 
Equation (2.1) should be interpreted as the growth effect of tax financed by the omitted 




) is omitted, then α1 measures the net effect of an increase in 
expenditures funded by taxes. Alternatively, if (
𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
) is omitted and expenditures are held 
constant, then 𝛼1 measures the net effect of an increase in taxes used to cut the deficit (or 
increase the surplus).   
The interpretation becomes even more complicated once taxes and expenditures are 
decomposed into their parts: distortionary versus non-distortionary taxes; productive versus 
unproductive expenditures. Table 2.1 summerizes the predicted tax-growth effects once one 
categorizes taxes and public expenditures into its components. 
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       Source: Adapted from Gemmell et al., 2009. 
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
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) is omitted, the coefficient on the non-distortionary tax rate 
variable measures the net effect of an increase in productive expenditures funded by an 
increase in non-distortionary taxes. As discussed below, it is generally accepted that growth 




is omitted, the coefficient on the distortionary tax rate variable measures the net effect of an 
increase in unproductive expenditures funded by an increase in distortionary taxes. In this 
case, a negative value for 𝛼1 would be expected. As a result, the two “tax rate” variables 
might legitimately produce opposite signs by virtue of the kind of tax variable that is being 
investigated, and depending on which other variables in the government budget constraint are 
omitted. 
To address this issue, I go through each estimated tax effect and identify both the 
operative tax types and the use of the tax revenues implied by the government budget 
constraint. Tax types and expenditures are then categorized as distortionary/non-
distortionary, productive/unproductive, or other according to the taxonomy provided in 
Table 2.2, taken from Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999).8  
 
 
                                                          
8 I use the Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999) taxonomy because it is broadly representative of the fiscal 
policy literature. It may be best thought of as representing relative categories. Distortionary taxes are those 




Table 2.2: Matching of Functional and Theoretical Classifications 
Functional classification Theoretical classification 
Taxation on income and profit 
Distortionary taxation 
 
Social security contributions 
Taxation on payroll and manpower 
Taxation on property 
Taxation on domestic goods and services Non-distortionary taxations 




Other tax revenues 
General public services expenditure 
Productive expenditures 
 




Transport and communication expenditure 
Social security and welfare expenditure 
Unproductive expenditures 
 
Expenditure on recreation 
Expenditure on economic services 
Other expenditures (unclassified) Other expenditures 
 
 Note: The categorizations in the table are taken from Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999). 
 
Table 2.3 summarizes the predicted effect of distortionary/non-distortionary taxes on 
economic growth given the omitted fiscal category. This is taken from Gemmell, Kneller, and 




sample. Accordingly, every estimated tax effect in my sample is assigned a predicted effect 
with respect to its impact on growth (negative, positive, or ambiguous/zero). 
Table 2.3: Predicted Tax Effects 
Type of Tax Omitted Fiscal Category Predicted Effect 
Distortionary Productive Expenditures Ambiguous 
Distortionary Unproductive expenditures Negative 
Distortionary All the expenditures(Pro&Unpro) Ambiguous 
Distortionary Other Expenditures Ambiguous 
Distortionary Deficit/Surplus Ambiguous 
Distortionary Other Revenue Ambiguous 
Distortionary Distortionary Taxes Ambiguous 
Distortionary Non-distortionary Taxes Negative 
Distortionary Intergovernmental Revenue Ambiguous 
Distortionary Net Utility Expenditures Ambiguous 
Non-distortionary Productive Expenditures Positive 
Non-distortionary Unproductive Expenditures Ambiguous 
Non-distortionary Productive & Unproductive Expenditures Ambiguous 
Non-distortionary Other Expenditures Ambiguous 
Non-distortionary Deficit/Surplus Positive 
Non-distortionary Other Revenue Ambiguous 
Non-distortionary Distortionary Taxes Positive 
Non-distortionary Non-distortionary Taxes Ambiguous 
Non-distortionary Intergovernmental Revenue Ambiguous 
Non-distortionary Net Utility Expenditures Ambiguous 
 
Note: The categorizations in the table are taken from Gemmell, Kneller, and Sanz (2009), where I combine 





There is another possible classification, in this case according to tax types. Taxes are 
classified as Labour taxes, Capital taxes, Consumption taxes, Mixed taxes, Other taxes, and 
Overall taxes. The classification system for assigning each tax to a tax type is presented in 
Table 2.4.  
       Table 2.4: Types of Taxes 
Tax Type Examples 
Labour 
Personal income tax 
Payroll tax  
Social security contributions 
Capital 
Corporate income tax  
Capital tax (tax on dividends) 
Consumption 
Consumption tax  
Taxes on goods and services  
Sales tax  
Value added tax (VAT)  
International trade tax 
Other tax 
Property tax 
Taxes not listed above 
Mixed tax Taxes that are a combination of the above types 
Overall tax Total taxes (e.g., Total Tax Revenues/GDP) 
 
Units of measurement. The second issue that deserves careful attention is the units of 
measurement for both economic growth (𝑔) and tax rate (𝑡𝑟) variables. Each of these 
variables can be measured in percentage points (e.g., 10%) or in decimals (0.1). This will 
clearly effect the size of the tax coefficient, 𝛼1. For example, if a one-percentage point 
increase in the tax rate lowers growth by 0.1%, and if both 𝑔 and 𝑡𝑟 are measured in 
percentage points, or both are measured in decimals, then the corresponding value of 𝛼1 will 




the corresponding value of 𝛼1 should be multiplied by 100 and therefore the corresponding 
effect will be -10. And if 𝑔 is measured in decimals, and 𝑡𝑟 is measured in percentage points, 
then the value of 𝛼1 should be divided by 100 and therefore the corresponding effect will be -
0.001. Accordingly, I adjust all estimated effects so that 𝛼1 = 𝑋 means that a one-percentage 
point increase in the tax rate is associated with an X percentage point increase in economic 
growth. If the original study lacks summary/descriptive statistics or the proper interpretation 
of the estimated results, it would be then difficult to determine the measurement units. In 
these cases, I contacted the author(s) to cross check the units. Those estimates were dropped 
from my analysis in the rare cases (one study) where I was unable to locate the author(s), or 
they did not respond to my emails. 
Countries. The third issue has to do with the specific countries included in a given 
study. While the countries considered as an OECD member are fairly homogeneous, this 
grouping also involves developing countries such as Turkey. OECD membership is granted 
on the basis of both (i) economic performance and (ii) democratic and institutional 
development.  Heterogeneities across OECD countries may yield systematically different 
results. Some of the studies available in the literature limit their sample to a sub-set of OECD 
countries including G-7, EU-15, and EU, with the idea that those subsets consist of more 
homogeneous countries. Appendix 2.6 lists the 34 OECD countries, ordered by their year of 
admission to the OECD.9 This meta-regression analysis controls for these different groupings 
to identify whether the estimated tax effects vary systematically across the different sets of 
countries included in the original studies. 
Duration of time periods. A fourth issue concerns the time frames of the data employed 
in the original studies. If the time periods of Equation (2.1) differ across studies, that could 
                                                          




cause estimates of 𝛼1 to differ, even when the underlying effect is the same. For example, 
suppose there were two growth studies, one used 5-year time periods, the other used annual 
data. Suppose the former measured the cumulative rate of growth over each five-year period, 
while the latter reported annual growth rates. All things constant, one might expect 𝛼1 to be 
larger in the former case. Accordingly, I adjust all growth measures to be (average) annual 
rates of growth. 
Duration of estimated tax effects. Since most growth models agree that tax-growth 
effects occur in the short-run, the distinction between short-, medium-, and long-run effects 
of tax may explain discrepancies observed in the literature. Thus, a fifth issue has to do with 
the duration of the estimated tax effect as implied by the specification of the regression 
equation. Let the estimated relationship between growth, 𝑔, and the tax rate variable, tr, be 
given by the finite distributed lag model, 
𝑔𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑡𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑡𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑡.                                                                                         (2.5) 
If this is the model estimated by the original study, then 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 represent the “short-
run/immediate” effects of a one-percentage point increase in taxes in years t and t-1 on 
economic growth in year t.   
By adding and subtracting 𝛼2𝑡𝑟𝑡 to the right hand side, one can rewrite the above as:  
𝑔𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜏 𝑡𝑟𝑡 − 𝛼2∆𝑡𝑟𝑡 + 𝑡,                                                                                            (2.6) 
where 𝜏 = (𝛼1 + 𝛼2). If this is the model estimated in the original study, then the coefficient 
on the current tax rate, 𝜏, represents the “cumulative/intermediate” effect of a one-percentage 
point increase in taxes in year t and t-1 on economic growth in year t.   




𝑔𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑡𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑡𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝑡.                                                                           (2.7) 
Subtracting 𝑔𝑡−1 from both sides gives: 
∆𝑔𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑡𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑡𝑟𝑡−1 + (𝛾 − 1)𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝑡,                                                              (2.8) 
which can be rewritten in error correction form as:  
∆𝑔𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛿(𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝜃𝑡𝑟𝑡) − 𝛼2∆𝑡𝑟𝑡 + 𝑡 ,                                                                       (2.9) 
where 𝛿 = (𝛾 − 1) and 𝜃 =  
(𝛼1+𝛼2)
(1−𝛾)
. This specification is common in recent mean group and 
pooled mean group studies of economic growth. In Equation (2.9), the coefficient on 𝑡𝑟𝑡 in 
the cointegrating equation, 𝜃, represents the total, long-run effect of a permanent, one-
percentage point increase in the tax rate on steady-state economic growth.10   
Specifications (2.5), (2.6), and (2.9) lead to three different measures of the effect of 
taxes on economic growth. My meta-regression analysis controls for this by noting the 
specification of the growth equation in the original study and categorizing the duration of the 
estimated tax effect as short-run, medium-run, or long-run. 
Different measures for economic growth and tax rates. A final issue to be addressed is 
how the primary studies define the tax rate and economic growth variables. While some 
studies use nominal GDP as a measure of economic growth, others use real GDP. I keep track 
of both measures, however, because as long as a given study applied the nominal GDP (in log 
form) and also included time dummies then there is no distinction between nominal and real 
GDP. Per capita GDP and total GDP are the other forms of measuring economic growth in 
                                                          
10 I have noticed that Equation (2.9) is sometimes estimated using an equivalent, alternative specification:   




the literature. One of the main challenges faced by empirical studies investigating the effects 
of tax is how to identify an accurate measure of tax rates (Mendoza et al., 1997). Since 
economic decisions depend on the marginal effective tax rate, this measure is more 
appropriate for examining the tax-growth effects. However, marginal effective tax rates are 
not observable and there is no obvious estimate of them. Therefore, several proxies have been 
proposed in the literature. The most commonly used proxy is “tax burden” defined as tax 
revenues over a given measure of income. But this specification creates a potential 
collinearity with government expenditures (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). The other available 
alternatives are average effective tax rates and statutory tax rates - typically the top marginal 
rate. These are more sophisticated measures. The last two measures are believed to perform 
better as opposed to the former in capturing the complexity of the tax system. And some 
studies attempt to distinguish marginal from average tax rates. I use dummy variables to 
indicate the specific measures underlying a given estimate. 
Control variables. In addition to the issues explained earlier, I code many other study 
characteristics. These include estimation methods, types of standard errors, whether the 
original study was published in a peer-reviewed journal, the publication date, the sample 
period length, the midyear of the sample period, and whether specific variables such as 
country fixed effects, human capital, trade openness, inflation, and others are included in the 
estimating equations. A full list of the variables used in this study is discussed in the next 
section. 
2.4. Empirical Analysis 
Preliminary analysis. My search strategy identified 42 comparable empirical studies that offer 
regression based estimates of tax-growth effects. By coding various characteristics discussed 




descriptive statistics for both these estimates and the associated t-statistics.11 For the full 
dataset, the median estimated tax effect is -0.073, implying that a ten percentage point 
increase in the tax rate is associated with a 0.73 percentage point decrease in annual 
economic growth. This should be compared to an average, annual growth rate for OECD 
countries of approximately 2.5 percent over the period 1970-2000, a period which roughly 
corresponds to the “average” sample period of the studies included in this meta-regression 
analysis.12,13 The median t-statistic is -1.27.   
Table 2.5 indicates that the estimated tax effects reported in primary studies range from 
a minimum of -3.52 to a maximum of 12.72. The max value seems unreasonable given the 
annual average growth rate of 2.5 percent. It suggests that a one percentage point increase in 
the tax rate is associated with over a 12 percentage point increase in annual growth rate, 
ceteris paribus. I check other unreasonable estimates to avoid any potential coding errors. 
Some of the primary studies report estimates that could be considered, in the context of the 
average growth rate, outliers. These outlier estimates can lead to inflated error rates and 
substantial distortion of the coefficients and their associated statistical significance, so I 
delete the top and bottom 5 percent of estimates and as a result obtain a sample including 641 
tax effects. Accordingly, the subsequent analysis works with a truncated sample of estimates 
(641 estimates) rather than initial full set (713 estimates). 
The descriptive statistics for the truncated sample are also reported in Table 2.5. The 
range of estimated tax effects for this sample is from a minimum of -0.524 to a maximum of 
0.166 which seems reasonable. The median t-statistic still indicates insignificance, while the 
                                                          
11 Excel spreadsheet that allows the user to replicate all the results of Table 2.5 through 2.11 can be downloaded 
from Dataverse:  https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/KNQEYB. 
12 This is calculated by taking the average beginning and average ending dates for the sample ranges of the 
respective studies. 
13 Growth rate is the average, annual growth rate over the period 1970-2000 for the 22 countries that belonged to 




sample of t-statistics ranges from a minimum of -14.50 to a maximum of 7.78, with a mean 
absolute value of 2.09. 
Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics for Estimated Effects and t-statistics 
 Estimated Tax Effects t-statistics 
 Full Truncated Full Truncated 
Mean -0.097 -0.109 2.16* 2.09* 
Median -0.073 -0.073 -1.27 -1.32 
Minimum -3.520 -0.524 -14.50 -14.50 
Maximum 12.720 0.166 8.03 7.78 
Std. Dev. 0.649 0.147 2.49 2.35 
1% -1.320 -0.480 -7.91 -8.29 
5% -0.530 -0.420 -6.17 -6.18 
10% -0.411 -0.342 -4.72 -4.72 
90% 0.078 0.041 1.07 0.67 
95% 0.167 0.082 1.67 1.25 
99% 0.820 0.143 4.59 3.09 
Obs 713 641 713 641 
 
Figure 2.1 plots the estimated tax of the truncated sample. If tax effects were 
homogeneous across studies and sampling error is the only reason making the estimated 
effects differ, one would then expect a bell-shaped (standard) histogram. However, as can be 
clearly seen in Figure 2.1 this is not the case, implying that the distribution is skewed towards 
negative values. This histogram can also be used to identify if there is any publication 
selection in the literature. Lack of symmetry in this plot suggests that there might be 
publication selection bias towards negative estimates. The results from this simple visual test 















             
            Figure 2.1: Histogram of Estimated Tax Effects (Truncated) 
 
Figure 2.2 depicts a forest plot of the respective studies using a “Fixed Effects” 
weighting scheme. Note that the concept of both “Fixed Effects” and “Random Effects” in 
the meta-regression analysis context is quite different from the definitions used in the panel 
data literature (Reed, 2015). In the current context it simply means that the estimated tax 
effects are weighted by the inverse of their standard errors. For each study, a weighted 
average along with a 95 percent confidence interval is computed.  
Looking at Figure 2.2, there are a couple of points which deserve particular attention. 
First, most of the studies estimate small effects with tight confidence intervals, although, 
study 39 (Abd Hakim et al., 2013) is a notable exception with respect to the confidence 
intervals. Second, there is a large amount of heterogeneity across studies, given the large 𝐼2 
computed and represented at the bottom of this figure (Higgins and Thompson, 2002). As 
discussed earlier, there are several reasons that may explain why this is the case. These 
include different measures of tax rate and economic growth, how primary studies deal with 

















countries, differences in estimation methods applied, whether the effect is short-, medium, or 
long-run and so on. The large value of 𝐼2 suggests that the heterogeneity across studies is far 
beyond just sampling error.14  
Third, the last column calculates the percentage weight assigned to each study in 
calculating the overall weighted average. Study 26 (Hanson, 2010) is weighted substantially 
larger than all the other studies combined (81.39% versus 18.61%). The disproportionately 
large weight assigned to study number 26 is not a real concern as long as this study is truly 
more reliable. However, it might be a good reason to switch to the “Random Effects” 
weighting scheme.  
                                                          
14 𝐼2measures heterogeneity, 𝐼2 = 𝜎ℎ
2/(𝜎ℎ
2 + 𝜎𝜀





Figure 2.2: Forrest Plot of Studies (Fixed Effects) 
 
The general assumption under the “Fixed Effects” framework is that there is an 
identical true effect size across all studies included in an MRA, and the only reason estimates 




studies receive substantially more weight, because their “signal” is less distorted by “noise,” 
since the estimates are more precise. In this framework, the optimal weight to assign each 
estimate is the inverse of its standard error.  
In contrast, the general assumption under the “Random Effects” framework is that there 
is not just one true effect but a distribution of effects. This means that we cannot simply 
ignore a small study by assigning a smaller weight because these studies provide valuable 
information about the distribution of effects. Note that the weight implemented in the 
“Random Effects” model consists of two parts: (i) within-study variances (same as FE), and 
(ii) between-study variances (Borenstein et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, the subsequent empirical work in this chapter emphasizes the “Random 
Effects” estimates where tax effects are weighted by their standard error (within-study 
heterogeneity) plus another term that captures the between-study heterogeneity. This will 
have the effect of equalizing the weights given to individual studies because cross-study 
heterogeneity is so great. Figure 2.3 displays the forest plot using “Random Effects”. The 


















The distribution of the reported estimates is illustrated in Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 in a 
form of a funnel plot. The funnel plot is a scatter diagram of effect sizes (here regression 
coefficients of the tax rate variable) versus some measure of their precision, typically the 
inverse of the standard error (1 𝑆𝐸𝑖⁄ ). It can be used as a simple visual tool to identify if there 
is any publication selection bias available in the literature (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2010). 
It also provides further insight into the distribution of estimated tax effects. 
Figure 2.4 displays individual estimates. In Figure 2.5 each study is represented by a single 
point relating its mean estimate to its mean standard error.15  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Funnel Plot (All Estimates) 
 
                                                          
15 Both funnel plots omit observations where the standard error is greater than 1. This allows one to better 





Figure 2.5: Funnel Plot (Mean of Study Estimates) 
 
The solid line in both plots indicates the mean of estimated tax effects, and the dash 
lines that fan out from the top of the funnel shows the 95% confidence area where most of the 
estimates would fall if the dispersion in estimates was driven solely by sampling error. 
Publication bias is indicated whenever a disproportionate number of estimates lie on one side 
of the inverted, V-shaped confidence area. Both funnel plots suggest there is publication bias 
in favour of negative estimates. Further, the wide dispersion at the top of the funnel is 
consistent with substantial heterogeneity previously shown by the 𝐼2 value reported with the 
forest plot. 
FAT/PET tests. Table 2.6 reports the results of two tests: the Funnel Asymmetry Test 
(FAT) which is a conventional way to detect whether the literature suffers from publication 
selection bias (Egger et al., 1997; Stanley, 2008), and the Precision Effect Test (PET), which 
tests for the significance of the overall effect (Stanley and Doucoulliagos,2012; Shemilt et al., 
2011). Both tests are obtained from estimating the following specification using weighted 




?̂?1,𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗,                                                                                                           (2.10) 
where ?̂?1,𝑖𝑗 is the estimated tax effect from regression j in study i. The null hypotheses for the 
FAT and PET are 𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0 and 𝐻0: 𝛽0 = 0, respectively.   
My analysis uses four different weights to estimate Equation (2.10). The “Fixed 









where 𝜏2 is the estimated variance of population tax effect across studies. This set of weights 
ignores the fact that some studies report more estimates compared to others. As a result, a 
study including 10 estimates would be weighted 10 times more than a study including one 
single estimate, ceteris paribus. To address this issue, I multiply both sets of weights by the 
inverse of the number of estimates reported per study, (
1
𝑁𝑖
). Doing so, I assign each given 
study approximately the same weight as others even though the number of reported estimates 
differs from one study to another. Thus, “Weight 1” refers to the standard weighting scheme 
in which the number of reported estimates matter and studies with higher number of estimates 



























































Observations 641 641 641 641 641 641 
 
Note: Values in Row (1) and Row (2) come from estimating 𝛽1 and 𝛽0, respectively, in Equation (2.10) in the text. In both 
cases, the top value is the coefficient estimate, and the bottom value in parentheses is the associated t-statistic. The four 
WLS estimators (Fixed Effects-Weight1, Fixed Effects-Weight2, Random Effects-Weight1, and Random Effects-Weight2) 
are described in the “FAT/PET tests” subsection of Section 2.4 in the text. All four of the estimation procedures calculate 
cluster robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, respectively. 
 
Heteroskedasticity is always an issue for meta-regression analysis, because the original 
estimates, which are the dependent variable, come from very different datasets with different 
sample sizes and different estimation techniques. Thus, some variation of weighted least 
squares (WLS) should always be employed. Furthermore, authors in this literature typically 
report multiple estimates and therefore estimates within the study cannot be assumed 
independent. To account for these data complexities, the first four columns of Table 2.6 
report the results of estimating Equation (2.10) using WLS with respect to the four different 
weighting schemes described above, and calculating cluster robust standard errors, with 
clustering by study. The FAT is reported in the first row. For all four estimators, the null 
hypothesis of no publication bias is rejected at the 1 percent level of significance. The 
negative coefficients imply that there is a selection bias in favour of negative estimated tax 
                                                          




effects, perhaps due to researchers choosing to disproportionately report negative estimates, 
or reviewers in peer-reviewed journals discriminating against positive results. These results 
are consistent with earlier visual inspection of the estimated effects histogram and also the 
visual evidence of publication bias from the funnel plots represented in Figure 2.4 and 2.5. 
The first four columns of the second row of Table 2.6 report the PET. All four 
estimators show that the overall tax effect, controlling for publication bias, is statistically 
insignificant and relatively small in economic terms. According to the “Random Effects 
(Weight1)”, a 10-percentage point increase in the tax rate is associated with a 0.01 percentage 
point decrease in annual GDP growth, ceteris paribus.  
The last two columns report random effects estimates of Equation (2.10) when the 
publication bias term (𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗) is not included, so that the overall estimate is not corrected for 
publication bias. The corresponding estimates of the overall tax effects are now substantially 
larger in absolute value (compared to previous results), and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. According to the “Random Effects (Weight1) in Column (5), a 10-percentage 
point increase in the tax rate is associated with a 0.65 percentage point decrease in annual 
GDP growth.  These results indicate that the statistically and economically significant results 
reported in the literature are influenced by negative publication bias. Once one controls for 
that, the estimated tax-growth effect is substantially smaller and statistically insignificant. As 
a result, I want to be sure that my subsequent analysis corrects for this. 
This section has addressed one of the main objectives of this research, to obtain an 
“overall estimate” of the effect of taxes on economic growth in OECD countries. I find that 
once I correct and accommodate for publication bias then the overall effect on taxes is 




discussion on factors that cause tax estimates to differ across studies (cf. Section III) makes 
clear that any estimate of overall tax effects is not particularly meaningful. The same fiscal 
policy intervention can be estimated as a positive or negative tax effect depending on the 
omitted fiscal categories from the primary study’s regression equation. Accordingly, the next 
section undertakes a meta-regression that allows tax effects to vary systematically according 
to study and data characteristics. 
 Meta-regression. Section 2.3 identified factors that may cause heterogeneity in the 
reported estimates. In this section I compare tax effects associated with fiscal policies that are 
predicted to have negative growth effects with those predicted to have positive effects.  I also 
investigate whether some types of taxes are more growth-retarding than others. To do that, it 
will be necessary to control for the factors that may influence estimates of tax effects. 
Table 2.7 reports the variables used in the subsequent meta-regression analysis. The 
first set of variables were previously discussed and match each tax effect to a prediction. A 
little more than a fourth of the estimated tax effects allow a definite sign prediction, with 22.8 
percent predicted to be negative, 5.9 percent predicted to be positive, and the rest ambiguous. 
As these three variables comprise the full set of possibilities, at least one variable must be 
omitted in the empirical analysis. Here and elsewhere in the table, I indicate the omitted 
variable with an asterisk.  
The second set of variables assigns each tax effect to one of six types of taxes (Labour, 
Capital, Consumption, Other, Mixed, and Overall). The most common tax variable is 
constructed by taking the ratio of total tax revenues over GDP. Approximately 34.5 percent 
of tax effects are of this type. However, many studies disaggregate tax effects into separate 
types. For example, 18.6 percent of estimated tax effects involve Labour taxes (e.g., personal 




associated with Capital taxes (e.g., corporate income taxes, taxes on capital gains and 
dividends) and 13.3 percent are related to Consumption taxes (e.g., ad valorem taxes on 
goods and services, VAT). The remainder of tax effects mostly involve a mix of different 
types of taxes.   
Other variables are grouped according to the following categories: Country Group, 
Economic Growth Measure, Tax Variable Measure, Duration of Tax Effect, etc. Most of the 
observed tax effects are estimated using data from the larger set of OECD countries (78.8%), 
as opposed to smaller groupings such as the G-7 countries (11.7%) or EU countries (6.4% 
and 3.1%). In most cases economic growth is measured in per capita terms (74.1%). Most 
taxes are measured as average rather than marginal rates (91.0% versus 9.0%); are specified 
in level rather than differenced form (82.8% versus 17.2%); and are effective rather than 
statutory tax rates (90.6% versus 9.4%). Most estimated tax effects measure the immediate 
effect of a tax change (70.2%) versus a medium- or long-run effect (5.3% and 24.5%).   
Two thirds of the estimated tax effects in my meta-regression come from peer-reviewed 
journal articles and the mean year of publication was 2007. Almost all of the original studies 
used panel data to estimate tax effects (99.1%). The average sample length in the original 
studies was 31.4 years, and the average mid-point was 1985. About two-thirds of the tax 
effects were estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or a related procedure that 
assumed errors to be independently and identically distributed across observations (such as 
mean group or pooled mean group procedures). Of the remainder, 15.4 percent used 
Generalized Laest Squares (GLS), and 16.8 percent attempted to correct for endogeneity 
using a procedure such as Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) or Generalized Method of 




I categorized standard errors into three groupings because the standard error plays such 
a significant role in meta-regression analysis: SE-OLS (58.7%); SE-HET (24.5%), where 
standard errors were estimated using a heteroskedastic-robust estimator; and SE-Other 
(16.8%), whenever allowance was made for off-diagonal terms in the error variance-
covariance matrix to be nonzero. Lastly, dummy variables were used to indicate the presence 
of important control variables, the most common of which were country fixed effects 
(83.3%), and measures of investment (58.5%), initial income (55.9%), human capital such as 




Table 2.7: Summary Statistics of Study Characteristics 
Variable Description Mean Min Max 
PREDICTED TAX EFFECTS 
Prediction-Negative =1, if the theoretical prediction of the coefficient is negative  0.228 0 1 
Prediction-Ambiguous* =1, if the theoretical prediction of the coefficient is ambiguous 0.713 0 1 
Prediction-Positive =1, if the theoretical prediction of the coefficient is positive 0.059 0 1 
TAX TYPE 
Labour-Tax =1, if labour tax 0.186 0 1 
Capital-Tax =1, if capital tax 0.125 0 1 
Consumption-Tax* =1, if consumption tax 0.133 0 1 
Other-Tax  =1, if other type of tax 0.005 0 1 
Mixed-Tax =1, if multiple tax types (but not overall tax) 0.207 0 1 
Overall-Tax =1, if overall tax 0.345 0 1 
COUNTRY GROUP 
G-7 =1, if G7 countries 0.117 0 1 
EU-15 =1, if EU-15 countries 0.064 0 1 
EU =1, if EU countries but not EU-15 0.031 0 1 
OECD* =1, if OECD countries but not G7, EU-15, or EU 0.788 0 1 
ECONOMIC GROWTH MEASURE 
GDP =1, if dependent variable is GDP growth 0.259 0 1 
PC-GDP* =1, if dependent variable is per capita GDP growth 0.741 0 1 
TAX VARIABLE MEASURE 
Marginal =1, if marginal tax rate (as opposed to average tax rate) 0.090 0 1 
Differenced =1, if change in tax rate (as opposed to level of tax rate) 0.172 0 1 
ETR =1, if effective tax rate (as opposed to statutory tax rate) 0.906 0 1 
DURATION OF TAX EFFECT 
Short-run* =1, if tax variable measures immediate/short-run effect 0.702 0 1 
Medium-run =1, if tax variable measures cumulative/medium-run effect 0.053 0 1 




Variable Description Mean Min Max 
STUDY TYPE 
Peer-reviewed =1, if study published in peer-reviewed journal 0.661 0.48 0.75 
Publication Year Year in which the last version of study was “published.” 2007 1993 2015 
DATA TYPE 
Cross-section =1, if data are cross-sectional.  0.009 0 1 
Panel* =1, if data are panel 0.991 0 1 
Length Length of sample time period 31.4 5 40 
Mid-Year Midpoint of the sample time period 1985 1970.5 2004.5 
ESTIMATION TYPE 
OLS* =1, if OLS estimator is used. 0.677 0 1 
GLS =1, if Generalized Least Squares estimator is used. 0.154 0 1 
TSLS/GMM =1, if estimator corrects for endogeneity, e.g. 2SLS, 3SLS, or GMM.  0.168 0 1 
STANDARD ERROR TYPE 
SE-OLS* =1, if OLS standard error is considered. 0.587 0 1 
SE-HET =1, if heteroskedasticity standard error is considered. 0.245 0 1 
SE-Other =1, if both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation standard error are considered. 0.168 0 1 
INCLUDED VARIABLES 
Initial income =1, if initial level of income included 0.559 0 1 
Lagged DV =1, if lagged dependent variable included 0.167 0 1 
CountryFE =1, if the country fixed effects are included 0.833 0 1 
Investment =1, if investment included 0.585 0 1 
Trade Openness =1, if trade openness included 0.170 0 1 
Human Capital =1, if human capital included 0.440 0 1 
Population Growth =1, if population growth included 0.243 0 1 
Employment Growth =1, if employment growth included 0.378 0 1 
Unemployment =1, if unemployment rate included 0.090 0 1 
Inflation =1, if inflation rate included 0.131 0 1 
 
Note: The grouped variables include all possible categories, where the categories omitted in the subsequent analysis are indicated by an asterisk, where applicable. 
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In my investigation of tax effects, I adopt the following empirical procedure. First I 
separate out the two sets of tax variables: Prediction-Negative and Prediction-Positive; and 
Labour-Tax, Capital-Tax, Other-Tax, Mixed-Tax, and Overall-Tax. I do this because the two 
sets of tax variables are significantly correlated. For example, Labour and Capital taxes are 
significantly associated with tax policies that are predicted to have negative effects. I then 
combine the two sets of tax variables to check for robustness.   
For each set of regressions, I also include two sets of control variables. The top panel of 
each of the following tables reports the regression results when all control variables are 
included in the equation. The bottom panel reports the results when a stepwise procedure is 
used to select control variables, even while the tax variables are fixed to remain in each 
equation.17 Since the tax variables are locked into each regression, the use of the stepwise 
procedure does not invalidate testing for their significance. All regressions also include the 
publication bias variable, SE, and thus control for publication bias. 
The results of this analysis are given in Table 2.8 through Table 2.10. Table 2.8 reports 
the results when the prediction variables (Prediction-Negative and Prediction-Positive) are 
included in the meta-regression, while holding out the tax type variables. Across all four 
estimation procedures, and for both sets of control variables, I estimate a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient for the variable Prediction-Negative, and a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for Prediction-Positive. These results are consistent with 
the predictions of growth theory. 
 
 
                                                          
17 I use a backwards stepwise regression procedure that selects variables so as to minimize the Schwarz 
Information Criterion. I employed the user-written, Stata program vselect to implement the stepwise procedure. 
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Note: The top panel reports the results of estimating Equation (2.10) with the addition of the two 
tax variables, Prediction-Negative and Prediction-Positive. The bottom panel adds control 
variables selected through a backwards stepwise regression procedure that selects variables so as 
to minimize the Schwarz Information Criterion (see Footnote #12). The top value in each cell is 
the coefficient estimate, and the bottom value in parentheses is the associated t-statistic. The four 
WLS estimators (Fixed Effects-Weight1, Fixed Effects-Weight2, Random Effects-Weight1, and 
Random Effects-Weight2) are described in the “FAT/PET tests” subsection of Section 2.4 in the 
text. All four estimation procedures calculate cluster robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate 












































































































































Note: The top panel reports the results of estimating Equation (2.10) with the addition of the five 
tax variables, Labour, Capital, Other, Mixed, and Overall taxes. The bottom panel adds control 
variables selected through a backwards stepwise regression procedure that selects variables so as 
to minimize the Schwarz Information Criterion (see Footnote #12). The top value in each cell is 
the coefficient estimate, and the bottom value in parentheses is the associated t-statistic. The four 
WLS estimators (Fixed Effects-Weight1, Fixed Effects-Weight2, Random Effects-Weight1, and 
Random Effects-Weight2) are described in the “FAT/PET tests” subsection of Section 2.4 in the 
text. All four estimation procedures calculate cluster robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate  
















































































































































































The results are only slightly less supportive of growth theory when the tax type 
variables are added to the specification. Table 2.10 reports the corresponding estimates. The 
coefficient for Prediction-Negative remains negative and statistically significant across all 
four estimation procedures. Prediction-Positive is positive and statistically significant in the 
two random effects regressions (Columns 3 and 4), but insignificant in the two fixed effects 
regressions (Columns 1 and 2). As noted above, I consider the random effects estimator to be 
more reliable, so that the results from Table 2.10 are generally consistent with those from 
Table 2.8. 
Not only do these findings constitute general statistical support in favour of the 
predictions of growth theory, but the respective coefficients indicate that tax policy can have 
a substantial economic impact. For example, the difference between the coefficients for 
Prediction-Negative and Prediction-Positive range from a minimum of 0.027 (Table 2.10, 
Bottom panel, Column 1) to a maximum of 0.194 (Table 2.8, Bottom panel, Column 4), with 
a midpoint value of approximately 0.11.  
Let me now consider the following thought experiment. Suppose fiscal policy 
underwent the following policy switch:  distortionary taxes and unproductive expenditures 
were reduced by 10 percentage points while, simultaneously, non-distortionary taxes and 
productive expenditures were increased by the same amount.  Using a point estimate of 0.11, 
my meta-regression results indicate that this would increase annual growth of GDP by 1.1 
percentage points.  As noted above, the average annual growth rate for OECD countries over 
the sample range of the studies included in this meta-regression analysis was approximately 
2.5 percent. Thus a 1.1 percentage point increase in annual growth would constitute a 
substantial increase.  Admittedly, this thought experiment is an extreme case, both in the 
absolute size of the tax changes and in the swing in fiscal policy from one extreme of the 
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growth pole to the other. Nevertheless, it does indicate that there is a role for tax-based fiscal 
policy to increase economic growth amongst OECD countries.  
The last tax issue addressed in this study investigates whether some types of taxes are 
more growth-retarding than others. As noted in Table 2.2, Labour and Capital taxes are 
commonly classified as distortionary, while Consumption taxes are classified as non-
distortionary.  
Table 2.9 estimates a meta-regression with the tax type variables but with prediction 
variables omitted, while Table 2.10 includes both. As the omitted category is Consumption 
taxes, I expect the coefficient on Labour and Capital taxes to be negative, whereas there is no 
sign expectation for the other tax type coefficients.   
With respect to Labour taxes, the results from Table 2.9 across all four estimation 
procedures and with both sets of control variables show negative and statistically significant 
coefficients. However, when prediction variables are added to the regression (cf. Table 2.10), 
the coefficient on Labour-Tax becomes insignificant in the preferred random effects 
regressions. In terms of economic significance, the estimates range from -0.064 (Table 2.9, 
Top panel, Column 3) to 0.010 (Table 2.10, Bottom panel, Column 4). The more negative 
estimates indicate that raising revenues from Labour taxes rather than Consumption taxes can 
have important growth consequences. However, given that some of the preferred Random 
Effects estimates are statistically insignificant, my overall assessment is that these estimates 
constitute weak evidence that Labour taxes are more growth-retarding than Consumption 
taxes. 
The evidence that Capital taxes are more distortionary than Consumption taxes is even 
weaker. While the coefficients on the Capital-Tax variable are negative in all Table 2.9 
regressions, they are insignificant in the preferred Random Effects estimations. When the 
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prediction variables are added, the respective coefficients are generally insignificant (cf. 
Table 2.10). One of the regressions even produces a significant positive coefficient (bottom 
panel, Random Effects-Weight2). As a result, I conclude that the evidence that Capital taxes 
are more distortionary than Consumption taxes is mixed.  
Bayesian model averaging of control variables. In order to address one of the main 
objectives of this study I now turn to an analysis of the control variables. The problem is that 
other than the two sets of tax variables, there are 28 control variables and it is not clear which 
ones should be included. In other words, multicollinearity may be an issue with the inclusion 
of so many variables. For example, when all 28 variables are included with both sets of tax 
variables and the meta-regression is estimated using the “Random Effects (Weight2)” 
estimator, as in Column (4) of the top panel of Table 2.10, only 5 of the 28 control variables 
are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In contrast, when a general-to-specific (G-
to-S) approach is used -- in this case, backwards selection -- only 9 of the 28 control variables 
are significant (cf. bottom panel of Table 2.10).  Further, one of the variables that is 
significant in the top panel is not significant in the bottom panel’s specification. Thus, 
variable selection matters when trying to determine the effect of various control variables on 
estimated tax effects. 
To tackle the problem of specification uncertainty, I use a technique called Bayesian 
Model Averaging, or BMA (Zeugner, 2011). BMA is not specifically designed for meta-
regression studies. But because model uncertainty is an issue in these studies, it is an 
appropropriate method to apply. BMA runs a vast number of regressions with different 




Table 2.11 reports the results of an analysis where I lock in the tax variables 
Prediction-Negative and Prediction-Positive and then apply BMA to the 28 control variables. 
All specifications adjust for publication bias. The results differ with respect to the estimation 
procedure used. However, they are more consistent across analyses than would be the case, 
say, if I reported the results from specifications that included all variables and those that 
employed stepwise regression. I report results for both the “Fixed Effects (Weight 1)” and 
“Random Effects (Weight 2)” estimators. These two estimators use very different weighting 
schemes. Previous tables indicated that the estimates from these two estimators sometimes 
vary substantially. As a result, they provide an indication of robustness across estimation 
procedures.  
I report three summary measures. For each variable I compute a Posterior Inclusion 
Probability (PIP), which is the sum of posterior model probabilities of the regressions in 
which the variable is included. It can capture how well the model is designed and may be 
compared to the adjusted 𝑅2, or to information criteria. With 28 control variables, there are 
228 potential regressions with various variable specifications. Variables that appear in 
specifications with high likelihood values will have larger PIP values. By construction, every 
variable appears in 50 percent of all possible specifications. However, the PIP can be very 
close to 100 percent if the specifications that include a variable have much greater likelihood 
values than those in which it is omitted. 
The Posterior Mean (Post. Mean) uses the above-mentioned probability values to 
weight the estimated coefficients from each specification. Specifications in which a variable 
is not included assign an “estimated value” of zero to construct the Posterior Mean. Lastly, 
BMA also calculates the probability that a given coefficient has a positive sign (Cond. Pos. 
Sign). This is constructed in the same manner as the Posterior Mean, except that it uses a 
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dummy variable indicating positive values rather than the estimated coefficient in 
constructing a weighted average. 
Table 2.11 uses yellow to highlight all the control variables that: (i) have a PIP greater 
than 50%; (ii) have a Conditional Positive Sign of either 1.00 or 0.00 – indicating that the 
respective coefficient is consistently estimated to be either positive or negative in the most 
likely specifications; and (iii) have the same Conditional Positive Sign value for both the 
Fixed Effects(Weight1) and Random Effects(Weight2) estimators.   
Studies that estimate tax effects for G-7 and EU-15 countries produce consistently less 
negative/more positive estimates than studies that include a large sample of countries from 
the OECD. To place the size of the Posterior Mean values in context, it helpful to recall that 
the median estimated tax effect from Table 2.5 is  -0.073.  By this standard, the effect of 
belonging to a G-7 country is relatively large (0.184 in the FE model and 0.181 in the RE 
model). The effect associated with being a EU-15 member, while still positive, is 
substantially smaller. 
I find that studies that measure economic growth using total GDP (GDP) rather than 
per capita GDP, and that employ a marginal (as opposed to average) measure of tax rates 
(Marginal), generally produce tax effects that are less negative/more positive. Compared to 
the short-run effects of taxes, studies that estimate medium-run tax effects (Medium-run) 
produce estimates of tax effects that are less negative/more positive; while studies that 
estimate long-run, steady-state tax effects (Long-run) produce estimates that are more 
negative/less positive. There is evidence to indicate that more recent studies (Publication 
Year) produce less negative/more positive estimates as do cross-sectional studies (Cross-
section) compared to panel studies. However, there is also evidence that studies using more 
recent data (Mid-Year) find more negative/less positive tax effects.   
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With respect to estimation procedures, studies that use GLS rather than OLS (GLS) 
generally produce more negative/less positive estimates of tax effects. Interestingly, 
correcting for endogeneity (TSLS/GMM) does not appear to have much impact. Meta-
regressions using the Fixed Effects(Weight1) estimator find that studies that employ 
TSLS/GMM generally estimate more negative/less positive effects. Meta-regressions using 
the Random EffectsWeight2) estimator find the opposite. However, in both cases the Posterior 
Mean values are negligibly small (-0.001 and 0.009), suggesting either that tax policy is not 
endogenous or that the instruments that have been employed in previous studies are not 
effective in correcting endogeneity. There is evidence that it makes a difference as to how 
standard errors are calculated, with studies that incorporate serial correlation, cross-sectional 
correlation and the like in calculating standard errors (SE-Other) associated with less 
negative/more positive effects. 
Lastly, I find that studies that include initial income, employment growth, and 
unemployment rates in the growth equations are likely to produce less negative/more positive 
estimates; with studies that include country fixed effects, population growth, and inflation 
producing more negative/less positive tax effects. While the above findings are robust across 
variable specifications and the two estimation procedures, I again emphasize that the sizes of 





     Table 2.11: Bayesian Model Averaging Analysis (Control Variables) 
Variable 
Fixed Effects(Weight1) Random Effects(Weight2) 
PIP Post. Mean Cond. Pos. Sign PIP Post. Mean Cond. Pos. Sign 
G-7 1.00 0.184 1.00 1.00 0.181 1.00 
EU-15 0.97 0.032 1.00 0.99 0.066 1.00 
EU 0.81 0.064 1.00 0.59 0.000 0.56 
GDP 0.99 0.025 1.00 1.00 0.065 1.00 
Marginal 0.80 0.006 1.00 0.76 0.023 1.00 
Differenced 0.84 -0.018 0.01 1.00 -0.096 0.00 
ETR 1.00 0.027 1.00 1.00 -0.091 0.00 
Medium-run 1.00 0.081 1.00 0.98 0.052 1.00 
Long-run 0.99 -0.015 0.00 1.00 -0.079 0.00 
Peer-reviewed 1.00 0.056 1.00 0.63 -0.004 0.00 
Publication Year 0.98 0.004 1.00 1.00 0.009 1.00 
Cross-section 0.76 0.009 1.00 0.73 0.015 1.00 
Length 0.94 -0.002 0.00 0.61 0.000 0.08 




Fixed Effects(Weight1) Random Effects(Weight2) 
PIP Post. Mean Cond. Pos. Sign PIP Post. Mean Cond. Pos. Sign 
GLS 1.00 -0.043 0.00 0.84 -0.021 0.00 
TSLS/GMM 0.73 -0.001 0.00 0.78 0.009 1.00 
SE-HET 0.70 -0.001 0.15 0.73 0.009 1.00 
SE-Other 1.00 0.051 1.00 0.69 0.013 1.00 
Initial income 0.92 0.013 1.00 0.99 0.048 1.00 
Lagged DV 0.89 -0.027 0.00 0.71 0.016 1.00 
Country FE 1.00 -0.047 0.00 1.00 -0.062 0.00 
Investment 0.82 0.004 1.00 0.78 -0.011 0.00 
Trade Openness 0.73 0.003 1.00 0.67 -0.006 0.00 
Human Capital 0.84 0.007 1.00 0.87 -0.013 0.00 
Population Growth 1.00 -0.050 0.00 1.00 -0.074 0.00 
Employment Growth 0.98 0.028 1.00 0.87 0.019 1.00 
Unemployment 1.00 0.066 1.00 1.00 0.046 1.00 





Note: The column headings PIP, Post. Mean, and Cond. Pos. Sign stand for Posterior Inclusion Probability, Posterior Mean, and the likelihood-weighted 
probability that the respective coefficient takes a positive sign. These are described in the “Bayesian model averaging of control variables” subsection of Section 2.4 
in the text. The Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) analysis was done using the R package BMS, described in Zeugner (2011). The WLS estimators Fixed Effects-
Weight1 and Random Effects-Weight2 are described in the “FAT/PET tests” subsection of Section IV. All specifications included the tax variables 
Prediction_Negative and Prediction_Positive, which were forced into all model specifications, and adjusted for publication bias. The table yellow-highlights all the 
control variables that (i) have a PIP greater than 50%; (ii) have a Conditional Positive Sign of either 1.00 or 0.00 – indicating that the respective coefficient is 
consistently estimated to be either positive or negative in the most likely specifications; and (iii) have the same Conditional Positive Sign value for both the Fixed 
Effects(Weight1) and Random Effects(Weight2) estimators.  
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Figure 2.6 provides a visual representation of the BMA analysis for the tax (Prediction-
Negative and Prediction-Positive) and control variables using the Fixed Effects(Weight1) 
estimator.18 The figure reports estimates from the top 1000 models, with most likely models 
ordered from left to right. These 1000 models, out of 1028 possible models, account for a 
cumulative probability of approximately 30 percent. Red (blue) squares indicate that the 
respective coefficient is negative (positive) in the given model. A white square indicates that 
the variable is omitted from that model. A solid band of the same colour across the figure 
indicates that the respective variable is consistently estimated to have the same sign across all 
1000 models. In addition to confirming the results from Table 2.11 the figure also indicates 
the variable specifications of the top models. These closely match the PIP values in 
Table 2.11. The corresponding figure for the Random Effects(Weight2) estimator is quite 














                                                          
18 Note that in the associated specifications, the variable Precision corresponds to the constant term, while the 





Figure 2.6: Visual Representation of BMA Analysis (Fixed Effects-Weight1) 
 
Note: Each column represents a single model. Variables are listed in descending order of posterior inclusion probability (PIP) and have all been weighted according to the 
Fixed Effects – Weight 1 case. Blue (dark) indicates that the variable is included in that model and estimated to be positive. Red (light) indicates the variable is included and 




The effect of taxation on economic growth has been an enduring question. Despite the large 
body of research devoted to taxes and economic growth in OECD countries, the general 
picture that emerged from the empirical evidence is inconclusive. One reason for the 
seemingly contradictory findings is that estimates of tax effects are often estimating different 
things. Because of the government budget constraint, the same tax effect can be estimated to 
be positive or negative, depending on the other fiscal categories omitted from the 
specification. For this and other reasons, it is valuable to collect the estimates from this 
literature and carefully track the differences across studies so that the estimates can be 
combined to provide an overall assessment of the growth effects of taxes.   
This study combines results of 713 estimates from 42 studies, all of which attempt to 
estimate the effect of taxes on economic growth in OECD countries. I drop outlier estimates 
from both top and bottom of the sample range, and apply meta-regression analysis to analyse 
a final sample of 641 estimates. First, there is statistical evidence to support that estimates in 
the literature suffer from negative publication bias. Second, by accommodating and 
correcting for publication bias, the overall effect of taxes on economic growth is negligibly 
small and statistically insignificant. However, this overall effect is not particularly 
meaningful because it lumps together different tax policies.  
Third, to provide a clear picture of the scope of tax policy to effect economic growth, I 
categorize tax policies by their predicted effects on economic growth according to the 
findings in public finance. Once I control for publication bias, increases in unproductive 
expenditures funded by distortionary taxes and/or deficits have a statistically significant, 
negative effect on economic growth. On the contrary, increases in non-distortionary taxes to 
fund productive expenditures and/or government surpluses have a statistically significant, 
positive effect on economic growth. The difference between these “best” and “worst” tax 
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policies can be economically important. For example, using a midpoint estimate from my 
meta-regression analysis, I calculate that if distortionary taxes and unproductive expenditures 
were reduced by 10 percentage points while, simultaneously, non-distortionary taxes and 
productive expenditures were increased by the same amount, the net effect would be an 
increase of 1.1 percentage points in annual GDP growth. While this represents an extreme 
case, both in the absolute size of the tax changes, and in the swing in fiscal policy from one 
extreme of the growth pole to the other, it does indicate that there is scope for tax-based fiscal 
policy to increase economic growth. 
Fourth, with respect to particular types of taxes, I find weak evidence that taxes on 
labour are more growth retarding than other types of taxes. Evidence regarding other types of 
taxes is mixed. Finally, I find evidence that data and study characteristics account for much 
systematic variation in tax estimates across studies, though the effects from any one 
characteristic is generally small. The one exception is that studies that focus their analysis on 
G-7 countries find less negative/more positive tax effects than those that use a wider sample 
of OECD countries. 
One of the great advantages of meta-regression analysis compared to the original 
studies and also narrative reviews is that it can avoid some of the problems associated with 
publication bias and selective reporting of results. Further, it can control for differences 
across studies that might otherwise mask significant effects. It can also add new information 
relevant to the literature (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). This is particularly of interest 
when estimating the effects of tax policy. The results of this study indicate that once these 
factors are taken into account, the combined weight of the evidence from the literature 
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Appendix 2.1: List of Terms Used in Electronic Search by Category 
TAX ECONOMIC GROWTH OECD 
Tax(es) /Tax rate(s)/Taxation Economic growth OECD countries 
Tax policy(policies) Growth EU countries 
Tax ratios Economic indicators G-7 countries 
Tax changes Long-term growth High income OECD countries 
Tax rate change Long-run growth Industrial countries 
Fiscal policy(policies)  Rich countries 
Tax structures/Fiscal structures  Europe 
Fiscal decentralization  Cross-national study 




















Appendix 2.2: Letter to the Authors (OECD) 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
I am a Professor of economics at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand.  We have a 
research team here undertaking a “meta-analysis” of the relationship between taxes and 
economic growth in the OECD countries.   
A thorough meta-analysis involves collecting as many papers as possible on a subject, 
including unpublished research. The latter is known as “grey literature”, and includes 
conference proceedings, reports from research firms or think thanks, theses and dissertations, 
etc. The unpublished literature is particularly important for addressing publication bias. 
In this context, I am asking for your help.  
Attached to this email is a listing of research on the topic of taxes and economic growth in the 
OECD countries. To be included, the research had to (i) include data from OECD countries 
(ii) have a dependent variable that was the growth of per capita personal income (PCPI) or 
GDP, and (iii) include one or more measures of taxes. 
I am contacting you because you have researched in this area in the past. 
Would you please look over this list and see if there are any notable omissions?  I have 
broken the list down to the following categories: (i) journal articles, (ii) conference 
proceedings, (iii) studies from think tanks and research firms, (iv) theses/dissertations, and 
(v) working papers and unpublished research.   
The last two categories are especially difficult to get information on.  I would be greatly 
appreciative if you could identify any research we may have omitted. 
Finally, if you are aware of any researchers who are currently researching in this area, it 
would be great if you could reply back with their names, and I will follow up with them 
directly. 
I am sure you would agree that the subject of taxes and economic growth in OECD countries 
is very important.  There is now a substantial enough literature that a careful meta-analysis 
can help to organize an empirical consensus of the existing literature. 
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36 Volkerink et al. (2002)  Journal  26 
37 Widmalm (2001) Journal  6 
38 Xing (2011)  Working Paper  34 
39 Abd Hakim et al. (2013) Conference Paper  2 
40 Arin et al. (2015) Working Paper  6 
41 Paparas et al. (2015)  Journal 16 
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Appendix 2.6: List of Countries with Groupings 
Year OECD EU EU-15 G-7 
1961 Austria Austria Austria   
1961 Belgium Belgium Belgium   
1961 Canada   Canada 
1961 Denmark Denmark Denmark   
1961 France France France France 
1961 Germany Germany Germany Germany 
1961 Greece Greece Greece   
1961 Iceland     
1961 Ireland Ireland Ireland   
1961 Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg   
1961 Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands   
1961 Norway     
1961 Portugal Portugal Portugal   
1961 Spain Spain Spain   
1961 Sweden Sweden Sweden   
1961 Switzerland     
1961 Turkey     
1961 United Kingdom UK UK UK 
1961 United States   USA 
1962 Italy Italy Italy Italy 
1964 Japan   Japan 
1969 Finland Finland Finland   
1971 Australia     
1973 New Zealand     
1994 Mexico     
1995 Czech Republic Czech Republic    
1996 Hungary Hungry    
1996 Korea     
1996 Poland Poland    
2000 Slovak Republic Slovak Republic    
2010 Chile     
2010 Estonia Estonia    
2010 Israel     






Appendix 2.7: Visual Representation of BMA Analysis (Random Effects-Weight2) 
 
Note: Each column represents a single model. Variables are listed in descending order of posterior inclusion probability (PIP) and have all been weighted according to the 
Fixed Effects – Weight 1 case. Blue (dark) indicates that the variable is included in that model and estimated to be positive. Red (light) indicates the variable is included and 
estimated to be negative. No colour (white) indicates the variable is not included in that model. Further details about this plot is given in Zeugner (2011). 
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Appendix 2.8: Stata Codes 
.do file for TABLE 2.4 
 
clear   
log using "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\OECD\SampleMeans.smcl", replace 
set more off 
set type double  
graph drop _all 
import excel "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\OECD\TAX.xlsx", sheet("Stata") firstrow 
case (lower) 
//TABLE 4-Descriptive Statistica, Column 1(Estimated Tax Effects)-Full 
summ coefficient, detail 
//TABLE 4-Descriptive Statistica, Column 3(t-statistics)-Full 
summ tstatistics, detail 
//Mean absolute value of t-statitics 
gen abststat=abs(tstat) 
summ abststat 
//TABLE 4-Descriptive Statistica, Column 2(Estimated Tax Effects)-Truncated 
summ coefficient, detail 
scalar low = r(p5) 
scalar high = r(p95) 
gen endog = (tsls == 1 | gmm == 1) 
keep if coefficient > low & coefficient < high 
summ coefficient, detail 
//TABLE 4-Descriptive Statistica, Column 4(t-statistics)-Truncated 
summ tstatistics, detail 





















.do file for TABLE 2.5 
 
clear   
log using "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\OECD\Part1 Results.smcl", replace 
set more off 
set type double  
graph drop _all 
import excel "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\OECD\TAX.xlsx", sheet("Stata") firstrow 
case (lower) 
summ coefficient, detail 
scalar low = r(p5) 
scalar high = r(p95) 
summ tstat, detail 
summ coefficient tstat if coefficient > low & coefficient < high, detail 
 
keep if coefficient > low & coefficient < high 
 
// Generating transformed variables for FE and RE 
gen feprecision = 1/se 
gen fetstat = coefficient/se 
 
*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*   TABLE 5: FAT/PET                                                                        * 
*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
// Fixed Effects with SE 
//NOTE: If the coefficient on the constant term is significant, that  
//is evidence of publication bias 
// Fixed Effects 
//This regression gives equal weight to each observation 
// TABLE 5 - Column 1 
regress fetstat feprecision, vce(cluster idstudy) 
//This regression gives equal weight to each study 
// TABLE 5 - Column 2 
regress fetstat feprecision [pweight = weight], vce(cluster idstudy) 
// Fixed Effects without SE 
//NOTE: If the coefficient on the constant term is significant, that  
//is evidence of publication bias 
// Fixed Effects 
//This regression gives equal weight to each observation 
// TABLE 5 - (not reported) 
regress fetstat feprecision, noc vce(cluster idstudy) 
//This regression gives equal weight to each study 
// TABLE 5 - (not reported) 
regress fetstat feprecision [pweight = weight], noc vce(cluster idstudy) 
 
 
metan coefficient se, random 
scalar tau2 = r(tau2) 
gen revar = se^2 + tau2 
gen rese = sqrt(revar) 
gen reprecision = 1/rese 




// Random Effects with SE 
//This regression gives equal weight to each observation 
// TABLE 5 - Column 3 
regress retstat reprecision,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
//This regression gives equal weight to each study 
// TABLE 5 - Column 4 
regress retstat reprecision [pweight = weight], vce(cluster idstudy) 
// TABLE 5 - Column 5 
regress retstat reprecision, noc vce(cluster idstudy) 
//This regression gives equal weight to each study 
// TABLE 5 - Column 6 





























.do file for TABLE 2.6 
 
clear   
log using "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\OECD\Part1 Results.smcl", replace 
set more off 
set type double  
graph drop _all 
import excel "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\OECD\TAX.xlsx", sheet("Stata") firstrow 
case (lower) 
summ coefficient, detail 
scalar low = r(p5) 
scalar high = r(p95) 
 
keep if coefficient > low & coefficient < high 
gen endog = (tsls == 1 | gmm == 1) 
summ predneg predother predpos /// 
labourtax capitaltax consumptiontax othertaxes mixedtaxes overalltax /// 
g7 eu15 eumem oecd /// 
gdp pcgdp /// 
marginal differenced etr /// 
lrcase1 lrcase2 lrcase3 /// 
peerreviewed originalpubyear /// 
cs panel /// 
length originalmidyear /// 
ols gls endog /// 
seols sehet sehac /// 
income laggeddv countryfe /// 



















.do file for TABLE 2.7 
 
clear  
log using "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\OECD\Part1 Results.smcl", replace 
set more off 
set type double  
graph drop _all 
import excel "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\OECD\TAX.xlsx", sheet("Stata") firstrow 
case (lower) 
quietly summ coefficient, detail 
scalar low = r(p5) 
scalar high = r(p95) 
keep if coefficient > low & coefficient < high 
 
gen endog = (tsls == 1 | gmm == 1) 
 
// Generating transformed variables for FE and RE 
gen feprecision = 1/se 
gen fetstat = coefficient/se 
gen peerreviewedd = peerreviewed/se 
gen pubyearr = pubyear/se 
gen css = cs/se 
gen lengthh = length/se 
gen midyearr = midyear/se 
gen gdpp = gdp/se 
gen labourtaxx = labourtax/se 
gen capitaltaxx = capitaltax/se 
gen overalltaxx = overalltax/se 
gen othertaxess = othertaxes/se 
gen mixedtaxess = mixedtaxes/se 
gen marginall = marginal/se 
gen differencedd = differenced/se 
gen etrr = etr/se 
gen prednegg = predneg/se 
gen predposs = predpos/se 
gen investmentt = investment/se 
gen tradeopennesss = tradeopenness/se 
gen humann = human/se 
gen popgrowthh = popgrowth/se 
gen employgrowthh = employgrowth/se 
gen unemploymentt = unemploymentrate/se 
gen inflationn = inflation/se 
gen incomee = income/se 
gen laggeddvv = laggeddv/se 
gen countryfee = countryfe/se 
gen sehacc = sehac/se 
gen sehett = sehet/se 
gen lrcase22 = lrcase2/se 
gen lrcase33 = lrcase3/se 
gen glss = gls/se 
gen endogg = endog/se 
gen eu155 = eu15/se 
gen g77 = g7/se 
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************ FIXED EFFECTS ********************* 
********************************************** 
 
// These specifications include the SeR term 
// NOTE: The constant term is the SER term 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH OBSERVATION 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 1, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt /// 
inflationn incomee laggeddvv countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect fetstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm, backward bic /// 
fix(feprecision prednegg predposs) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 1, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg fetstat feprecision   /// 
prednegg predposs peerreviewedd gdpp popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc lrcase22 glss eu155 g77 ,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH STUDY 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs  [pweight = weight], vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 2, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt /// 
inflationn incomee laggeddvv countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm [pweight = weight],  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
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vselect fetstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm [pweight = weight], backward bic 
/// 
fix(feprecision prednegg predposs) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 2, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg fetstat feprecision   /// 
prednegg predposs peerreviewedd pubyearr lengthh midyearr differencedd popgrowthh employgrowthh 
unemploymentt /// 




************ RANDOM EFFECTS ******************* 
*********************************************** 
 
metareg coefficient predneg predpos, wsse(se) 
scalar tau2 = e(tau2) 
display tau2 
gen revar = se^2 + tau2 
gen rese = sqrt(revar) 
 
gen reprecision = 1/rese 
gen retstat = coefficient/rese 
replace peerreviewedd = peerreviewed/rese 
replace pubyearr = pubyear/rese 
replace css = cs/rese 
replace lengthh = length/rese 
replace midyearr = midyear/rese 
replace gdpp = gdp/rese 
replace labourtaxx = labourtax/rese 
replace capitaltaxx = capitaltax/rese 
replace overalltaxx = overalltax/se 
replace othertaxess = othertaxes/rese 
replace mixedtaxess = mixedtaxes/rese 
replace marginall = marginal/rese 
replace differencedd = differenced/rese 
replace etrr = etr/rese 
replace prednegg = predneg/rese 
replace predposs = predpos/rese 
replace investmentt = investment/rese 
replace tradeopennesss = tradeopenness/rese 
replace humann = human/rese 
replace popgrowthh = popgrowth/rese 
replace employgrowthh = employgrowth/rese 
replace unemploymentt = unemploymentrate/rese 
replace inflationn = inflation/rese 
replace incomee = income/rese 
replace laggeddvv = laggeddv/rese 
replace countryfee = countryfe/rese 
replace sehacc = sehac/rese 
replace sehett = sehet/rese 
replace lrcase22 = lrcase2/rese 
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replace lrcase33 = lrcase3/rese 
replace glss = gls/rese 
replace endogg = endog/rese 
replace eu155 = eu15/rese 
replace g77 = g7/rese 
replace eumemm = eumem/rese 
 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH OBSERVATION 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 3, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt /// 
inflationn incomee laggeddvv countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect retstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm, backward bic /// 
fix(reprecision prednegg predposs) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 3, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg retstat reprecision   /// 
prednegg predposs pubyearr midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd popgrowthh unemploymentt /// 
countryfee lrcase33 g77,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH STUDY 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs [pweight = weight], vce(cluster id) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 4, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt /// 
inflationn incomee laggeddvv countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm [pweight = weight],  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect retstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 




countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm [pweight = weight], backward bic 
/// 
fix(reprecision prednegg predposs) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 4, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg retstat reprecision /// 
prednegg predposs pubyearr gdpp marginall differencedd popgrowthh /// 





















































.do file for TABLE 2.8 
 
clear  
log using "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\OECD\Type of Tax Results.smcl", replace 
set more off 
set type double  
graph drop _all 
import excel "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\OECD\TAX.xlsx", sheet("Stata") firstrow 
case (lower) 
quietly summ coefficient, detail 
scalar low = r(p5) 
scalar high = r(p95) 
keep if coefficient > low & coefficient < high 
 
gen endog = (tsls == 1 | gmm == 1) 
 
// Generating transformed variables for FE and RE 
gen feprecision = 1/se 
gen fetstat = coefficient/se 
gen peerreviewedd = peerreviewed/se 
gen pubyearr = pubyear/se 
gen css = cs/se 
gen lengthh = length/se 
gen midyearr = midyear/se 
gen gdpp = gdp/se 
gen labourtaxx = labourtax/se 
gen capitaltaxx = capitaltax/se 
gen overalltaxx = overalltax/se 
//gen consumptiontaxx = consumptiontax/se 
gen othertaxess = othertaxes/se 
gen mixedtaxess = mixedtaxes/se 
gen marginall = marginal/se 
gen differencedd = differenced/se 
gen etrr = etr/se 
gen prednegg = predneg/se 
gen predposs = predpos/se 
gen investmentt = investment/se 
gen tradeopennesss = tradeopenness/se 
gen humann = human/se 
gen popgrowthh = popgrowth/se 
gen employgrowthh = employgrowth/se 
gen unemploymentt = unemploymentrate/se 
gen inflationn = inflation/se 
gen incomee = income/se 
gen laggeddvv = laggeddv/se 
gen countryfee = countryfe/se 
gen sehacc = sehac/se 
gen sehett = sehet/se 
gen lrcase22 = lrcase2/se 
gen lrcase33 = lrcase3/se 
gen glss = gls/se 
gen endogg = endog/se 
gen eu155 = eu15/se 
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gen g77 = g7/se 




************ FIXED EFFECTS ********************* 
********************************************** 
 
// These specifications include the SeR term 
// NOTE: The constant term is the SER term 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH OBSERVATION 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 1, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect fetstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss, backward bic /// 
fix(feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx ) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 1, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
 peerreviewedd popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc lrcase22 eu155 g77 ,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH STUDY 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
 [pweight = weight], vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 2, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 






// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect fetstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm [pweight = weight], backward bic 
/// 
fix(feprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 2, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
 peerreviewedd pubyearr lengthh midyearr humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt /// 




************ RANDOM EFFECTS ******************* 
*********************************************** 
 
metareg coefficient labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
, wsse(se) 
scalar tau2 = e(tau2) 
display tau2 
gen revar = se^2 + tau2 
gen rese = sqrt(revar) 
 
gen reprecision = 1/rese 
gen retstat = coefficient/rese 
replace peerreviewedd = peerreviewed/rese 
replace pubyearr = pubyear/rese 
replace css = cs/rese 
replace lengthh = length/rese 
replace midyearr = midyear/rese 
replace gdpp = gdp/rese 
replace labourtaxx = labourtax/rese 
replace capitaltaxx = capitaltax/rese 
replace overalltaxx = overalltax/se 
replace othertaxess = othertaxes/rese 
replace mixedtaxess = mixedtaxes/rese 
replace marginall = marginal/rese 
replace differencedd = differenced/rese 
replace etrr = etr/rese 
replace prednegg = predneg/rese 
replace predposs = predpos/rese 
replace investmentt = investment/rese 
replace tradeopennesss = tradeopenness/rese 
replace humann = human/rese 
replace popgrowthh = popgrowth/rese 
replace employgrowthh = employgrowth/rese 
replace unemploymentt = unemploymentrate/rese 
replace inflationn = inflation/rese 
replace incomee = income/rese 
replace laggeddvv = laggeddv/rese 
replace countryfee = countryfe/rese 
replace sehacc = sehac/rese 
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replace sehett = sehet/rese 
replace lrcase22 = lrcase2/rese 
replace lrcase33 = lrcase3/rese 
replace glss = gls/rese 
replace endogg = endog/rese 
replace eu155 = eu15/rese 
replace g77 = g7/rese 
replace eumemm = eumem/rese 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH OBSERVATION 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 3, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect retstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm, backward bic /// 
fix(reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 3, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
 pubyearr midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd popgrowthh unemploymentt /// 
inflationn incomee countryfee sehacc lrcase22 lrcase33 glss eu155 g77,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH STUDY 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
 [pweight = weight], vce(cluster id) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 4, Top Panel 
//Regression with all control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 




// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
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// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect retstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm [pweight = weight], backward bic 
/// 
fix(reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 4, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
pubyearr gdpp differencedd etrr humann popgrowthh /// 
















































.do file for TABLE 2.9 
 
clear  
log using "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\OECD\All Tax Var Results.smcl", replace 
set more off 
set type double  
graph drop _all 
import excel "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\OECD\TAX.xlsx", sheet("Stata") firstrow 
case (lower) 
quietly summ coefficient, detail 
scalar low = r(p5) 
scalar high = r(p95) 
keep if coefficient > low & coefficient < high 
 
gen endog = (tsls == 1 | gmm == 1) 
 
// Generating transformed variables for FE and RE 
gen feprecision = 1/se 
gen fetstat = coefficient/se 
gen peerreviewedd = peerreviewed/se 
gen pubyearr = pubyear/se 
gen css = cs/se 
gen lengthh = length/se 
gen midyearr = midyear/se 
gen gdpp = gdp/se 
gen labourtaxx = labourtax/se 
gen capitaltaxx = capitaltax/se 
gen overalltaxx = overalltax/se 
//gen consumptiontaxx = consumptiontax/se 
gen othertaxess = othertaxes/se 
gen mixedtaxess = mixedtaxes/se 
gen marginall = marginal/se 
gen differencedd = differenced/se 
gen etrr = etr/se 
gen prednegg = predneg/se 
gen predposs = predpos/se 
gen investmentt = investment/se 
gen tradeopennesss = tradeopenness/se 
gen humann = human/se 
gen popgrowthh = popgrowth/se 
gen employgrowthh = employgrowth/se 
gen unemploymentt = unemploymentrate/se 
gen inflationn = inflation/se 
gen incomee = income/se 
gen laggeddvv = laggeddv/se 
gen countryfee = countryfe/se 
gen sehacc = sehac/se 
gen sehett = sehet/se 
gen lrcase22 = lrcase2/se 
gen lrcase33 = lrcase3/se 
gen glss = gls/se 
gen endogg = endog/se 
gen eu155 = eu15/se 
gen g77 = g7/se 
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************ FIXED EFFECTS ********************* 
********************************************** 
// These specifications include the SeR term 
// NOTE: The constant term is the SER term 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH OBSERVATION 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 1, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect fetstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm, backward bic /// 
fix(feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx ) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 1, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg fetstat feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd etrr popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc lrcase22 lrcase33 eu155 g77 ,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH STUDY 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
 [pweight = weight], vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 2, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 




// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
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// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect fetstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm [pweight = weight], backward bic 
/// 
fix(feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 2, Bottom Panel 
//We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg fetstat feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd css midyearr gdpp humann employgrowthh unemploymentt /// 




************ RANDOM EFFECTS ******************* 
*********************************************** 
metareg coefficient labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
predneg predpos, wsse(se) 
scalar tau2 = e(tau2) 
display tau2 
gen revar = se^2 + tau2 
gen rese = sqrt(revar) 
 
gen reprecision = 1/rese 
gen retstat = coefficient/rese 
replace peerreviewedd = peerreviewed/rese 
replace pubyearr = pubyear/rese 
replace css = cs/rese 
replace lengthh = length/rese 
replace midyearr = midyear/rese 
replace gdpp = gdp/rese 
replace labourtaxx = labourtax/rese 
replace capitaltaxx = capitaltax/rese 
replace overalltaxx = overalltax/se 
replace othertaxess = othertaxes/rese 
replace mixedtaxess = mixedtaxes/rese 
replace marginall = marginal/rese 
replace differencedd = differenced/rese 
replace etrr = etr/rese 
replace prednegg = predneg/rese 
replace predposs = predpos/rese 
replace investmentt = investment/rese 
replace tradeopennesss = tradeopenness/rese 
replace humann = human/rese 
replace popgrowthh = popgrowth/rese 
replace employgrowthh = employgrowth/rese 
replace unemploymentt = unemploymentrate/rese 
replace inflationn = inflation/rese 
replace incomee = income/rese 
replace laggeddvv = laggeddv/rese 
replace countryfee = countryfe/rese 
replace sehacc = sehac/rese 
replace sehett = sehet/rese 
replace lrcase22 = lrcase2/rese 
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replace lrcase33 = lrcase3/rese 
replace glss = gls/rese 
replace endogg = endog/rese 
replace eu155 = eu15/rese 
replace g77 = g7/rese 
replace eumemm = eumem/rese 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH OBSERVATION 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg retstat reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 3, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg retstat reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect retstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm, backward bic /// 
fix(reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 3, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg retstat reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr midyearr gdpp popgrowthh unemploymentt /// 
incomee countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase33 glss eu155 g77,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH STUDY 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg retstat reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
 [pweight = weight], vce(cluster id) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 4, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg retstat reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 




// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect retstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gdpp marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
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investmentt tradeopennesss humann popgrowthh employgrowthh unemploymentt inflationn incomee 
laggeddvv /// 
countryfee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 glss endogg eu155 g77 eumemm [pweight = weight], backward bic 
/// 
fix(reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 4, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg retstat reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
pubyearr midyearr differencedd etrr humann popgrowthh /// 






























R Commands for TABLE 2.10 
 
Download R from the following link: 
https://cran.r-project.org/src/base/R-3/ 
The one I am applying is R-3.2.1.tar.gz 
 
After opening up the R, type the following commands: 




The data file should have the dependent variable as the first column. 
 
Open the data file (Excel spreadsheet )                  copy data 
 
TAX1=read.table("clipboard-512", sep="\t", header=TRUE) 
 
TAX11 = bms(TAX1, burn=10000000, iter=10000000, g="hyper", mprior="random", 







coef(TAX11, order.by.pip = T, exact=T, include.constant=T) 
 






























Chapter 3. Taxes and Economic Growth in U.S. 








A fundamental goal of economic policy makers is to encourage economic growth. Tax policy 
is considered to be one of the principal policy instruments for government to achieve this 
goal. Most economists would agree that taxes and spending are essential for economic 
growth. But they are uncertain as to what extent the negative economic effects of increasing 
taxes starts to outweigh the positive effects of increasing spending funded by these increased 
taxes. The previous chapter examined the effect of taxes on economic growth in OECD 
countries. This chapter pursues a similar line of study with respect to the effect of taxes on 
economic growth in U.S. states. 
The effect of tax policies on economic growth among U.S. states has been the focus of 
numerous academic studies over the last decades. Prominent examples include Helms (1985), 
Miller and Russek (1997), Reed (2008), Mullen and Williams (1994), Tomljanovich (2004), 
and Yamarik (2000). While some empirical studies find that state and local taxes have a 
measurable and consistently adverse impact on state economic growth, other studies reach the 
opposite conclusion. Many more are mixed, ambivalent, or show any adverse impacts are 
small (Mazerove, 2013). Despite the fact that many of these studies use similar data and 
examine many of the same states and time periods, estimates vary widely. The result is a lack 
of consensus among economists about whether in the US taxes have any impact on economic 
growth and, if they do, how large the size of the effect might be.   
There are several potential reasons that can explain heterogeneity across the reported 
estimates in the tax-growth literature. First, there is no settled theoretical prediction about the 
main determinants of economic growth. For example, the neoclassical growth model, 
introduced by Solow (1956), predicts that fiscal policies such as taxation and expenditures 
may have transitional effects on output level but not the long-run growth rate. In this class of 
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models, the long-run growth rate is determined by exogenous factors such as technical 
progress and population growth. The endogenous growth models introduced by Barro (1990) 
and King and Rebelo (1990) have challenged the traditional neoclassical growth model and 
provide a mechanism through which taxes and public expenditures can determine both the 
level of output and the steady-state growth rate. According to endogenous growth theory, 
Helms (1985) emphasizes that in order to evaluate the true effect of tax or expenditure on 
growth both sides of government budget constraints (GBC) including the sources and uses of 
funds must be taken into account.  
Partly in step with these theoretical issues, empirical studies have evolved over time. 
There are two distinct strands of literature among the studies investigating the role of taxation 
as a determinant of economic growth in U.S. states: (i) studies in which the complete 
specification of the government budget constraint (GBC) is taken into account, and (ii) 
studies ignoring the role of the government budget constraint. Further, it is important to 
recognize that the net effects of alternative policies may differ depending on the types of 
taxes/expenditures considered, what a government produces, and how the government output 
is financed. For example, if the revenue generated by distortionary taxes such as a personal 
income tax is used to fund productive expenditures such as infrastructure and/or education, 
then the expected net effect might differ from a situation in which same distortionary tax is 
used to fund unproductive expenditures such as welfare and/or recreation. Another important 
issue is to consider the duration of any tax effects. In other words, are the effects of taxes on 
economic growth being measured over short, medium, or long periods of time. For these and 
other reasons, even studies that use similar data can produce dissimilar estimates of tax 
effects. 
To overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings, and also in an attempt to offer a clear 
picture of the extensive and dispersed research investigating the effect of state and local taxes 
98 
 
on state economic growth, I conduct a meta-regression analysis (MRA) on existing studies. 
The main objectives of this study are to answer the following questions: (i) what is the 
overall, mean effect of taxes on economic growth in U.S. states?; (ii) is there any empirical 
evidence to support the public finance argument that “productive expenditures” financed by 
“distortionary taxes” are less growth retarding than same spending financed by “unproductive 
expenditures”?; (iii) are some taxes more growth retarding than others?; and (iv) what are the 
possible causes of heterogeneity in the results observed in the literature?  
To achieve the stated objectives, this study collects estimates of tax effects on 
economic growth in U.S. states from 29 empirical studies. According to a final sample of 868 
estimates, I find strong evidence that the empirical literature on estimated tax effects is 
influenced by negative publication bias by which I mean that negative estimates are over-
reported in publicly available studies. Once I control for this bias, I calculate that the “overall 
effect” of taxes on economic growth is small and statistically insignificant. However, as 
mentioned earlier, this “overall tax effect” is not very informative. Once I turn to analysing 
different types of tax policies, and after controlling for publication bias, the evidence 
regarding the composition of fiscal policy is mixed.   
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes how I 
collected the sample of estimates. Section 3.3 discusses some of the reasons why studies of 
tax effects can produce different estimates. Section 3.4 presents my empirical results, 
addressing my objectives. Section 3.5 summarizes the main findings of this research.  
3.2. Selection of Studies and Construction of Dataset 
This meta-regression analysis collects estimated tax effects derived from all studies that 
regress a variation of the following specification: 
𝑔 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑡𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,                                                                                                     (3.1) 
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where 𝑔 is a measure of economic growth, 𝑡𝑟 is a measure of the tax rate, and the data are 
taken from 50 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia. To identify these studies, I conducted 
a comprehensive search including both electronic and manual search procedures. It is worth 
noting that studies estimating non-linear transformation of tax effects (a squared term), such 
as the “growth hills” of Bania, Grey and Stone (2007) and also studies estimating interactive 
terms, such as Deskins and Hill (2010), are not included in this MRA. This is because if there 
is an interaction term in the model, the total effect is an outcome of both the term and its 
interaction. Unfortunately, the meta-analyst usually does not have access to the data 
necessary to calculate the associated marginal effect and its statistical significance. 
The electronic search used three categories of keywords: (i) “STATE and LOCAL 
TAXES” keywords, (ii) “STATE ECONOMIC GROWTH” keywords, and (iii) “U.S. 
STATES” keywords in the following combination: “STATE and LOCAL TAXES” and 
“STATE ECONOMIC GROWTH” and “U.S. STATES”. A variety of keywords were 
substituted for each of these three categories. All the possible alternatives are reported in 
Appendix 3.1. I then implemented the search on a variety of comprehensive electronic search 
engines such as: EconLit, Google Scholar, JSTOR, Web of Science, Scopus, RePEc, EBSCO, 
and ProQuest by searching various keyword combinations. A total of 459 studies were 
identified in this manner. 
As mentioned earlier, numerous studies have examined the relationship between taxes 
and economic growth. However, a meaningful meta-regression analysis requires comparable 
original studies and therefore the inclusion/exclusion selection criteria are designed to fulfil 
this requirement. Thus, to be included in this data set each study must meet the following 
criteria. First, a growth equation must have a tax variable. Second, the regional focus is U.S. 
states, so each study must include at least 44 contiguous U.S. states. The reason being that 
even though the U.S. includes 50 states plus the District of Columbia, most studies exclude 
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the non-contiguous states of Alaska and Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and sometimes 
other states as well, for various reasons. Finally, each included study must report sufficient 
statistical information to allow the calculation of the effect sizes such as regression 
coefficients, standard errors, and t-statistics or p-values.  
The abstracts and conclusions of the 459 studies were then read carefully to eliminate 
any studies that did not meet these criteria. Many studies, including government reports and 
narrative reviews, were excluded from my dataset as a result. Backwards and forwards 
citation search strategies were then implemented to locate additional studies. This process 
eventually resulted in a list of 43 studies, some of which were multiple versions of the same 
study, and included journal articles, conference proceedings, reports released by government 
agencies, think thanks and research firms, thesis and dissertations, and finally working papers 
and other unpublished or grey literature.19 
This list was then emailed to 56 researchers who had previously written at least one 
research paper on the topic of taxes and economic growth using U.S. data. The researchers 
were asked to assist in identifying any additional research papers of their own or of any 
master/PhD students who were working with them.20 A revised list of 53 studies was then 
compiled based on the responses I received from the researchers.21, 22 
Each study in the revised list was then read carefully and thoroughly to see whether it 
was eligible according to the defined inclusion criteria. The dependent variable had to be a 
measure of state income growth (usually GSP or Personal Income growth, but not 
                                                          
19 When reported estimates differ in multiple versions of the study, the peer-reviewed journal articles 
is considered as a benchmark. However, if there are additional estimates in previous versions of the 
study, I kept track of the outlet of the study, coded, and then pooled the estimates across versions. 
20 The letter along with the bibliography of the core studies emailed to the prominent authors in this 
research area is available in Appendix 3.2 and Appendix 3.3. 
21 I am grateful for helpful suggestion received from all the scholars. 
22 The two plus coders includes myself, a PhD student recruited as a research assistant, and Prof. Reed to 
provide us the right direction once there is discrepencies in the reconciliation process. 
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employment growth). Alternatively, the dependent variable could be in level form, as long as 
the lagged dependent variable was included in the specification. The growth equation had to 
include at least one tax variable that was measured in units of percent of income. Studies in 
which the “tax variable” consists of all revenues, such as the ratio of total revenues to GSP, 
were not included because they lump together tax and non-tax revenues. 
The states included in a given regression equation had to consist of at least 44 
contiguous U.S. states. While some studies included all the 50 states plus District of 
Columbia, others excluded outlier states such as Alaska and Hawaii plus the District of 
Columbia. There are several reasons for this. Outlier states such as Alaska and Hawaii have 
limited labour mobility compared to the contiguous 48 states. Alaska is also an outlier 
because a large share of its tax revenues comes from severance taxes on oil. And the District 
of Columbia is not a state.  Given the above-mentioned reasons one would expect the 
remaining studies to include 48 states. However, some studies dropped additional states, such 
as Wyoming (because it also receives a large portion of severance tax revenues from oil), 
Nebraska (because it has a unicameral legislature), or other states because of the absence of a 
sales and/or income tax. Setting the threshold at 44 contiguous states allowed me to include a 
larger number of studies. All estimated tax effects had to report a standard error or associated 
t-statistic. Finally, only studies written in English were included. I closed my research on 
October 2015. The final sample of 29 studies is listed in Appendix 3.4.23 
Once the final set of estimates was determined, I then went through each 
equation/estimate and coded a set of regressions and study characteristics (more details are 
provided in the next section). The coding was done independently by at least two coders with 
                                                          
23 Appendix 3.5 clarifies the steps which is undertaken to reach to the 42 final studies. 
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a careful reconciliation of any discrepancies or inconsistencies.24 All search and coding 
procedures followed the MAER-NET protocols closely (Stanley et al., 2013). 
3.3. Factors that Cause Tax Estimates to Differ Across Studies 
The government budget constraint. As explained in the previous chapter, to estimate the 
precise effects of tax on economic growth it is important to deal adequately with a number of 
issues. The first issue has to do with the government budget constraint and the importance of 
implicit financing. 
The regression coefficient on the tax rate can sometimes be misinterpreted once the 
importance of implicit financing and/or the role of the government budget constraint are 
ignored. The main argument is that the regression coefficient on tax variable should be 
interpreted as the growth effect of a tax financed by the omitted fiscal categories. For 
example, if public expenditure is omitted from the specification, the coefficient on tax 
variable measures the net effect of an increase in expenditure funded by taxes. 
The precise interpretation is further complicated by the finer gradations of taxes 
(distortionary versus non-distortionary) and expenditures (productive versus unproductive 
expenditures). Thus, the net effect of tax on growth depends on the simultaneous change in 
taxes and/or expenditures. For example, if capital spending such as infrastructure is omitted 
from the regression equation, the coefficient on the consumption tax rate variable measures 
the net effect of an increase in productive expenditures financed by an increase in non-
distortionary taxes. In which case, according to theory, a positive value for the tax coefficient 
would be expected (cf. Section 2.3 in the previous chapter for further details). As a result, 
similar “tax rate” variables might legitimately produce negative, positive or zero/ambiguous 
                                                          
24 The two plus coders includes myself, a PhD student recruited as a research assistant, and Prof. Reed to 
provide us the right direction once there is discrepencies in the reconciliation process. 
103 
 
effects by virtue of the kind of tax variable that was being investigated as well as which other 
variables in the government budget constraint were omitted.  
To address this issue, I go through each estimated tax effect and identify both the 
operative tax types and the use of the tax revenues implied by the government budget 
constraint. Tax types and expenditures are then categorized as distortionary/non-
distortionary, productive/unproductive, or other according to the taxonomy represented in 













                                                          
25 I use the Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999) taxonomy because it is broadly representative of the fiscal 
policy literature. Distortionary taxes are those distorting the private sector’s incentive to invest such as taxes on 
income and property. An example of non-distortionary tax would be taxes on consumption. 
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Table 3.1: Matching of Functional and Theoretical Classifications 
Functional classification Theoretical classification 
Taxation on income and profit 
Distortionary taxation 
 
Social security contributions 
Taxation on payroll and manpower 
Taxation on property 
Taxation on domestic goods and services Non-distortionary taxations 
Non-tax revenues 
Other revenues 
Other tax revenues 
General public services expenditure 
Productive expenditures 
 




Transport and communication expenditure 
Social security and welfare expenditure 
Unproductive expenditures 
 
Expenditure on recreation 
Expenditure on economic services 
Other expenditures (unclassified) Other expenditures 
Note: The categorizations in the table are taken from Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999) 
with some accommodation for the fact that the categories refer to revenues and expenditures 
for U.S. states. 
 
Table 3.2 summarizes the predicted effect of distortionary/non-distortionary taxes on 
economic growth given the omitted fiscal category. This is taken from Gemmell, Kneller and 
Sanz (2009) but has been adapted to the various cases available in my sample. Doing so, 
every tax effect is assigned a prediction with respect to its impact on growth (negative, 
positive, or ambiguous/zero), where I merge the original categories of “zero” and 
“ambiguous” to “ambiguous”. 
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  Table 3.2: Predicted Tax Effects 
Type of Tax Omitted Fiscal Category Predicted Effect 
Distortionary Productive Expenditures Ambiguous 
Distortionary Unproductive expenditures Negative 
Distortionary Productive & Unproductive Expenditures Ambiguous 
Distortionary Other Expenditures Ambiguous 
Distortionary Deficit/Surplus Ambiguous 
Distortionary Other Revenue Ambiguous 
Distortionary Distortionary Taxes Ambiguous 
Distortionary Non-distortionary Taxes Negative 
Distortionary Intergovernmental Revenue Ambiguous 
Distortionary Net Utility Expenditures Ambiguous 
Non-distortionary Productive Expenditures Positive 
Non-distortionary Unproductive Expenditures Ambiguous 
Non-distortionary Productive & Unproductive Expenditures Ambiguous 
Non-distortionary Other Expenditures Ambiguous 
Non-distortionary Deficit/Surplus Positive 
Non-distortionary Other Revenue Ambiguous 
Non-distortionary Distortionary Taxes Positive 
Non-distortionary Non-distortionary Taxes Ambiguous 
Non-distortionary Intergovernmental Revenue Ambiguous 
Non-distortionary Net Utility Expenditures Ambiguous 
Note:  The categorizations in the table are taken from Gemmell, Kneller, and Sanz (2009), where I combine 
the original categories of “zero” and “ambiguous” to “ambiguous”. 
I also classify each estimated tax effect according to its type. Taxes are classified as 
Labour taxes, Capital taxes, Consumption taxes, Property taxes, Mixed taxes, Other taxes, 
and Overall taxes. The classification system for assigning each tax to a tax type is given in 
Table 3.3.26 
 
                                                          
26 Mixed taxes are a combination of various types of taxes but not all. 
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        Table 3.3: Types of Taxes 
Tax Type Examples 
Labour 
Personal income tax 
Payroll tax  
Social security contributions 
Capital 
Corporate income tax  
Capital tax (tax on dividends) 
Consumption 
Consumption tax  
Taxes on goods and services  
Sales tax  
Value added tax (VAT)  
Property  Property tax  
Other tax Taxes not listed above 
Mixed tax  Taxes that are a combination of the above types 
Overall tax Total taxes (e.g., Total Tax Revenues/GSP) 
 
Units of measurement. The second issue refers to the units of measurement for 
economic growth and the measure of the tax rate variables in Equation (3.1). Each of these 
variables can be measured in percentage points (e.g., 2%) or in decimals (e.g., 0.02). This 
will obviously affect the size of the coefficients, 𝛼1. For example, if a one-percentage point 
increase in the tax rate lowers growth by 0.1%, and if both 𝑔 and 𝑡𝑟 are measured in 
percentage points, or both are measured in decimals, then the corresponding value of 𝛼1 will 
be -0.1. However, if 𝑔 is measured in percentage points, and 𝑡𝑟 is measured in decimals, then 
the corresponding value of 𝛼1 will be -10. And if 𝑔 is measured in decimals, and 𝑡𝑟 is 
measured in percentage points, then the value of  𝛼1 will be -0.001. Accordingly, I adjust all 
estimated effects so that 𝛼1 = 𝑋 means that a one-percentage point increase in the tax rate is 
associated with an 𝑋 percentage point increase in economic growth.27 
                                                          
27 Sometimes it was difficult to determine the units of measurement of the respective variables from the study so 
as to properly interpret the coefficient. When this would happen, we could contact the original author(s). When 
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States. The third issue relates to the specific states excluded from a given study. While 
there are studies in which all 50 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia are included, the 
convention established in the literature is to exclude Alaska and Hawaii as their economies 
are thought to behave differently from the continental states. Their isolation noticeably 
reduces the mobility of their labour force. In addition, the Alaskan economy has been 
strongly affected by construction of a pipeline in 1977, and therefore a substantial portion of 
tax revenue is received in the form of severance taxes as a result of oil exporting capabilities. 
The District of Columbia is also excluded from most studies since it is not a state. Many 
studies only exclude one of the above-mentioned states, although there are studies that 
exclude a subset of these states. I further categorize the excluded states by the groupings 
None (once all 50 states plus DC are included), AK, DC, AKDC, AKHIDC, 
AKHIDCOTHERS, with the idea that by leaving the outlier states aside the remaining sample 
consists of more homogeneous economies. My meta-regression analysis controls for these 
different groupings in order to identify whether the estimated tax effects vary systematically 
across the different sets of states excluded from the original studies. 
Duration of time periods. A fourth issue concerns the time frames of the data employed 
in the different studies. If the time periods of Equation (3.1) differ across studies, that could 
cause estimates of 𝛼1 to differ, even when the underlying effect is the same. For example, 
suppose there were two growth studies, but one used 5-year time periods while the other used 
annual data. Suppose the former measured the cumulative rate of growth over each five-year 
period while the latter reported annual growth rates. Ceteris paribus, one might expect 𝛼1 to 
be larger in the former case. Accordingly, I adjust all growth measures to be (average) annual 
rates of growth.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    




Duration of estimated tax effects. Since there is a consensus amongst growth models 
that tax-growth effects occur in the short-run, distinction between short-, medium-, and long-
run may partly explain discrepancies observed in the reported estimates. Therefore, the fifth 
issue is related to the duration of the estimated tax effect as implied by the specification of 
the regression equation.  
In the finite distributed lag (FDL) model, the coefficient on the current tax rate as well 
as the lagged tax rate represent the “short-run/immediate” effects of a one-percentage point 
increase in taxes in the current year and the previous year, respectively, on the current 
economic growth. Modifications of the regression specification may alter the effects from 
“short-run/immediate” to “cumulative/intermediate” or “long-run/permanent”. 
 My meta-regression analysis controls for this by noting the specification of the growth 
equation in the original study and categorizing the duration of the estimated tax effect as 
short-run, medium-run, or long-run. 
Different measures for economic growth and tax rates. A final issue has to do with how 
the economic growth and tax rate variables are defined in the primary studies. While some 
studies measure economic growth in terms of nominal GSP/Personal Income, others apply 
real GSP/Personal Income. Other measures available in the literature are per capita 
GSP/Personal Income and total GSP/Personal Income. It is worth nothing that I don’t 
distinguish between real and nominal growth as long as the economic growth measure used in 
the primary studies is a log transformation of nominal GSP/Personal Income and time 
dummies are included in the specification.  
When it comes to measuring “the tax rate”, the main question is how to accurately 
measure tax rates. Unfortunately, economic theory provides no clear answer to this question. 
As a result various measures can be seen in the literature. Most studies use effective tax rates, 
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defined as the ratio of tax revenues over a given measure of income. However, Engen and 
Skinner (1992) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993) show that average tax rates are strongly 
correlated with public spending. Others use statutory tax rates typically the top marginal rate. 
And some studies attempt to distinguish marginal from average tax rates. Marginal tax rates 
are defined as the additional taxes paid when personal income rises by a small amount. For 
example, for a personal income tax, the marginal tax rate describes a person’s tax bracket and 
shows how much taxes are paid on the last dollar earned from working and investing. Since 
economic decisions depend on the marginal tax rate, this measure is more appropriate for 
investigating the effect of taxes on growth. However, marginal tax rates are not easily 
observable. I use dummy variables to indicate the specific measures underlying a given 
estimate. 
Control variables. In addition to all the challenging issues discussed earlier, I code 
many other study characteristics, including estimation methods; types of standard errors; 
whether the original study was published in a peer-reviewed journal; publication year; sample 
period length; midpoint of the sample; and inclusion of various specific variables such as 
state fixed effects, human capital, capital investment, employment/population growth, and 




3.4. Empirical Analysis 
Preliminary analysis. As mentioned earlier, my literature search produced a dataset of 29 
studies containing a total of 966 estimated tax effects. Table 3.4 reports the descriptive 
statistics for both the estimated tax effects and their associated t-statistics. The median 
estimated tax effect is -0.055 for the full dataset, implying that a ten percentage point increase 
in the tax rate is associated with a 0.55 percentage point decrease in annual economic growth. 
This compares to an average, annual PCPI growth for the 48 contiguous U.S. states of 
approximately 6.07 per cent over the period 1975-2003.28This period roughly corresponds to 
the “average” sample period of the studies included in this analysis. 29,30 The median t-
statistic is -0.67. 
Table 3.4 immediately identifies a problem in that the minimum and maximum 
estimated effects are -7.21 and 9.58.31 These values indicate a tax effect size that is 
considerably outside the bounds of reasonable. While researchers differ in their estimates of 
the effects of taxes, nobody suggests that a one percentage point increase in the tax rate 
would lower annual economic growth by over 7 percentage points, or increase it by over 9 
percentage points. Accordingly, the subsequent analysis works with a truncated sample of 
estimates. 
I delete the top and bottom 5 percent of estimates and obtain a sample of 868 estimated 
tax effects. The descriptive statistics for this truncated sample are also reported in Table 3.4. 
The range of estimated tax effects for this sample is from a minimum -1.47 to a maximum of 
                                                          
28 Note that average, annual GSP growth was not available over the above mentioned period. 
29 This is calculated by taking the average beginning and average ending dates for the sample ranges of the 
respective studies. 
30 Growth rate is the average, annual PCPI growth rate over the period 1975-2003 for the 48 states. Alaska, 
Hawaii and the District of Columbia are excluded. The reason why I report annual PCPI growth rather than 
annual GSP growth is due to the gap in data availability (data for GSP is not available untill 1977). 
31 Excel spreadsheet that allows the user to replicate all the results of Table 3.4 through 3.10 can be downloaded 
from Dataverse:  https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/IW8UEY 
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0.639. The median t-statistic still indicates insignificance, while the samples of t-statistics 
range from a minimum of -17.29 to a maximum of 8.77, with a mean absolute value of 1.87. 
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for Estimated Effects and t-statistics 
 Estimated Tax Effects t-statistics 
 Full Truncated Full Truncated 
Mean -0.140 -0.121 2.12* 1.87* 
Median -0.055 -0.055 -0.67 -0.71 
Minimum -7.210 -1.47 -18.54 -17.29 
Maximum 9.581 0.639 8.77 8.77 
Std. Dev. 1.023 0.349 3.00 2.55 
1% -3.47 -1.33 -13.23 -10.76 
5% -1.50 -0.83 -5.8 -4.87 
10% -0.797 -0.535 -3.63 -3.45 
90% 0.358 0.262 2.13 1.78 
95% 0.66 0.37 1.67 2.60 
99% 2.841 0.587 4.95 3.59 
Obs 966 868 966 868 
Note: The mean absolute value of t-statistics is indicated by an asterisk. 
 
Figure 3.1 plots the estimated tax of the truncated sample. If tax effects were 
homogeneous across studies and differed solely due to sampling error, we would expect a 
bell-shaped histogram. This is clearly not the case in Figure 3.1. The distribution is skewed to 
the left, and suggests that there may be sample selection favouring negative estimates, 




Figure 3.1: Histogram of Estimated Tax Effects (Truncated) 
 
Fixed Effects versus Random Effects. In order to achieve the first goal of this study of 
estimating the “overall tax effect”, an appropriate weight must be assigned to each 
study/estimate. The reason for this is that the studies/estimates are not equally precise. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to give more weight to the more precise studies/estimates. There 
are two models used in the MRA literature, “fixed effects” and “random effects”. It is worth 
mentioning that “fixed effects” and “random effects” mean something entirely different in 
meta-analysis than they do in panel data econometrics (Reed, 2015). 
Fixed Effects. The underlying assumption for the fixed effects model is that there is one 
true effect size and the main sources of effect size variation is due to sampling error. 
Accordingly, the weight assigned to each estimate is the inverse of its associated standard 
error. 
Random Effects. For the random effects model, on the other hand, we assume that there 
is a distribution of “true effects”. In this case, which is more realistic than the previous one, 

















of (i) sampling error, and (ii) genuine differences in the underlying effects. The 
corresponding weight in this case is the inverse of these two components. 
Figure 3.2 presents a forest plot of the respective studies using a “fixed effects” 
weighting scheme. In this figure, the estimated tax effects are weighted by the inverse of their 
estiamted standard errors. A weighted average is constructed for each study, along with a 95 
percent confidence interval. Several features of the forest plot are noteworthy. First, most of 
the studies estimate small effects with tight confidence intervals, though study 5 (Chernick, 






Figure 3.2: Forrest Plot of Studies (Fixed Effects) 
 
Second, there is a substantial amount of cross-study heterogeneity, indicated by an 
exceptionally large 𝐼2 value of 98.3% (Higgins and Thompson, 2002). As discussed above, 
different studies have different ways of incorporating the government budget constraint, of 
measuring tax effects of different durations, study different samples of states, and so on. The 


































































































high 𝐼2 value indicates that the differences across studies overwhelm the variation that would 
be expected solely from sampling error. Finally, the last column shows the percentage weight 
each study receives in calculating the overall weighted average. Study 14 (Reed, 2008) is 
weighted substantially more than all the other studies combined (65.34% versus 34.66%). 
The disproportionately large weight given to one study is not necessarily a concern if that one 
study is truly, substantially more reliable than the others. However, it may be prudent to use a 
more dispersed weighting scheme. 
Accordingly, the subsequent empirical work emphasizes the “random effects” 
estimates, where tax effects are weighted by their standard error plus a term that captures the 
cross-study heterogeneity. Because cross-study heterogeneity is so great, this will have the 
effect of equalizing the weights given to individual studies. Figure 3.3 displays the forest plot 
using random effects. The study weights are much more balanced. The Reed study now 
















NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis


































































































Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 reports two funnel plots, with estimates plotted against their 
standard errors. The top figure displays individual estimates. In the bottom figure, each study 
is represented by a single point relating its mean estimate to its mean standard error. 32 The 
solid line in both plots shows the overall mean of estimated tax effects. The dotted lines that 
fan out from the top of the funnel demarcate the 95% confidence area where most of the 
estimates would fall if the dispersion in estimates was driven solely by sampling error. 
Publication bias is indicated whenever a disproportionate number of estimates lie on one side 
of the inverted, V-shaped confidence area. Both funnel plots indicate publication bias, with a 
preference for negative estimates over positive ones. Further, the wide dispersion at the top of 
the funnel is consistent with substantial heterogeneity, as previously indicated by the 𝐼2 
value. 
 
                        Figure 3.4: Funnel Plot (Individual Estimates) 
 
                                                          
32 Both funnel plots omit observations where the standard error is greater than 1. This allows the reader to better 
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                        Figure 3.5: Funnel Plot (Mean of Study Estimates) 
FAT/PET tests. Table 3.5 reports the results of two tests: the Funnel Asymmetry Test 
(FAT) to test for publication bias, and the Precision Effect Test (PET), which tests for the 
significance of the overall effect.33 Both tests are obtained from estimating the following 
specification using Weighted Least Squares (WLS), 
?̂?1,𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗,                                                                                                          (3.2) 
where  ?̂?1,𝑖𝑗 is the estimated tax effect from regression j in study i. The null hypotheses for 
the FAT and PET are 𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0 and 𝐻0: 𝛽0 = 0, respectively. 
This analysis uses four different weights to estimate Equation (3.2). The Fixed Effects 








respectively, where 𝜏2 is the estimated variance of the population tax effect across studies. 
This set of weights makes no allowance for the fact that some studies report more estimates 
than others. As a result, a study with 50 estimates is weighted 50 times more than a study that 
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), where 𝑁𝑖 is the number of estimated tax effects reported in study i. The corresponding 
Fixed Effects (Weight 2) and Random Effects (Weight 2) estimators attempt to give equal 
weight to each study regardless of the number of tax effects each study reports.  

















































Observations 868 868 868 868 868 868 
Note: Values in Row (1) and Row (2) come from estimating 𝛽1 and 𝛽0, respectively, in Equation (3.2) in the text.  In both 
cases, the top value is the coefficient estimate, and the bottom value in parentheses is the associated t-statistic. The four 
WLS estimators (Fixed Effects-Weight1, Fixed Effects-Weight2, Random Effects-Weight1, and Random Effects-Weight2) 
are described in the “FAT/PET tests” subsection of Section 3.4 in the text.  All four of the estimation procedures calculate 
cluster robust standard errors.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, 
respectively. 
 
The first four columns of Table 3.5 report the results of estimating Equation (3.2) with 
WLS, using the four different weighting schemes described above. The FAT is reported in 
the first row. Apart from the first column in which the null hypothesis of no publication bias 
is rejected at the 5 percent level of significance, all the three remaining estimators reject the 
null at the 1 percent level of significance. The negative coefficients indicate that sample 
selection favours negative estimated tax effects, perhaps due to researchers choosing to 
disproportionately report negative estimates, or journals discriminating against positive 
results. These results are consistent with earlier observations about the histogram of estimated 
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effects and the visual evidence of publication bias from the funnel plots represented in 
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5. 
The first four columns of the second row of Table 3.5 report the PET estimates. All 
four estimators support the conclusion that the overall tax effect, controlling for publication 
bias, is statistically insignificant and relatively small in economic terms. For example, the 
Random Effects (Weight 1) estimate indicates that a ten percentage point increase in the tax 
rate is associated with a 0.09 percentage point decrease in annual GSP/Personal Income 
growth. The last two columns report random effects estimates of Equation (3.2) when the 
publication bias term (SEij) is not included, so that the overall estimate is not corrected for 
publication bias. The corresponding estimates of the overall tax effects are now substantially 
larger in absolute value and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. According to the 
Random Effects (Weight 1) estimate in Column (5), a ten percentage point increase in the tax 
rate is associated with a 0.38 percentage point decrease in annual GSP growth. These results 
indicate that the statistically and economically significant results reported in the literature are 
a consequence of publication bias that favours negative estimates of tax effects, while 
suppressing the publication of positive tax effects. As a result, I want to be sure that my 
subsequent analysis corrects for this. 
This section addresses the first goal of this research to obtain an “overall estimate” of 
the effect of taxes on economic growth in US States. We find that a publication bias adjusted 
estimate of the overall effect on tax is statistically insignificant and negligibly small in 
economic terms. However, my previous discussion on factors that cause tax estimates to 
differ across studies (cf. Section 3.3) makes clear that any estimate of overall tax effects is 
not particularly meaningful. The same fiscal policy action can be estimated as a positive or 
negative tax effect depending on the elements of the government budget constraint that are 
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omitted from the original study’s regression equation. Accordingly, the next section 
undertakes a meta-regression that allows tax effects to vary systematically according to study 
and data characteristics. 
Meta-regression. In this section, we compare tax effects associated with fiscal policies 
that are predicted to have negative growth effects, with those predicted to have positive 
effects. We also investigate whether some types of taxes are more growth-retarding than 
others. To do that, it will be necessary to control for the myriad factors that affect estimates 
of tax effects.  
Table 3.6 reports the variables used in the subsequent meta-regression analysis. The 
first sets of variables were previously discussed and match each tax effect to a prediction. A 
little more than an eighth of the estimated tax effects allow a definite sign prediction, with 9.9 
percent predicted to be negative, 3.3 percent predicted to be positive, and the rest ambiguous. 
As these three variables comprise the full set of possibilities, at least one variable must be 
omitted in the empirical analysis. Here and elsewhere we indicate the omitted variable with 
an asterisk.  
The second set of variables assign each tax effect to one of seven types of taxes 
(Labour, Capital, Consumption, Property, Other, Mixed, and Overall). The most common tax 
variable is constructed by taking the ratio of total tax revenues over GSP. Approximately 32.9 
percent of tax effects are of this type. However, many studies disaggregate tax effects into 
separate types. For example, 31.2 percent of estimated tax effects involve Labour taxes (e.g., 
personal income taxes, payroll taxes, social security contributions). Another 11.1 percent are 
associated with Capital taxes (e.g., corporate income taxes, occupational and business 
licencing tax, taxes on capital gains and dividends), 9.1 percent are related to Consumption 
taxes (e.g., sales tax, ad valorem taxes on goods and services, VAT), and 9.2 percent are 
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associated with Property taxes (e.g., taxes on property, taxes on immovable property, and 
land taxes). The remainder of tax effects mostly involve either a mix of different tax types or 
other tax types. 
Subsequent variables are grouped into numerous categories: State Group, Economic 
Growth Measure, Tax Variable Measure, Duration of Tax Effect, etc. Most of the observed 
tax effects are estimated using data from a set of 48 contiguous states (50.1%) where Alaska, 
Hawaii and the District of Columbia are excluded from the sample. This is in contrast to 
studies that included all the 50 states plus the District of Columbia (7%), or the ones that 
excluded Alaska, Hawaii, and District of Columbia as well as other states (11.6%). The 
remaining portion constitutes those excluding either Alaska (18.7%) or the District of 
Columbia (10.3%) or both (2.3%). In most cases, economic growth is measured in per capita 
personal income terms (63%), as opposed to GSP (20%), per capita GSP (10.8%), and 
personal income (6.1%). Most taxes are measured as average rates, rather than marginal 
(74.8% versus 25.2%); are specified in level rather than differenced form (80% versus 20%); 
and are effective rather than statutory tax rates (70.2% versus 29.8%). Most estimated tax 
effects measure the immediate effect of a tax change (86%), versus a medium- or long-run 
effect (11.5% and 2.5%, respectively).  
A little more than a quarter of the estimated tax effects in my meta-regression come 
from peer-reviewed journal articles with the mean year of publication being 2010.34 Most of 
the original studies used panel data to estimate tax effects (91%) as opposed to cross-section 
data (9%). The average sample length in the original studies was 28.6 years and the average 
mid-point year was 1989. About half of the tax effects were estimated using GLS. Of the 
remainder, 35.1 percent used OLS or a related procedure, and 9.8 percent attempted to correct 
                                                          
34 If the estimated tax effects come from a working paper then the publication year indicates the year in which 
the latest version of the paper is publicly available. 
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for endogeneity using a procedure such as TSLS or GMM. Because the standard error plays 
such a significant role in meta-regression analysis, we categorize standard errors into three 
groupings: SE-OLS (47.9%); SE-HET (18.8%), where standard errors were estimated using a 
heteroskedastic-robust estimator; and SE-Other (33.3%), whenever allowance was made for 
off-diagonal terms in the error variance-covariance matrix to be nonzero. Lastly, dummy 
variables were used to indicate the presence of important control variables, the most common 
of which were state fixed effects (77.4%) and measures of initial income (45.9%). A fifth of 
the estimated tax effects control for at least two of three measures of investment (e.g., capital 
investment, private capital, spending), employment growth (e.g., unemployment rate, 
population growth, wage), and human capital (e.g., educational achievement or education as a 
proxy for human capital). 
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics of Study Characteristics 
Variable Description Mean Min Max 
 PREDICTED TAX EFFECTS    
Prediction-Negative =1, if the theoretical prediction of the coefficient is negative  0.099 0 1 
Prediction-Ambiguous* =1, if the theoretical prediction of the coefficient is ambiguous 0.868 0 1 
Prediction-Positive =1, if the theoretical prediction of the coefficient is positive 0.033 0 1 
 TAX TYPE    
Labour-Tax =1, if labour tax 0.312 0 1 
Capital-Tax =1, if capital tax 0.111 0 1 
Consumption-Tax* =1, if consumption tax 0.091 0 1 
Property-Tax  =1, if property tax 0.092 0 1 
Other-Tax  =1, if other type of tax 0.046 0 1 
Mixed Tax =1, if multiple tax types (but not overall tax) 0.018 0 1 
Overall-Tax =1, if overall tax 0.329 0 1 
 STATE GROUP    
None =1, if all states and DoC are included 0.070 0 1 
AK =1, if Alaska is excluded 0.187 0 1 
DC =1, if District of Columbia is excluded 0.103 0 1 
AK, DC =1, if both Alaska and District of Columbia are excluded 0.023 0 1 
AK, HI, DC* =1, if states including (AK, HI, and DC) are excluded 0.501 0 1 
AKHIDCOthers =1, if states including (AK, HI, DC, and Others) are excluded 0.116 0 1 
 ECONOMIC GROWTH MEASURE    
GSP =1, if dependent variable is GSP growth 0.200 0 1 
PC-GSP =1, if dependent variable is per capita GSP growth 0.108 0 1 
PI =1, if dependent variable is PI growth 0.061 0 1 




Variable Description Mean Min Max 
 TAX VARIABLE MEASURE    
Marginal =1, if marginal tax rate (as opposed to average tax rate) 0.252 0 1 
Differenced =1, if change in tax rate (as opposed to level of tax rate) 0.200 0 1 
ETR =1, if effective tax rate (as opposed to statutory tax rate) 0.702 0 1 
 DURATION OF TAX EFFECT    
Short-run* =1, if tax variable measures immediate/short-run effect 0.860 0 1 
Medium-run =1, if tax variable measures cumulative/medium-run effect 0.115 0 1 
Long-run =1, if tax variable measures long-run, steady-state effect 0.025 0 0 
 STUDY TYPE    
Peer-reviewed =1, if study published in peer-reviewed journal 0.274 0 1 
Publication Year Year in which the last version of study was “published.” 2010 1985 2015 
 DATA TYPE    
Cross-section =1, if data are cross-sectional.  0.092 0 1 
Panel* =1, if data are panel. 0.908 0 1 
Length Length of sample time period. 28.6 5 65 
Mid-Year Midpoint of the sample time period. 1989 1921 2003.5 
 ESTIMATION TYPE    
OLS* =1, if OLS estimator is used. 0.351 0 1 
GLS =1, if Generalized Least Squares estimator is used. 0.551 0 1 
TSLS/GMM =1, if estimator corrects for endogeneity, e.g. 2SLS, 3SLS, or GMM.  0.098 0 1 
 STANDARD ERROR TYPE    
SE-OLS* =1, if OLS standard error is considered. 0.479 0 1 
SE-HET =1, if heteroskedasticity standard error is considered. 0.188 0 1 





Variable Description Mean Min Max 
 INCLUDED VARIABLES    
Initial income =1, if initial level of income included. 0.459 0 1 
Lagged DV =1, if lagged dependent variable included. 0.234 0 1 
StateFE =1, if the state fixed effects are included. 0.774 0 1 
HLK =1, if at least two out of three control variables (H, L, K) are included. 0.211 0 1 
Note: The grouped variables include all possible categories, where the categories omitted in the subsequent analysis are indicated by an asterisk, where applicable.
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In addressing the twin questions regarding the predictions of growth theory and 
differences in tax types on growth, we adopt the following empirical procedure. First we 
separate out the two sets of tax variables: Prediction-Negative and Prediction-Positive for 
addressing the first of the two research questions; and Labour-Tax, Capital-Tax, Property-
Tax, Other-Tax, Mixed-Tax and Overall-Tax to address the second question. We do this 
because the two sets of tax variables are significantly correlated. For example, Labour and 
Capital taxes are significantly associated with tax policies that are predicted to have negative 
effects. We then combine the two sets of tax variables to check for robustness.  
For each set of regressions, I also include two sets of control variables. The top panel of 
each table reports the regression results when all control variables are included in the 
equation. The bottom panel reports the regression results when a backwards stepwise 
procedure is used to select control variables, even while the tax variables are fixed to remain 
in each equation.35 The use of the stepwise procedure does not invalidate their significance 
testing, since the tax variables are locked into each regression. All regressions also include 
the publication bias variable, SE, and thus control for publication bias. 
The results of this analysis are given in Table 3.7 through Table 3.9. Table 3.7 reports 
the results when the prediction variables (Prediction-Negative and Prediction-Positive) are 
included in the meta-regression, while holding out the tax type variables. Prediction-Negative 
is negative but statistically insignificant in the two fixed effects regressions for both sets of 
control variables (Column 1 and 2, top and bottom panel). However, despite the expectation 
from growth theory, it is positive and significant and positive and insignificant in the 
following two random effects regressions (Column 3 and 4). The results are not supportive at 
                                                          
35 I use a backwards stepwise regression procedure that selects variables so as to minimize the Schwarz 
Information Criterion. I employed the user-written, Stata program vselect to implement the stepwise procedure. 
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all when it comes to the Prediction-Positive case. Almost in all cases (except in column 2, 
bottom panel), we estimate a negative and significant coefficient for this variable.  
         










































































Note: The top panel reports the results of estimating Equation (3.2) with the addition of the two 
tax variables, Prediction-Negative and Prediction-Positive.  The bottom panel adds control 
variables selected through a backwards stepwise regression procedure that selects variables so as 
to minimize the Schwarz Information Criterion (see Footnote #25).  The top value in each cell is 
the coefficient estimate, and the bottom value in parentheses is the associated t-statistic. The four 
WLS estimators (Fixed Effects-Weight1, Fixed Effects-Weight2, Random Effects-Weight1, and 
Random Effects-Weight2) are described in the “FAT/PET tests” subsection of Section 3.4 in the 
text.  All four estimation procedures calculate cluster robust standard errors.  *, **, and *** 























































































































































Note: The top panel reports the results of estimating Equation (3.2) with the addition of the five 
tax variables, Labour, Capital, Other, Mixed, and Overall taxes.  The bottom panel adds control 
variables selected through a backwards stepwise regression procedure that selects variables so as 
to minimize the Schwarz Information Criterion (see Footnote #25).  The top value in each cell is 
the coefficient estimate, and the bottom value in parentheses is the associated t-statistic. The four 
WLS estimators (Fixed Effects-Weight1, Fixed Effects-Weight2, Random Effects-Weight1, and 
Random Effects-Weight2) are described in the “FAT/PET tests” subsection of Section 3.4 in the 
text.  All four estimation procedures calculate cluster robust standard errors.  *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, respectively. 
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Note: This panel reports the results of estimating Equation (3.2) with the addition of the seven tax 
variables, Prediction-Negative, Prediction-Positive, Labour, Capital, Other, Mixed, and Overall 
taxes.  The top value in each cell is the coefficient estimate, and the bottom value in parentheses is 
the associated t-statistic. The four WLS estimators (Fixed Effects-Weight1, Fixed Effects-Weight2, 
Random Effects-Weight1, and Random Effects-Weight2) are described in the “FAT/PET tests” 
subsection of Section 3.4 in the text.  All four estimation procedures calculate cluster robust 
















































































































Note: This panel adds control variables selected through a backwards stepwise regression 
procedure that selects variables so as to minimize the Schwarz Information Criterion (see Footnote 
#25).  The top value in each cell is the coefficient estimate, and the bottom value in parentheses is 
the associated t-statistic. The four WLS estimators (Fixed Effects-Weight1, Fixed Effects-Weight2, 
Random Effects-Weight1, and Random Effects-Weight2) are described in the “FAT/PET tests” 
subsection of Section 3.4 in the text.  All four estimation procedures calculate cluster robust 






The results are even more inconsistent with the theoretical prodictions when the tax type 
variables are added to the specification. Table 3.9 reports the corresponding estimates. The 
coefficient for Prediction-Negative remains negative and statistically insignificant in the two 
fixed effects regressions (Column 1 and 2), but positive and statistically significant in the two 
random effects regressions (the top panel of column 3 and 4). Prediction-Positive is negative and 
statistically significant across all four estimation procedures, and for both sets of control 
variables (the exception is the bottom panel, second Column).  
The last tax issue addressed in this study investigates whether some types of taxes are 
more growth retarding than others. As noted in Table 3.1, Labour and Capital taxes are 
commonly classified as distortionary, while Consumption taxes are classified as non-
distortionary. Table 3.8 estimates a meta-regression with the tax type variables but with 
prediction variables omitted, while Table 3.9 includes both. As the omitted category is 
Consumption taxes, we expect the coefficient on Labour and Capital taxes to be negative, 
whereas there is no sign expectation for the other tax type coefficients.  
With respect to Labour taxes, the results from Table 3.8, with both sets of control 
variables, are negative but statistically insignificant in the Fixed Effects (Weight2) case, positive 
and statistically significant when using the Random Effects (Weight1) estimation, and positive 
and statistically insignificant in the two remaining estimation procedures. When prediction 
variables are added to the regression (cf. Table 3.9), the coefficient on Labour-Tax becomes all 
positive and statistically insignificant in three out of four cases. We can conclude that there is 
insufficient evidence that Labour taxes are more growth-retarding than Consumption taxes is 
mixed. 
There is also no evidence that Capital taxes are more distortionary than Consumption 
taxes. The coefficients on the Capital-Tax variable are positive in all Table 3.8 regressions. They 
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are insignificant across the fixed effects estimations and with both sets of control variables, but 
in contrast they are generally significant across the random effects estimations. When the 
prediction variables are added, the respective coefficients are generally positive and insignificant 
(cf. Table 3.9). One of the regressions even produces a significant positive coefficient (top and 
bottom panel, Random Effects-Weight1). As a result, we conclude that there is no evidence that 
Capital taxes are more distortionary than Consumption taxes. 
Bayesian model averaging of control variables. Having addressed the major goals of this 
study, we turn to an analysis of the control variables. There are 26 control variables not counting 
the two sets of tax variables. Multicollinearity is always a potential problem with so many 
variables. For example, when all the 26 variables are included with both sets of tax variables and 
the meta-regression is estimated using the Random Effects-Weight2 estimator, as in Column (4) 
of the top panel of Table 3.9, 5 of the 26 control variables are statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. When the backwards stepwise routine is employed, as in the bottom panel of Table 
3.9, 9 of the 26 control variables are significant. Two of the variables that are significant in the 
top panel are no longer significant in the bottom panel’s specification. Thus, variable selection 
makes a difference. This was not so much of a problem when we estimated tax effects, because 
the variables were locked into the respective specifications without regard to statistical 
significance. However, it is a problem when trying to decide which control variables to include 
in a parsimonious specification.  
We use Bayesian Model averaging (BMA) to address this issue (Zeugner, 2011). BMA 
involves running many regressions with various subsets of these 26 control variables and then 
constructing the weighted average over these regressions. Table 3.10 reports the results of an 
analysis where we lock in the tax variables Prediction-Negative and Prediction-Positive and then 
apply BMA to the 26 control variables. All specifications adjust for publication bias. The results 
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differ somewhat depending on the estimation procedure used. However, they are more consistent 
across analyses than would be the case, say, if we reported the results from the specifications 
that included all variables and those that employed stepwise regression. We report results for 
both the Fixed effects-Weight1 and Random Effects-Weight2 estimators. These two estimators 
use very different weighting schemes. Previous tables indicated that the estimates from these two 
estimators sometimes vary substantially. As a result, they provide an indication of robustness 
across estimation procedures.  
We report three summary measures. The Posterior Inclusion Probability (PIP) is a 
weighted probability that uses the likelihood values of specifications to construct a “probability” 
that a given specification is “true”. There are 1026 possible variable specifications with 26 
control variables. Variables that appear in specifications with high likelihood values will have 
larger PIP values. By construction, every variable appears in 50 percent of all possible 
specifications. However, the PIP can be very close to 100 percent if the specifications that 
include a variable have much greater likelihood values than those in which it is omitted. 
The Posterior Mean (Post. Mean) uses the above-mentioned probability values to weight 
the estimated coefficients from each specification. Specifications in which a variable is not 
included assign an “estimated value” of zero to construct the Posterior Mean. Lastly, BMA also 
calculates the probability that a given coefficient has a positive sign (Cond. Pos. Sign). This is 
constructed in the same manner as the Posterior Mean, except that it uses a dummy variable 
indicating positive value in constructing a weighted average rather than the estimated 
coefficients.  
Yellow rows in Table 3.10 highlight all the control variables that: (i) have a PIP greater 
than 50%; (ii) have a Conditional Positive Sign of either 1.00 or 0.00 – indicating that the 
respective coefficient is consistently estimated to be either positive or negative in the most likely 
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specifications; and (iii) have the same Conditional Positive Sign value for both the Fixed Effects 
(Weight1) and Random Effects (Weight2) estimators.  
Studies that estimate tax effects for all the states plus the District of Columbia while 
excluding Alaska from the sample produce consistently less negative/more positive estimates 
than studies excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia as is conventional in the 
literature. To place the size of the Posterior Mean values in context, it is helpful to recall that the 
median estimated tax effect from Table 3.4 is -0.055. By this standard, the effect of excluding 
AK from the sample is relatively large (0.180 and 0.175, respectively). The effect associated 
with excluding both Alaska and the District of Columbia is negative and smaller. We find that 
studies that employ Differenced (as opposed to level), generally produce more negative/less 
positive tax effects. Compared to the short-run effects of taxes, studies that estimate long-run 
effects produce estimates that are more negative/less positive.  
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     Table 3.10: Bayesian Model Averaging Analysis (Control Variables) 
Variable 
Fixed Effects(Weight1) Random Effects(Weight2) 
PIP Post. Mean Cond. Pos. Sign PIP Post. Mean Cond. Pos. Sign 
Peer-reviewed 0.79 -0.0023 0.14 0.07 -0.0011 0.10 
Publication Year 1.00 -0.0010 0.00 0.07 0.0001 0.00 
Cross-section 0.97 -0.0363 0.00 0.14 0.0064 1.00 
Length 1.00 0.0009 1.00 0.06 0.0000 0.31 
Mid-Year  0.92 0.0004 1.00 0.06 0.0000 0.92 
GSP 0.77 0.0081 0.97 0.06 0.0007 0.99 
PC-GSP 0.96 0.0498 1.00 0.05 -0.0003 0.22 
PI 0.95 -0.0075 0.00 0.15 -0.0096 0.00 
Marginal 0.88 0.0190 1.00 0.06 0.0008 0.98 
Differenced 1.00 -0.0326 0.00 1.00 -0.1054 0.00 
ETR 0.88 0.0123 1.00 1.00 -0.0933 0.00 
HLK 0.99 -0.0166 0.00 0.06 -0.0005 0.25 
Initial Income 0.89 -0.0096 0.01 0.08 -0.0017 0.01 
Lagged DV  1.00 0.0571 1.00 0.47 -0.0276 0.00 




Fixed Effects(Weight1) Random Effects(Weight2) 
PIP Post. Mean Cond. Pos. Sign PIP Post. Mean Cond. Pos. Sign 
SE-HET 1.00 -0.0401 0.00 0.12 0.0043 0.95 
SE-Other 0.99 -0.0127 0.00 0.05 -0.0002 0.22 
Medium-run 1.00 -0.0323 0.00 0.08 0.0019 0.84 
Long-run 0.83 -0.0551 0.00 0.86 -0.1535 0.00 
GLS 0.86 0.0065 0.98 0.68 0.0362 1.00 
TSLS/GMM 0.74 0.0003 0.71 0.07 0.0012 0.85 
None 0.74 -0.004 0.18 0.06 -0.0009 0.19 
AK 1.00 0.1798 1.00 1.00 0.1746 1.00 
DC 1.00 -0.0982 0.00 0.06 -0.0005 0.39 
AKDC 1.00 -0.1222 0.00 1.00 -0.2995 0.00 
AKDCHIOTHERS 0.79 0.0114 1.00 0.06 -0.0009 0.04 
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Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 provide visual representations of the BMA analysis for the tax 
(Prediction-Negative and Prediction-Positive) and control variables using the Fixed Effects 
(Weight1) and Random Effects (Weight2) estimators, respectively.36 The figures report estimates 
from the top 1000 models, out of 1026 possible models, account for a cumulative probability of 
approximately 37 and 23 percent. Red (blue) squares indicate that the respective coefficient is 
negative (positive) in the given model. A white square indicates that the variable is omitted from 
that model. Solid bands of the same colour across the figures indicate that the respective variable 
is consistently estimated to have the same sign across all 1000 models. In addition to confirming 
the results from Table 3.10, the figures also indicate the variable specifications of the top 
















                                                          
36 Note that in the associated specifications, the variable Precision corresponds to the constant term, while the 






 Figure 3.6: Visual Representation of BMA Analysis (Fixed Effects-Weight1) 
Note: Each column represents a single model. Variables are listed in descending order of Posterior Inclusion Probability (PIP) and have all been weighted 
according to the Fixed Effects-Weight1 case. Blue (dark) indicates that the variable is included in that model and estimated to be positive. Red (light) indicates that 
the variable is included and estimated to be negative. No colour (white) indicates that the variable is not included in that mode. Further details about this plot are 





               Figure 3.7: Visual Representation of BMA Analysis (Random Effects-Weight2) 
Note: Each column represents a single model. Variables are listed in descending order of Posterior Inclusion Probability (PIP) and have all been weighted 
according to the Random Effects-Weight2 case. Blue (dark) indicates that the variable is included in that model and estimated to be positive. Red (light) 
indicates that the variable is included and estimated to be negative. No colour (white) indicates that the variable is not included in that mode. Further details 





The impact of state and local taxes on state economic growth in the US has been a long-
lasting question. The importance of this issue is reflected by the large number of empirical 
studies investigating this relationship. However, the literature has generated a large number 
of frequently conflicting estimates. The main reason being that the estimates of tax effects of 
different studies are often estimating different things. It is important to realize that the same 
tax effect can be estimated to be positive or negative, depending on the omitted fiscal 
categories from the specification. As a result, ignoring the role of government budget 
constraints may change the results dramatically. For this and other reasons, it is valuable to 
collect the estimates from this literature and carefully track the differences within and 
between studies so that the estimates can be integrated in order to provide an overall 
assessment of the growth effects of taxes. 
This study combines 966 estimates derived from 29 studies, all of which examine the 
effect of taxes on economic growth in U.S. states. Extreme outliers are dropped from both 
ends of the sample range, and all the analyses discussed for a final sample of 868 estimates. 
The results show evidence of negative publication selection bias in the literature. Controlling 
for publication bias, the overall effect of state and local taxes on state economic growth is 
small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. However, this overall effect is not 
particularly meaningful since it lumps together different kinds of tax policies. With respect to 
particular types of taxes, I could not find enough evidence to support that taxes on labour are 
more growth retarding than other types of taxes. Evidence regarding other types of taxes is 
mixed.  
Overall, these results are very surprising and stand in stark contrast to the results I 
obtained in the previous chapter when analysing studies of tax effects in OECD countries.  
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Ironically, there is a temptation to keep manipulating the data until I get results from US 
states that are consistent with those from OECD countries.  However, I am mindful that this 
procedure violates the research plan with which I began my study.  To further manipulate the 
analysis to obtain consistent results would contribute to the very publication bias I am trying 
to overcome in my analysis.  As a result, I believe it is important to report the results for US 
states using the exact same procedures that I used for the OECD countries, without alteration.  
I leave it as a future research subject to further explore these inconsistencies.  
While further investigation is required to precisely explore the reasons for this state of 
affairs, there are three hypotheses that may explain the observed contrast in the reported 
results in two consecutive chapters. First, a simple comparison of summary statistics on the 
predicted tax effects respectively reported in Table 2.7 and Table 3.6 shows that research 
undertaken in US context generally ignores the government budget constraints. Second, 
Econometric methods applied in OECD studies are generally more sophisticated with some 
attempts to distinguish between the short- versus long-run effects. Finally, the econometrics 
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Appendix 3.1: List of Terms Used in Electronic Search by Category 
TAX ECONOMIC GROWTH U.S. STATES 
Tax(es) /Tax rate(s)/Taxation Economic growth Contiguous states  
State and local taxes/taxation Regional economic growth  U.S. States 
Tax policy(policies) State economic growth  American States 
Tax ratios State economic performance  State and local level 
Tax changes Regional economic activity  
Tax rate change Economic indicators  
State fiscal policy(policies) Long-term growth  
Tax structures/Fiscal 
structures 
Long-run growth  
Fiscal decentralization Growth  















Appendix 3.2: Letter to the Authors (U.S. States) 
 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
 
I am a Professor of economics at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand.  We have a 
research team here undertaking a “meta-analysis” of the relationship between taxes and 
economic growth in US states.   
  
A thorough meta-analysis involves collecting as many papers as possible on a subject, 
including unpublished research. The latter is known as “grey literature”, and includes 
conference proceedings, reports from research firms or think thanks, theses and dissertations, 
etc.   The unpublished literature is particularly important for addressing publication bias. 
  
In this context, I am asking for your help.  
  
Attached to this email is a listing of research on the topic of taxes and economic growth in 
US states.  To be included, the research had to (i) include data from at least 45 US states, (ii) 
have a dependent variable that was the growth of state per capita personal income (PCPI) or 
GSP, and (iii) include one or more measures of state-level taxes. 
  
I am contacting you because you have researched in this area in the past. 
  
Would you please look over this list and see if there any notable omissions?  I have broken 
the list down to the following categories: (i) journal articles, (ii) conference proceedings, (iii) 
studies from think tanks and research firms, (iv) theses/dissertations, and (v) working papers 
and unpublished research.   
  
The last two categories are especially difficult to get information on.  I would be greatly 
appreciative if you could identify any research we may have omitted. 
  
Finally, if you are aware of any researchers who are currently researching in this area, it 
would be great if you could reply back with their names, and I will follow up with them 
directly. 
  
I am sure you would agree that the subject of taxes and economic growth in US states is very 
important.  There is now a substantial enough literature that a careful meta-analysis can help 
to organize an empirical consensus of the existing literature. 
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Appendix 3.4: Final Sample of Studies 
ID Study Publication Status 
Number of 
estimates 
1 Arkes (2014) Working Paper  184 
2 Prillaman and Meier (2014)  Journal 68 
3 Bradly (2007) Thesis  1 
4 Chernick (1997) Journal 4 
5 Chernick (2010) Journal 3 
6 Clarke and Miller (2013) Working Paper  180 
7 Feng and Young (2003) Working Paper  28 
8 Goff, Lebedinsky and Lile (2012) Journal 12 
9 Mc Cracken (2006) Thesis 14 
10 Miller and Russek (1997) Journal 50 
11 Mullen and Williams (1994) Journal 22 
12 Ojede, atems and Yamarik (2014) Working Paper  18 
13 Pjesky (2002) Thesis  27 
14 Reed (2008) Journal 55 
15 Rhee (2012) Working Paper  40 
16 Srithongrung (2013) Working Paper  6 
17 Tomljanovich (2004) Journal 33 
18 Vedder (1990, 1996) Journal + Working Paper  7 
19 Wibow (2003) Thesis 24 
20 Yamarik (2000) Journal 5 
21 Yu, Wallace and Nardinelli (1991) Journal 20 
22 ECIN-Jan-2014-1240 (2014) Working Paper  22 
23 Helms (1985) Journal 12 
24 Bauer et l. (2012) Journal 6 
25 Rasmussen and Zuehlke (1990) Journal 4 
26 Caporale and Leirer (2010) Journal 5 
27 Goetz et al. (2010) Journal 2 
28 Gale et al. (2015)  Journal 94 




Appendix 3.5: Litearure Search Flow Diagram 
 
  
Records identified through 
database searching (n=457) 
Additional records identified 
through other sources (n=53) 
Records after duplicates removed (n=472) 




Full-text articles assessed for 
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Full-text articles excluded 
(n=15) 
Studies included in 
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                    Appendix 3.6: List of States of the United States 
ID State State Abbreviations 
1 Alaska AK 
2 Alabama AL 
3 Arkansas AR 
4 Arizona AZ 
5 California CA 
6 Colorado CO 
7 Connecticut CT 
8 Delaware DE 
9 Florida FL 
10 Georgia GA 
11 Hawaii HI 
12 Iowa IA 
13 Idaho ID 
14 Illinois IL 
15 Indiana IN 
16 Kansas KS 
17 Kentucky KY 
18 Louisiana LA 
19 Massachusetts MA 
20 Maryland MD 
21 Maine ME 
22 Michigan MI 
23 Minnesota MN 
24 Missouri MO 
25 Mississippi MS 
26 Montana MT 
27 North Carolina NC 
28 North Dakota ND 
29 Nebraska NE 
30 New Hampshire NH 
31 New Jersey NJ 
32 New Mexico NM 
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ID State State Abbreviations 
33 Nevada NV 
34 New York NY 
35 Ohio OH 
36 Oklahoma OK 
37 Oregon OR 
38 Pennsylvania PA 
39 Rhode Island RI 
40 South Carolina SC 
41 South Dakota SD 
42 Tennessee TN 
43 Texas TX 
44 Utah UT 
45 Virginia VA 
46 Vermont VT 
47 Washington WA 
48 Wisconsin WI 
49 West Virginia WV 
50 Wyoming WY 








Appendix 3.7: Stata Codes 
.do file for TABLE 3.4 
 
log using "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\US\SampleMeans.smcl", replace 
set more off 
set type double  
graph drop _all 
import excel "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\US\TAX.xlsx", sheet("Stata") firstrow 
case (lower) 
//TABLE 4-Descriptive Statistica, Column 1(Estimated Tax Effects)-Full 
summ coefficient, detail 
//TABLE 4-Descriptive Statistica, Column 3(t-statistics)-Full 
summ tstatistics, detail 
//Mean absolute value of t-statitics 
gen abststat=abs(tstat) 
summ abststat 
//TABLE 4-Descriptive Statistica, Column 2(Estimated Tax Effects)-Truncated 
summ coefficient, detail 
scalar low = r(p5) 
scalar high = r(p95) 
gen endog = (tsls == 1 | gmm == 1) 
keep if coefficient > low & coefficient < high 
summ coefficient, detail 
//TABLE 4-Descriptive Statistica, Column 4(t-statistics)-Truncated 
summ tstatistics, detail 




















.do file for TABLE 3.5 
 
clear   
log using "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\US\Part1 Results.smcl", replace 
set more off 
set type double  
graph drop _all 
import excel "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\US\TAX.xlsx", sheet("Stata") firstrow 
case (lower) 
summ coefficient, detail 
scalar low = r(p5) 
scalar high = r(p95) 
summ tstat, detail 
summ coefficient tstat if coefficient > low & coefficient < high, detail 
 
keep if coefficient > low & coefficient < high 
 
// Generating transformed variables for FE and RE 
gen feprecision = 1/se 
gen fetstat = coefficient/se 
 
*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*   TABLE 5: FAT/PET                                                                        * 
*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
// Fixed Effects with SE 
//NOTE: If the coefficient on the constant term is significant, that  
//is evidence of publication bias 
// Fixed Effects 
//This regression gives equal weight to each observation 
// TABLE 5 - Column 1 
regress fetstat feprecision, vce(cluster idstudy) 
//This regression gives equal weight to each study 
// TABLE 5 - Column 2 
regress fetstat feprecision [pweight = weight], vce(cluster idstudy) 
// Fixed Effects without SE 
//NOTE: If the coefficient on the constant term is significant, that  
//is evidence of publication bias 
// Fixed Effects 
//This regression gives equal weight to each observation 
// TABLE 5 - (not reported) 
regress fetstat feprecision, noc vce(cluster idstudy) 
//This regression gives equal weight to each study 
// TABLE 5 - (not reported) 
regress fetstat feprecision [pweight = weight], noc vce(cluster idstudy) 
 
 
metan coefficient se, random 
scalar tau2 = r(tau2) 
gen revar = se^2 + tau2 
gen rese = sqrt(revar) 
gen reprecision = 1/rese 
gen retstat = coefficient/rese 
 
// Random Effects with SE 
//This regression gives equal weight to each observation 
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// TABLE 5 - Column 3 
regress retstat reprecision,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
//This regression gives equal weight to each study 
// TABLE 5 - Column 4 
regress retstat reprecision [pweight = weight], vce(cluster idstudy) 
// TABLE 5 - Column 5 
regress retstat reprecision, noc vce(cluster idstudy) 
//This regression gives equal weight to each study 
// TABLE 5 - Column 6 





























.do file for TABLE 3.6 
 
clear   
log using "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\US\Part1 Results.smcl", replace 
set more off 
set type double  
graph drop _all 
import excel "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\US\TAX.xlsx", sheet("Stata") firstrow 
case (lower) 
summ coefficient, detail 
scalar low = r(p5) 
scalar high = r(p95) 
 
keep if coefficient > low & coefficient < high 
gen endog = (tsls == 1 | gmm == 1) 
summ predneg predother predpos /// 
labourtax capitaltax consumptiontax othertaxes mixedtaxes propertytax overalltax /// 
none ak dc akdc akhidc akhidcothers /// 
gsp pcgsp pi pcpi /// 
marginal differenced etr /// 
lrcase1 lrcase2 lrcase3 /// 
peerreviewed pubyear /// 
cs panel /// 
length midyear /// 
ols gls endog /// 
seols sehet sehac /// 



















.do file for TABLE 3.7 
 
clear  
log using "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\US\Part1 Results.smcl", replace 
set more off 
set type double  
graph drop _all 
import excel "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\US\TAX.xlsx", sheet("Stata") firstrow 
case (lower) 
quietly summ coefficient, detail 
scalar low = r(p5) 
scalar high = r(p95) 
keep if coefficient > low & coefficient < high 
 
gen endog = (tsls == 1 | gmm == 1) 
 
// Generating transformed variables for FE and RE 
gen feprecision = 1/se 
gen fetstat = coefficient/se 
gen peerreviewedd = peerreviewed/se 
gen pubyearr = pubyear/se 
gen css = cs/se 
gen lengthh = length/se 
gen midyearr = midyear/se 
gen gspp = gsp/se 
gen pcgspp = pcgsp/se 
gen pii = pi/se 
gen labourtaxx = labourtax/se 
gen capitaltaxx = capitaltax/se 
gen propertytaxx = propertytax/se 
gen overalltaxx = overalltax/se 
gen othertaxess = othertaxes/se 
gen mixedtaxess = mixedtaxes/se 
gen marginall = marginal/se 
gen differencedd = differenced/se 
gen etrr = etr/se 
gen prednegg = predneg/se 
gen predposs = predpos/se 
gen hlkk = hlk/se 
gen incomee = income/se 
gen laggeddvv = laggeddv/se 
gen statefee = statefe/se 
gen sehacc = sehac/se 
gen sehett = sehet/se 
gen lrcase22 = lrcase2/se 
gen lrcase33 = lrcase3/se 
gen glss = gls/se 
gen endogg = endog/se 
gen nonee = none/se 
gen akk = ak/se 
gen dcc = dc/se 
gen akdcc = akdc/se 








************ FIXED EFFECTS ********************* 
********************************************** 
 
// These specifications include the SeR term 
// NOTE: The constant term is the SER term 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH OBSERVATION 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 1, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect fetstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss, backward bic /// 
fix(feprecision prednegg predposs) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 1, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg fetstat feprecision   /// 
prednegg predposs pubyearr lengthh midyearr differencedd /// 




//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH STUDY 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs  [pweight = weight], vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 2, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss [pweight = weight],  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect fetstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss  [pweight = weight], backward bic /// 




//TABLE 7, Collumn 2, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg fetstat feprecision   /// 
prednegg predposs pubyearr lengthh midyearr differencedd hlkk /// 





************ RANDOM EFFECTS ******************* 
*********************************************** 
 
metareg coefficient predneg predpos, wsse(se) 
scalar tau2 = e(tau2) 
display tau2 
gen revar = se^2 + tau2 
gen rese = sqrt(revar) 
 
gen reprecision = 1/rese 
gen retstat = coefficient/rese 
replace peerreviewedd = peerreviewed/rese 
replace pubyearr = pubyear/rese 
replace css = cs/rese 
replace lengthh = length/rese 
replace midyearr = midyear/rese 
replace gspp = gsp/rese 
replace pcgspp = pcgsp/rese 
replace pii = pi/rese 
replace labourtaxx = labourtax/rese 
replace capitaltaxx = capitaltax/rese 
replace propertytaxx = propertytax/rese 
replace overalltaxx = overalltax/rese 
replace othertaxess = othertaxes/rese 
replace mixedtaxess = mixedtaxes/rese 
replace marginall = marginal/rese 
replace differencedd = differenced/rese 
replace etrr = etr/rese 
replace prednegg = predneg/rese 
replace predposs = predpos/rese 
replace hlkk = hlk/rese 
replace incomee = income/rese 
replace laggeddvv = laggeddv/rese 
replace statefee = statefe/rese 
replace sehacc = sehac/rese 
replace sehett = sehet/rese 
replace lrcase22 = lrcase2/rese 
replace lrcase33 = lrcase3/rese 
replace glss = gls/rese 
replace endogg = endog/rese 
replace nonee = none/rese 
replace akk = ak/rese 
replace dcc = dc/rese 
replace akdcc = akdc/rese 





//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH OBSERVATION 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 3, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect retstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss, backward bic /// 
fix(reprecision prednegg predposs) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 3, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg retstat reprecision  /// 
prednegg predposs differencedd etrr lrcase33 /// 
akk akdcc,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH STUDY 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs [pweight = weight], vce(cluster id) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 4, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss [pweight = weight],  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect retstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss [pweight = weight], backward bic /// 
fix(reprecision prednegg predposs) 
 
//TABLE 7, Collumn 4, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg retstat reprecision /// 
prednegg predposs pubyearr css midyearr pii /// 






.do file for TABLE 3.8 
 
clear  
log using "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\US\Type of Tax Results.smcl", replace 
set more off 
set type double  
graph drop _all 
import excel "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\US\TAX.xlsx", sheet("Stata") firstrow 
case (lower) 
quietly summ coefficient, detail 
scalar low = r(p5) 
scalar high = r(p95) 
keep if coefficient > low & coefficient < high 
 
gen endog = (tsls == 1 | gmm == 1) 
 
// Generating transformed variables for FE and RE 
gen feprecision = 1/se 
gen fetstat = coefficient/se 
gen peerreviewedd = peerreviewed/se 
gen pubyearr = pubyear/se 
gen css = cs/se 
gen lengthh = length/se 
gen midyearr = midyear/se 
gen gspp = gsp/se 
gen pcgspp = pcgsp/se 
gen pii = pi/se 
gen labourtaxx = labourtax/se 
gen capitaltaxx = capitaltax/se 
gen propertytaxx = propertytax/se 
gen overalltaxx = overalltax/se 
gen othertaxess = othertaxes/se 
gen mixedtaxess= mixedtaxes/se 
gen marginall = marginal/se 
gen differencedd = differenced/se 
gen etrr = etr/se 
gen prednegg = predneg/se 
gen predposs = predpos/se 
gen hlkk = hlk/se 
gen incomee = income/se 
gen laggeddvv = laggeddv/se 
gen statefee = statefe/se 
gen sehacc = sehac/se 
gen sehett = sehet/se 
gen lrcase22 = lrcase2/se 
gen lrcase33 = lrcase3/se 
gen glss = gls/se 
gen endogg = endog/se 
gen nonee = none/se 
gen akk = ak/se 
gen dcc = dc/se 
gen akdcc = akdc/se 








************ FIXED EFFECTS ********************* 
********************************************** 
 
// These specifications include the SeR term 
// NOTE: The constant term is the SER term 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH OBSERVATION 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 1, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect fetstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss, backward bic /// 
fix(feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx ) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 1, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg fetstat feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
pubyearr lengthh midyearr differencedd hlkk incomee laggeddvv /// 




//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH STUDY 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
 [pweight = weight], vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 2, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss [pweight = weight],  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect fetstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss [pweight = weight], backward bic /// 
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fix(feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 2, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg fetstat feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 




************ RANDOM EFFECTS ******************* 
*********************************************** 
 
metareg coefficient labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
, wsse(se) 
scalar tau2 = e(tau2) 
display tau2 
gen revar = se^2 + tau2 
gen rese = sqrt(revar) 
 
gen reprecision = 1/rese 
gen retstat = coefficient/rese 
replace peerreviewedd = peerreviewed/rese 
replace pubyearr = pubyear/rese 
replace css = cs/rese 
replace lengthh = length/rese 
replace midyearr = midyear/rese 
replace gspp = gsp/rese 
replace pcgspp = pcgsp/rese 
replace pii = pi/rese 
replace labourtaxx = labourtax/rese 
replace capitaltaxx = capitaltax/rese 
replace propertytaxx = propertytax/rese 
replace overalltaxx = overalltax/rese 
replace othertaxess = othertaxes/rese 
replace mixedtaxess = mixedtaxes/rese 
replace marginall = marginal/rese 
replace differencedd = differenced/rese 
replace etrr = etr/rese 
replace prednegg = predneg/rese 
replace predposs = predpos/rese 
replace hlkk = hlk/rese 
replace incomee = income/rese 
replace laggeddvv = laggeddv/rese 
replace statefee = statefe/rese 
replace sehacc = sehac/rese 
replace sehett = sehet/rese 
replace lrcase22 = lrcase2/rese 
replace lrcase33 = lrcase3/rese 
replace glss = gls/rese 
replace endogg = endog/rese 
replace nonee = none/rese 
replace akk = ak/rese 
replace dcc = dc/rese 
replace akdcc = akdc/rese 




//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH OBSERVATION 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg retstat reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 3, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg retstat reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect retstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss, backward bic /// 
fix(reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 3, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg retstat reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
marginall differencedd akk akdcc,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH STUDY 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg retstat reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
 [pweight = weight], vce(cluster id) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 4, Top Panel 
//Regression with all control variables 
reg retstat reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss [pweight = weight], vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect retstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss [pweight = weight], backward bic /// 
fix(reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx) 
 
//TABLE 8, Collumn 4, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg retstat reprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css midyearr pcgspp pii marginall differencedd sehacc sehett glss akhidcotherss 





.do file for TABLE 3.9 
 
clear  
log using "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\US\All Tax Var Results.smcl", replace 
set more off 
set type double  
graph drop _all 
import excel "\\file\UsersN$\nal53\Home\Desktop\(Nazila's program)\US\TAX.xlsx", sheet("Stata") firstrow 
case (lower) 
quietly summ coefficient, detail 
scalar low = r(p5) 
scalar high = r(p95) 
keep if coefficient > low & coefficient < high 
 
gen endog = (tsls == 1 | gmm == 1) 
 
// Generating transformed variables for FE and RE 
gen feprecision = 1/se 
gen fetstat = coefficient/se 
gen peerreviewedd = peerreviewed/se 
gen pubyearr = pubyear/se 
gen css = cs/se 
gen lengthh = length/se 
gen midyearr = midyear/se 
gen gspp = gsp/se 
gen pcgspp = pcgsp/se 
gen pii = pi/se 
gen labourtaxx = labourtax/se 
gen capitaltaxx = capitaltax/se 
gen propertytaxx = propertytax/se 
gen overalltaxx = overalltax/se 
gen othertaxess = othertaxes/se 
gen mixedtaxess= mixedtaxes/se 
gen marginall = marginal/se 
gen differencedd = differenced/se 
gen etrr = etr/se 
gen prednegg = predneg/se 
gen predposs = predpos/se 
gen hlkk = hlk/se 
gen incomee = income/se 
gen laggeddvv = laggeddv/se 
gen statefee = statefe/se 
gen sehacc = sehac/se 
gen sehett = sehet/se 
gen lrcase22 = lrcase2/se 
gen lrcase33 = lrcase3/se 
gen glss = gls/se 
gen endogg = endog/se 
gen nonee = none/se 
gen akk = ak/se 
gen dcc = dc/se 
gen akdcc = akdc/se 








************ FIXED EFFECTS ********************* 
********************************************** 
// These specifications include the SeR term 
// NOTE: The constant term is the SER term 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH OBSERVATION 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess 
overalltaxx  /// 
,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 1, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess 
overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect fetstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss, backward bic /// 
fix(feprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 1, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess 
overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr lengthh differencedd /// 
laggeddvv sehett lrcase22 akk dcc akdcc ,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH STUDY 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess 
overalltaxx  /// 
 [pweight = weight], vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 2, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess 
overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss [pweight = weight],  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
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vselect fetstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss [pweight = weight], backward bic /// 
fix(feprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 2, Bottom Panel 
//We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg fetstat feprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess 
overalltaxx  /// 
pubyearr lengthh midyearr marginall differencedd hlkk laggeddvv sehacc sehett glss /// 




************ RANDOM EFFECTS ******************* 
*********************************************** 
metareg coefficient labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess overalltaxx  /// 
predneg predpos, wsse(se) 
scalar tau2 = e(tau2) 
display tau2 
gen revar = se^2 + tau2 
gen rese = sqrt(revar) 
 
gen reprecision = 1/rese 
gen retstat = coefficient/rese 
replace peerreviewedd = peerreviewed/rese 
replace pubyearr = pubyear/rese 
replace css = cs/rese 
replace lengthh = length/rese 
replace midyearr = midyear/rese 
replace gspp = gsp/rese 
replace pcgspp = pcgsp/rese 
replace pii = pi/rese 
replace labourtaxx = labourtax/rese 
replace capitaltaxx = capitaltax/rese 
replace propertytaxx = propertytax/rese 
replace overalltaxx = overalltax/rese 
replace othertaxess = othertaxes/rese  
replace mixedtaxess = mixedtaxes/rese 
replace marginall = marginal/rese 
replace differencedd = differenced/rese 
replace etrr = etr/rese 
replace prednegg = predneg/rese 
replace predposs = predpos/rese 
replace hlkk = hlk/rese 
replace incomee = income/rese 
replace laggeddvv = laggeddv/rese 
replace statefee = statefe/rese 
replace sehacc = sehac/rese 
replace sehett = sehet/rese 
replace lrcase22 = lrcase2/rese 
replace lrcase33 = lrcase3/rese 
replace glss = gls/rese 
replace endogg = endog/rese 
replace nonee = none/rese 
replace akk = ak/rese 
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replace dcc = dc/rese 
replace akdcc = akdc/rese 
replace akhidcotherss = akhidcothers/rese 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH OBSERVATION 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx othertaxess mixedtaxess 
overalltaxx  /// 
,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 3, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx mixedtaxess othertaxess 
overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss,  vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect retstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss, backward bic /// 
fix(reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx mixedtaxess othertaxess overalltaxx) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 3, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx mixedtaxess othertaxess 
overalltaxx  /// 
marginall differencedd lrcase33 akk akdcc , vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//THIS SECTION GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO EACH STUDY 
// Basic regression with no control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx mixedtaxess othertaxess 
overalltaxx  /// 
 [pweight = weight], vce(cluster id) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
//TABLE 9, Collumn 4, Top Panel 
// Regression with all control variables 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx mixedtaxess othertaxess 
overalltaxx  /// 
peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss [pweight = weight], vce(cluster idstudy) 
display e(r2_a) 
 
// Here we use backwards stepwise regression selecting on the best regression using the BIC criterion 
// We lock in the variables: feprecision labourtaxx capitaltaxx consumptiontaxx othertaxess prednegg predposs 
vselect retstat peerreviewedd pubyearr css lengthh midyearr gspp pcgspp pii marginall differencedd etrr  /// 
hlkk incomee laggeddvv statefee sehacc sehett lrcase22 lrcase33 /// 
glss endogg nonee akk dcc akdcc akhidcotherss [pweight = weight], backward bic /// 




//TABLE 9, Collumn 4, Bottom Panel 
// We take the results from the preceding stepwise regression and reestimate the best model 
// but this time with cluster robust standard errors 
reg retstat reprecision prednegg predposs labourtaxx capitaltaxx propertytaxx mixedtaxess othertaxess 
overalltaxx  /// 
































R Commands for TABLE 3.10 
 
Download R from the following link: 
https://cran.r-project.org/src/base/R-3/ 
The one I am applying is R-3.2.1.tar.gz 
 
After opening up the R, type the following commands: 




The data file should have the dependent variable as the first column. 
 
Open the data file (Excel spreadsheet )                  copy data 
 
TAX1=read.table("clipboard-512", sep="\t", header=TRUE) 
 
TAX11 = bms(TAX1, burn=10000000, iter=10000000, g="hyper", mprior="random", 







coef(TAX11, order.by.pip = T, exact=T, include.constant=T) 
 
































Chapter 4. Meta-Analysis and Publication Bias: 








Meta-regression analysis offers a statistical analysis through which conflicting theoretical 
and/or empirical findings on a given topic can be summarized and compared. Two main 
objectives of meta-regression analysis are (i) to reach a single conclusion about the 
magnitude and significance of the results, and (ii) to compare findings yielded from various 
studies and explain potential reasons for the heterogeneity observed among estimates. Meta-
regression analysis has become an increasingly popular method in economics and business. 
Figure 4.1 depicts a time series bar chart that lists all Web of Science journal articles in 
economics and business that have the word “meta-analysis” in the title. The trend is clearly 
upward reflecting the fact that the number of studies applying this tool is increasing over 
time. 
 
Figure 4.1: Number of Articles in Economics and Business Listed in Web of Science with 
“Meta-Analysis” in the Title 
Note: Web of Science categories are: Economics, Business Finance, Business, Management, Criminology 




It is well known that publication selection bias or “selectivity bias” can distort the 
distribution of estimated effects in the literature. Publication bias might happen because there 
is a tendency amongst researchers, reviewers, and editors to avoid reporting and publishing 
statistically insignificant estimates or estimates which are inconsistent with well-established 
theories. As a result, the true effect of the focal predictor on the response variable might be 
over- or under-estimated. An example of the second type of bias called directional 
publication bias was provided by Stanley (2005). He documented how the price elasticity of 
water demand is exaggerated fourfold in the literature as a direct result of publication 
selection bias. It is generally accepted that positive estimates of price elasticities of demand 
are inconsistent with theory. 
The data used for meta-analysis consist of estimated effects from studies on a particular 
phenomenon. If the distribution of those effects is distorted, so will be any conclusion derived 
from them. It is therefore crucial to identify whether the literature on a given topic suffers 
from publication selection bias and if there is, how it should be corrected.  
A common procedure for doing this in the economics and business literature is through 
the FAT-PET-PEESE procedure (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012; 2014a). Figure 4.2 shows 
the associated four steps procedure. The first is the Funnel Asymmetry Test (FAT) to test 
whether the sample of estimates is influenced by publication selection bias. It uses Weighted 
Least Squares (WLS) to regress the estimated effects (α̂j) on a constant term (β0) and the 
standard errors of the estimated effects (SEj); where weights ωi = (
1
SEi
) are applied to 
correct for heteroskedasticity in the estimates (which is inevitable in meta-regression 
analysis). If the estimated coefficient on the standard error variable, β̂1, is statistically 





Figure 4.2: FAT-PET-PEESE Procedure 
 
Source: Adapted from Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012, page 79). 
Regardless of the results in the previous step, the next step is to conduct a Precision 
Effect Test (PET) to test whether there is a genuine, non-zero, true effect of estimates once 
publication bias is accommodated and corrected. It uses the same equation as the FAT, but 
Meta-Study 
1. Conduct FAT; 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟏 = 𝟎 
?̂?𝒊
𝑺𝑬𝒊
=  𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟎 (
𝟏
𝑺𝑬𝒊











2. Conduct PET; 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟎 = 𝟎 
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4. Estimate 𝜷𝟎 using PEESE: 
?̂?𝒊
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3. We fail to find sufficient 




tests whether 𝛽0 = 0. If the 𝑆𝐸𝑖 variable were not included in the equation and if OLS was 
used rather than WLS, then the estimate of 𝛽0 would simply be the arithmetic mean of the 
estimated effects in the literature. Thus, ?̂?0 is an estimate of the overall effect, and the PET 
tests ?̂?0 for statistical significance, correcting for publication bias. 
If the PET fails to reject the null hypothesis of no effect, then β̂0 is taken as the 
estimate of overall effect with the understanding that it is not statistically significantly 
different from zero. In other words, there is not enough evidence to support the existence of 
any empirical effect. If the PET, however, rejects the null, then one concludes that there is a 
genuine non-zero true effect.  In that case, one estimates a new specification known as the 
PEESE, or Precision Effect Estimate with Standard Error.  The corresponding estimate of β0 
then becomes the “best” estimate of the overall effect.  
Given the wide application of the FAT-PET-PEESE (FPP) procedure in the economics 
and business literature (e.g. Costa-Font; Gemmill, and Rubert (2011); Doucouliagos, Stanley, 
and Viscusi (2014); Doucouliagos and Paldam (2013); Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett (2011); 
Haelermans and Borghans (2012); Havránek (2010); Iwasaki and Tokunaga (2014); Laroche 
(2016); Lazzaroni and Van Bergeijik (2014); Linde Leonard, Stanley, and Doucouliagos 
(2014); and Nelson (2013)), it is surprising that there have not been any comparative 
evaulations of its performance. That is the purpose of this chapter.   
The three objectives of this study are to evaluate how well the FAT-PET-PEESE 
procedure (i) correctly detects the existence of publication selection bias, (ii) correctly tests 
the existence of a genuine non-zero true effect, and (iii) compares with three common meta-
analysis estimators that do not correct for publication bias. 
I use Monte Carlo experiments to demonstrate that the FPP procedure does not perform 
well in the kind of statistical environments one would expect to encounter in economics and 
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business. Section 4.2 describes my Monte Carlo experiments including associated 
terminology. Section 4.3 describes my experimental design and the simulated datasets used in 
my analysis, and also presents the results. Section 4.4 presents the main conclusions from this 
research. 
4.2. Description of the Monte Carlo Experiments   
4.2.1. Publication Bias 
It is widely recognized that publication selection bias or “selectivity bias” distorts the 
distribution of estimated effects that appear in the literature. This arises because there is a 
tendency amongst researchers, reviewers, and editors to submit or accept manuscripts for 
publication based upon the direction or the strength of their results. Thus, it is unlikely that 
papers with statistically insignificant results or results which are not in line with an 
established theory could get published in a peer-reviewed journal. These studies usually end 
up sitting, unpublished, in file drawers of researchers. That is why this problem is called the 
“file-drawer problem” (Rosenthal, 1979). 
Two popular types of publication bias modelled in these experiments are: (i) 
publication bias against insignificant results and (ii) publication bias against wrong-sign 
results. An example of the latter is a price elasticity where there is a strong presumption that 
the estimate should be negative, so that positive estimates will find it difficult to get 
published.  
In my analysis, I model the first type of publication bias assuming that there is a 
tendency in favour of the strength of the results. Therefore, if the absolute values of the 
reported t-statistics associated with the estimates are greater than or equal to 2, then they will 
get published. Studies with insignificant estimates can still get published, but with a relatively 
small probability. For the second type of publication bias, I assume that theory predicts the 
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“correct” sign should be positive. The publication process then works against negative 
estimates.  While negative estimates can still get published, they can do so only with a 
relatively small probability.  
4.2.2. Estimators 
I use Monte Carlo experiments to compare the performance of seven different estimators. For 
the sake of comparison, I use estimators studied by Reed (2015).37 However, the main focus 
of this study is on a new estimator, the estimator described above as part of the FAT-PET-
PEESE procedure. I compare these estimators using three performance measures: Bias, 
Mean-Squared Error (MSE) as an efficiency test, and Type I error rates associated with 
testing whether the estimate of 𝛼 equals its true value. The remainder of this section describes 
the respective estimators.  
The “Unadjusted” estimator. The unadjusted estimator of the mean true effect of 𝑥 on 𝑦 is 
given by OLS estimates of 𝛽0 in the following equation: 
?̂?𝑖1 =  𝛽0 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑀                                                                                                (4.1) 
where ?̂?𝑖1 is the 𝑖th estimated effect of 𝑦 on 𝑥, and 𝑀 is the number of estimates in the “Post-
Publication” bias sample. The unadjusted estimator simply calculates the arithmetic mean of 
estimated effects across studies. It is used as a benchmark to compare the various meta-
analysis (MA) estimators against.  
The “Fixed Effects” (FE) estimator. Under this model I assume that there is one true 
underlying effect size and the only reason for the studies to obtain different estimated effect 
sizes is due solely to sampling error. This is why Borenstein et al. (2010) call this model the 
“common-effect model,” which conveys the message more precisely. The fixed effect 
                                                          




estimator weights all the observations by the inverse of the estimated standard error of ?̂?𝑖, 
𝑆𝐸𝑖. The FE estimator of the mean true effect is the weighted least squares estimate of 𝛽0, 
except that the residuals are standardized to produce a sample variance of 1. 
?̂?𝑖1
𝑆𝐸𝑖






, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑀                                                                                      (4.2) 
The “Weighted Least Squares” (WLS) estimator. The WLS estimator is identical to the 
FE estimator except that the residual remains unstandardized. It is worthwhile to note that 
both FE and WLS estimators produce identical estimates of 𝛽0, but the associated standard 
errors are different. 
The “Random Effects” (RE) estimator. While the fixed effects models assume that 
there is one underlying true effect for all studies, this assumption seems quite implausible for 
most meta-analyses conducted in economics and business. Thus, under this model I assume 
that there is a distribution of true underlying effects and the goal is to estimate the mean of 
this distribution of true effects. The RE estimator is motivated by the assumption that 
differences in estimated effects across studies are due to (i) sampling error and also (ii) 
genuine differences in the underlying effects. The second component is represented by 𝜏, 
which is the “between studies” variance. If the two variances are independent of each other, 
then,  
𝑆𝐸(?̂?𝑖) =  √(𝑆𝐸𝑖)2 + 𝜏2 = 𝜔𝑖                                                                                            (4.3)                                                         
The RE estimator of the mean true effect is given by weighted least squares estimation of 𝛽0, 
with weights equal to 𝜔𝑖: 
?̂?𝑖1
𝜔𝑖






, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑀                                                                                        (4.4) 
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The “Precision Effect Testing” (PET) estimator. The PET estimator is designed to 
report the genuine underlying empirical effect after accommodating and correcting for 
publication bias. The PET adds the 𝑖th study’s estimated standard error of the estimated 
effect, (𝑆𝐸𝑖), as an explanatory variable to control for publication bias. It then estimates the 
value of the mean effect as follows:  
?̂?𝑖1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑀                                                                                 (4.5) 




), where 𝑆𝐸𝑖 is the same term used to correct for publication bias:  
?̂?𝑖1
𝑆𝐸𝑖
=  𝛽0 (
1
𝑆𝐸𝑖
) + 𝛽1 +  
𝑒𝑖
𝑆𝐸𝑖
, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑀                                                                            (4.6) 
The “Precision-Effect Estimate with Standard Error” (PEESE) estimator. The PEESE 
estimator is designed to provide a better estimate of the actual empirical effect corrected for 
publication bias. What makes this estimator different from the PET is that it replaces 𝑆𝐸𝑖 with 
(𝑆𝐸𝑖)
2 in equation (4.5): 
?̂?𝑖1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝐸𝑖)
2 + 𝑒𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑀                                                                             (4.7) 
This yields the following weighted least squares specification: 
?̂?𝑖1
𝑆𝐸𝑖
=  𝛽0 (
1
𝑆𝐸𝑖
) + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝑖 +  
𝑒𝑖
𝑆𝐸𝑖
, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑀                                                                       (4.8)  
The last estimator, the FPP estimator, which is the main focus of this chapter, combines the 
“FAT” with elements of both the “PET” and “PEESE.” 
The “FAT-PET-PEESE” (FPP) estimator. Three main elements available in the “FAT-
PET-PEESE” approach are summarized as follows: (i) identify the existence of publication 
bias (FAT); (ii) identify the presence of a genuine non-zero “true” effect (PET), corrected for 
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publication bias; and (iii) estimate the magnitude of this “true” effect after accommodating 
and correcting for publication bias (both PET and PEESE). 
The “FAT-PET-PEESE” (FPP) estimator – Step One. The first step involved in 
implementing the FPP estimator carries out the Funnel Asymmetry Test (FAT). This test is 
designed to test for publication bias. As can be seen in Equation (4.5), it uses Weighted Least 
Squares (WLS) to regress the estimated effects (?̂?𝑖) on a constant term and the standard 
errors of the estimated effects (𝑆𝐸𝑖); where weights 𝜔𝑖 = (
1
𝑆𝐸𝑖
) are applied to correct for 
heteroskedasticity in estimates.  Whereas the PET focuses on the coefficient 𝛽0 in Equation 
(4.5), the FAT tests whether the coefficient on the SE variable, 𝛽1, is significantly different 
from zero. If ?̂?1 is significant, then the null hypothesis, 𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0, which indicates there is 
no publication bias, is rejected.  Note that the bias can be positive or negative. If the 
conclusion of the FAT is a failure to reject the null, then there is not enough evidence to 
support the existence of publication bias. As part of my analysis of the performance of the 
FAT-PET-PEESE estimator, I will also record the performance of this FAT. 
The “FAT-PET-PEESE” (FPP) estimator – Steps Two and Three. Regardless of the 
results on the previous step, one proceeds to the Precision Effect Test (PET), which is 
designed to identify whether there is genuine non-zero empirical effect after accounting for 
publication bias. According to Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012), the reason why the test is 
called precision effect testing is because 𝛽0 is the coefficient on precision (the inverse of the 
standard error). It uses the same equation as the FAT, but tests whether 𝐻0: 𝛽0 = 0.  
If the 𝑆𝐸𝑗variable was not included in the equation and if OLS was used rather than 
WLS, then the estimate of 𝛽0 would simply be the arithmetic mean of the estimated effects in 
the literature. Thus, ?̂?0 is an estimate of the overall effect, and the PET tests ?̂?0 for statistical 
significance, corrected for publication bias.  
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If one fails to reject the null hypothesis of no effect, 𝐻0: 𝛽0 = 0. then ?̂?0 is taken as the 
estimate of overall effect with the understanding that it is statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. However, if the null is rejected, then one proceeds to Step Four and a new specification 
is estimated. 
The “FAT-PET-PEESE” (FPP) estimator – Step Four. If the previous step determines 
that the true effect/mean value of the distribution of true effects is statistically different from 
zero, Stanley and Doucouliagos (2007, 2011) recommend that one estimate Equation (4.8) 
rather than Equation (4.6).  In this case, the associated estimate of β0 represents the best 
estimate of overall true effect.  
In this study the four-step procedure explained above produces two test results (the 
FAT and PET), and a single estimate of overall effect (which I identify as the “FPP” 
estimate). To summarize, each simulation starts with conducting the FAT. Following that, 
regardless of the results for the FAT, the PET is conducted.  If the PET produces a failure to 
reject conclusion, the coefficient on the precision term (the inverse of the standard error), is 
taken as the estimate of overall effect. If the PET produces a reject conclusion, the PEESE 
specification is estimated (cf. Equation 4.8), and the coefficient on the precision term from 
this specification is taken as the estimate of overall effect. This procedure is represented in 
the Figure 4.2 flowchart. 
4.3. The Experiments 
I create three different simulation environments to conduct my Monte Carlo experiments. In 
the first two simulation environments (“Fixed Effects” and “Random Effects”) only one 
estimate per study is produced.  In the last one (“Panel Random Effects”), multiple estimates 
per study are produced. The latter case is far more realistic, as most studies in the economics 
and business literature produce more than one estimate of the effect that is being studied.  
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In the Fixed Effects environment, there is only one underlying true effect and the only 
reason for the studies to obtain different estimated effect sizes is because of sampling error. 
In contrast, the true effect of x on y differs across studies in the Random Effects environment. 
In the last data environment, the true effects are heterogeneous both within and between 
studies. Given that studies differ in various characteristics such as sample sizes, estimation 
methods, sets of control variables, geographical units, and time periods, the more realistic 
data environment is when there is a distribution of the true effects. 
In the Fixed Effects environment, the experiments begin by simulating a common true 
effect. The common true effect, 𝛼, is used to generate individual (𝑦, 𝑥) observations, from 
which a single estimate is derived. In the Random Effects environment, the experiments 
begin by simulating a distribution of true effects that is normally distributed with mean value 
𝛼. Random draws from this distribution generate study-specific “true effects”,𝛼𝑖. The 𝛼𝑖’s are 
used to generate individual (𝑦, 𝑥) observations, from which a single estimate is derived. The 
Panel Random Effects environment also builds in heterogeneity across regressions within a 
study.  Each of these environments is described in greater detail below. 
The estimates derived within each of these environments are then put through a 
publication bias “filter”, with the number of estimates in the post-publication bias sample, 𝑀, 
being determined endogenously. The resulting sample constitutes the sample of estimates 
available to the hypothetical meta-analyst. 
The respective estimators are applied to this post-publication bias sample to produce 
estimates of 𝛼, the true effect in the Fixed Effects environment, and the mean of the 
distribution of true effects in the Random Effects and Panel Random Effects environments. 
This process simulates a single meta-analysis study. 
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The process is repeated to produce 10,000 simulated meta-analysis studies. The 
estimates for each of the estimators are then aggregated over these simulated studies and 
compared on the dimensions of Bias, MSE, and Type I error rates. 
For each of the tree environments, I run experiments for nine different values of 𝛼 
including: 0 (i.e., no overall effect), 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, and 4. When the distribution of 
true effects is centred on zero, there will be more statistically insignificant estimates, and 
more wrong-signed estimates, than when the distribution shifts to the right. As a result, the 
percent of studies excluded by publication bias will be greatest at 𝛼 = 0. As 𝛼 increases and 
the distribution shifts to the right, fewer studies are impacted by publication bias. Eventually, 
for a sufficiently large value of  𝛼 , all studies are “published”, and the post-publication bias 
sample is identical to the pre-publication bias sample. As will be demonstrated below, the 
consequence of increasing 𝛼 will differ depending on the nature of the publication bias 
(statistical insignificance versus wrong-signed (or wrong-direction) estimates).  
Performance Tests. Table 4.2 through 4.9 compare seven different estimators across 
three different performance dimensions: (i) Average Estimate of Mean True Effect, (ii) Mean 
Squared Error (MSE), and (iii) Type I error rates. 
Mean Squared Error (MSE). MSE is one of the three performance dimensions 
investigated in this study. The MSE measures the average squared difference between the 
estimator ?̂? and the parameter 𝛼, which represents either the true effect (Fixed Effects 
environment), or the mean of the distribution of true effects (Random Effects and Panel 
Random Effects environments). 
𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 𝐸(?̂? − 𝛼)2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?) + [𝐸(?̂?) − 𝛼]2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?) + 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠(?̂?)2,                             (4.9)  
where                       
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𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 (?̂?) = 𝐸(?̂?) − 𝛼                                                                                                        (4.10) 
This is also called the risk function of an estimator, with (?̂? − 𝛼)2 comprising a 
quadratic loss function.  Thus, MSE contains two components. The first component measures 
the variability of the estimator (precision), while the second measures its bias (accuracy).  
One of the properties of a good estimator is that it should have a relatively small MSE.  
Type I Error Rates. Another measure of an estimator’s performance is the Type I error 
rate associated with testing whether the estimate of 𝛼 equals its true value. In the context of 
my experiments, the associated null hypothesis is: 
𝐻0: 𝛽0 =  𝛼  
I test this null at the 95% confidence/5% significance level. As a result, the associated 
rejection rates should likewise be equal to 5 percent. Type I error rates substantially larger or 
smaller than 5% indicate that the results from hypothesis testing with the given estimator are 
not reliable. For example, a Type I error rate equal to 0.89 means that, in my experiments, the 
true null hypothesis is incorrectly rejected 89% of the time. This compares with an expected 
rejection rate of 5% given the 5% significance level employed in the tests. 
4.3.1. The Fixed Effects Data Environment 
Experimental Design. For the Fixed Effects (FE) data environment, the true effect is the same 
for all studies. The data generating process (DGP) for the experiments in this data 
environment is given by 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 + 𝛼𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇                                                                                    (4.11) 
In my experiments, I set 𝑇 = 100 observations. In order to generate different coefficient 
standard errors, I allow the DGP error term to have different variances across studies: 
𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆𝑖 ∙ 𝑁𝐼𝐷(0,1),where                                                                                                 (4.12) 
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𝜆𝑖 = 0.2 + 𝑈𝐼𝐷(0,30)                                                                                                       (4.13) 
𝜆𝑖 controls the variance of the error term. The last specification, Equation (4.13) provides a 
realistic range of 𝜆𝑖 and ensures that the variance is always nonzero. 
Table 4.1 is designed to give a picture of what a typical meta-analysis sample looks 
like, both before and after publication bias.  The specific case that is represented is when the 
true effect equals 1 (𝛼 = 1). The top panel represents average sample characteristics of an 
“empirical literature” consisting of 1000 estimated effects, before publication bias keeps 
some of them from seeing the light of day.  This is the “Pre-Publication Bias” sample.  The 
next two panels respectively report average sample characteristics after imposing the two 
types of publication bias:  publication bias against insignificance and publication bias against 
wrong-signs. As noted earlier, we assume that theory predicts that the respective effect 
should be positive (as in a value-of-life study).  These are each “Post-Publication Bias” 
samples, and comprise the samples that the hypothetical meta-analyst analyzes. 
When α = 1 and there is no publication bias, the (average) median value of estimated 
effect in the full sample is 1.00, as would be expected. Estimated effects range from an 
average minimum of -6.85 to an average maximum of 8.92. t-statistics range from an average 
minimum of -2.69 to an average maximum of 45.62. The median t-value in the full sample is, 
on average, statistically insignificant.  
These estimated effects and corresponding statistics are unobserved to the meta-analyst, 
as the meta-analyst only sees the estimates that survive publication bias (the “Post-
Publication Bias” samples. When α = 1 and publication bias is in favour of statistical 
significance, the average meta-analysis sample reduces to 318 estimated effects. The 
associated median estimated effect is 1.18 (representing a bias of 18%), and the average 
median t-statistic has increased from 0.94 in the unbiased, full sample to 2.60, and is now 
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statistically significant. Similar results can be seen when publication bias favours estimates 
that are positively signed, though the median t-statistic is, on average, not so large as to be 
significant. 
Note that when α = 1, both types of publication bias disproportionately omit negative 
estimated effects, inducing a positive bias in both estimated effects and t-statistics in the post-
publication bias samples. Further, both post-publication bias samples look “reasonable”. The 
estimated ranges of t-statistics/precision are comparable to those typically reported in 











            
 
 
 Table 4.1: Sample Characteristics for a Simulated Meta-Analysis Data Set (Fixed Effects (α = 1)) 
Variable Median Minimum P5% P95% Maximum 
Pre-Publication Bias (100 percent of estimates): 
Estimated effect 1.00 -6.85 -1.99 3.99 8.92 
t-statistic 0.94 -2.69 -0.96 6.08 45.62 
Publication Bias Against Insignificance (31.8 percent of estimates): 
Estimated effect 1.18 -6.74 -0.84 5.19 8.86 
t-statistic 2.60 -2.69 -0.45 14.95 45.44 
Publication Bias Against Negative Effects (80.5 percent of estimates): 
Estimated effect 1.20 -4.61 0.11 4.26 8.92 





Fixed Effects: Performance Tests. Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 compare seven different 
estimators across the three different performance dimensions mentioned earlier. While 
Table 4.2 reports the results when publication bias is directed against statistical 
insignificance, Table 4.3 examines publication bias against wrong-signed estimates. Each of 
the estimators is studied for a set of mean true effect values (𝛼) ranging from 0.0 to 4.0.  
The top panel of Table 4.2 reports the average estimated effects for each of the 
respective estimators. The first two columns report the value of the true effect (𝛼) and the 
average percent studies included in the simulated meta-analysis (MA) studies, where the 
average is taken over 10,000 simulated studies. The first thing to note is that there is a strong 
relationship between the size of the true effect and the number of studies that survive 
publication bias against statistical insignificance. When 𝛼 = 0, less than 15% of all studies 
appear in the meta-analyst’s sample. As 𝛼 increases and the mean of the distribution of 
estimated effects moves away from zero, more and more studies produce significant 
estimates. When 𝛼 = 4, approximately three-quarters of all studies survive publication bias 
and are included in the meta-analyst’s sample. 
The next column reports results for the Unadjusted estimator. When 𝛼 = 0 and 
publication bias discriminates against insignificant estimates, the average estimated value of 
𝛼 for the Unadjusted estimator (averaged across the 10,000 simulated MA studies) is 0.01, 
which is very close to its expected value of 0. The Unadjusted estimator is an unbiased 
estimator of the true effect when 𝛼 = 0 because sampling error is equally likely to produce 
significant estimates that are above and below the true effect. However, as 𝛼 increases, 
publication bias disproportionately omits studies with estimates below the true effect since, 




Table 4.2: Comparative Performance of Meta-Analysis Estimators (Fixed Effects/Publication 
Bias against Insignificance) 
α Percent Unadjusted PET PEESE FPP FE WLS RE 
Average Estimate of Mean True Effect 
0.0 14.3 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.5 23.0 0.92 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.56 
1.0 31.8 1.57 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.05 
1.5 40.0 2.14 1.46 1.50 1.50 1.51 1.51 1.54 
2.0 47.6 2.67 1.96 2.00 2.00 2.01 2.01 2.03 
2.5 54.6 3.17 2.47 2.50 2.50 2.51 2.51 2.53 
3.0 61.1 3.65 2.97 2.99 2.99 3.01 3.01 3.02 
3.5 67.0 4.12 3.47 3.49 3.49 3.51 3.51 3.51 
4.0 72.2 4.58 3.97 3.99 3.99 4.01 4.01 4.01 
Mean Squared Error 
0.0 14.3 0.0520 0.0021 0.0016 0.0018 0.0015 0.0015 0.0071 
0.5 23.0 0.1935 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0035 
1.0 31.8 0.3378 0.0012 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0024 
1.5 40.0 0.4199 0.0014 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0017 
2.0 47.6 0.4504 0.0014 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0012 
2.5 54.6 0.4494 0.0012 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0008 
3.0 61.1 0.4245 0.0011 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 
3.5 67.0 0.3845 0.0009 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 
4.0 72.2 0.3353 0.0007 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
Type I Error Rates (𝐻0: 𝛽0 = 𝛼) 
0.0 14.3 0.05 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.05 0.01 
0.5 23.0 0.82 0.50 0.22 0.22 0.33 0.13 0.73 
1.0 31.8 1.00 0.86 0.10 0.10 0.29 0.15 0.71 
1.5 40.0 1.00 0.91 0.07 0.07 0.27 0.17 0.64 
2.0 47.6 1.00 0.91 0.08 0.08 0.23 0.17 0.52 
2.5 54.6 1.00 0.89 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.16 0.40 
3.0 61.1 1.00 0.86 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.29 
3.5 67.0 1.00 0.82 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.21 
4.0 72.2 1.00 0.75 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 
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When 𝛼 = 1.0, the Unadjusted estimator overestimates the mean true effect by 
approximately 57%. As 𝛼 increases, fewer and fewer studies are affected by publication bias. 
While the table does not show that, further increases in 𝛼 would eventually cause the 
publication bias associated with the Unadjusted estimator to disappear. 
Continuing with the top panel of Table 4.2, I turn my attention to the performances of 
the six MA estimators. I am particularly interested in the first three estimators, which are 
specifically designed to address publication bias. The last of these reports the overall effect 
derived from the four-step, FAT-PET-PEESE procedure (“FPP”). With respect to estimation 
bias, all three estimators do very well compare to the Unadjusted estimator. When 𝛼 = 1, the 
mean estimates of the true effect for the PET, PEESE, and FPP estimators are 0.97, 1.00 and 
1.00, respectively. When 𝛼 = 2, the estimates are 1.96, 2.00 and 2.00. In fact, for every value 
of 𝛼, the PET reports a bias of 3% to 4%. However, the PEESE and FPP estimators eliminate 
estimation bias. This success seemingly validates the ability of the PET, PEESE and FPP 
estimators to correct for publication bias. 
However, the next three columns demonstrate that the other MA estimators also 
perform well, even though they do not explicitly address publication bias. The explanation 
lies in how the study estimates are weighted. In one way or another, all six of these estimators 
weight by the inverse of the estimated coefficient’s standard error. 
Turning to the middle panel of Table 4.2, which focuses on MSE performance, I see 
that the Unadjusted estimator, unsurprisingly, performs by far the worst. Of the three MA 
estimators designed to address and accommodate for publication bias, the PEESE and FPP 
estimators are most efficient. However, the FE and WLS estimators perform extremely close 
to the efficient estimators. 
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The bottom panel of Table 4.2 is the first indication that the respective MA estimators 
suffer from performance inadequacies, and this includes the FPP estimator.  Type I error rates 
associated with the hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽0 =  𝛼 are often far in excess of their expected value of 
5%. 
In summary, all six MA estimators perform better than the Unadjusted estimator. 
Among those six, the FPP estimator performs among the best, but struggles when it comes to 
reliability in hypothesis testing.   
Table 4.3 continues investigating the Fixed Effects case, where all studies share a 
common true effect, but it reports publication bias that is targeted towards wrong-signed 
estimates. As evidenced by the top panel, the Unadjusted estimator again produces effect 
estimates that can be substantially biased. In contrast to publication bias against statistical 
insignificance, the bias is greatest for small values of 𝛼. As 𝛼 increases, studies estimate 
fewer negative effects, so more studies get “published”. When 𝛼 is very large (= 4), almost 
all studies get published (98%), and the Unadjusted estimator correspondingly has a 
relatively small estimation bias. 
Turning now to the PET, PEESE and FPP estimators, the FPP estimator is superior. 
However, depending on whether 𝛼 = 0 or 𝛼 > 0, the relative performance of PET and 
PEESE are quite different. When 𝛼 = 0, the PET estimator performs very well; when 𝛼 > 0, 
the PEESE estimator dominates. As before, the other three MA estimators generally also do a 
good job of eliminating estimation bias; and have MSE performance similar to the PEESE 





Table 4.3: Comparative Performance of Meta-Analysis Estimators (Fixed Effects /Publication 
Bias against Wrong Sign) 
α Percent Unadjusted PET PEESE FPP FE WLS RE 
Average Estimate of Mean True Effect 
0.0 55.0 1.01 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.08 
0.5 71.7 1.22 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.51 
1.0 80.6 1.56 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 
1.5 86.5 1.94 1.48 1.50 1.50 1.51 1.51 1.51 
2.0 90.6 2.34 1.99 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
2.5 93.5 2.76 2.49 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 
3.0 95.5 3.20 2.99 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
3.5 97.0 3.65 3.49 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 
4.0 98.0 4.11 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Mean Squared Error 
0.0 55.0 1.0164 0.0001 0.0028 0.0003 0.0054 0.0054 0.0068 
0.5 71.7 0.5245 0.0010 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
1.0 80.6 0.3174 0.0006 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
1.5 86.5 0.1957 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
2.0 90.6 0.1179 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
2.5 93.5 0.0701 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
3.0 95.5 0.0412 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
3.5 97.0 0.0240 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
4.0 98.0 0.0140 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Type I Error Rates (𝐻0: 𝛽0 = 𝛼) 
0.0 55.0 1.00 0.08 0.99 0.08 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.5 71.7 1.00 0.86 0.08 0.08 0.45 0.50 0.44 
1.0 80.6 1.00 0.71 0.07 0.07 0.22 0.27 0.22 
1.5 86.5 1.00 0.53 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.13 
2.0 90.6 1.00 0.37 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.08 
2.5 93.5 1.00 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 
3.0 95.5 0.98 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 
3.5 97.0 0.82 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 
4.0 98.0 0.53 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 
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4.3.2. Random Effects Data Environment 
Experimental Design. For the Random Effects data environments, I generate heterogeneity in 
true effects across studies by letting the true effect be normally and independently distributed 
with mean 𝛼 and variance 1. In particular, the DGP producing individual observations for 
study 𝑖 is given by: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡, 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇, where                                                                       (4.14) 
𝛼𝑖 = 𝑁𝐼𝐷(𝛼, 1)                                                                                                                   (4.15) 
All the studies have 𝑇 = 100 observations. In order to generate different coefficient standard 
errors, I allow the DGP error term to have different variances across studies as follows: 
𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆𝑖𝑁𝐼𝐷(0,1), where                                                                                                   (4.16) 
𝜆𝑖 = 0.5 + 𝑈𝐼𝐷(0,30).                                                                                                      (4.17) 
As before, 𝜆𝑖 controls the variance of the error term. The last specification sets the minimum 
and maximum value for 𝜆𝑖. 
The specific parameter values used in the experiments were selected to simultaneously 
satisfy four criteria: 
1. Produce a realistic range of 𝑡-values for the estimated effects. 
2. Produce realistic-looking funnel plots. 
3. Cause the percent of studies eliminated by publication bias to range between 10 and 
90 percent (so all the MA studies are impacted by publication bias to some degree) 
4. Produce realistic values of “effect heterogeneity” 
“Effect heterogeneity” refers to the differences in true effects across studies. 
197 
 
As discussed earlier, the experiments model two kinds of publication bias: selection 
against statistical insignificance, and selection against wrong-signed estimates. In both cases, 
statistically insignificant/wrong-signed estimates are allowed to be included in the post-
publication bias sample, but with a relatively low probability. The experiments set this 
probability at 10 percent. 
Table 4.4 gives average sample characteristics for a typical meta-analysis sample in the 
the Random Effects data environment when 𝛼 = 1. The associated parameter values in 
Equations (4.16) and (4.17) have been chosen to produce a range of estimated effects and t-
statistics similar to those produced in the Fixed Effects data environment (cf. Table 4.1). The 
additional sample characteristics added to this table is a measure of effect heterogeneity, 𝐼2.  
𝐼2 takes values between 0 and 1 and measures the share of variation in the estimated 
effects that is not attributed to sampling error (Higgins and Thompson, 2002). As a point of 
comparison, 𝐼2 values between 70-95% are commonly encountered in economics and 












            
Table 4.4: Sample Characteristics for a Simulated Meta-Analysis Data Set (Random Effects (α = 1)) 
 Variable Median Minimum P5% P95% Maximum 
Pre-Publication Selection Bias Sample (100 percent of estimates): 
Estimated effect 1.00 -7.47 -2.38 4.39 9.46 
t-statistic 0.79 -13.19 -1.47 5.90 42.19 
Percent significant 0.26 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.30 
I2 0.86 0.72 0.81 0.90 0.94 
Publication Bias Against Insignificance (33.0 percent of estimates): 
Estimated effect 1.81 -7.43 -2.07 5.69 9.54 
t-statistic 2.54 -13.21 -2.35 12.63 42.24 
Percent significant 0.93 0.89 0.91 0.94 0.95 
I2 0.94 0.86 0.92 0.96 0.98 
Publication Bias Against Negative Effects (74.6 percent of estimates): 
Estimated effect 1.55 -5.01 0.05 4.77 9.52 
t-statistic 1.28 -5.14 0.04 7.33 42.05 
Percent significant 0.49 0.44 0.46 0.51 0.53 






Random Effects: Performance Tests. Table 4.5 is the Random Effects analogue to 
Table 4.2. It shows estimator performance in the presence of publication bias against 
statistical insignificance. As in the Fixed Effects case, when 𝛼 = 0.0, the Unadjusted 
estimator is an unbiased estimator of the true effect because sampling error is equally likely 
to produce significant estimates that are above and below the true effect. However, as 𝛼 
increases, publication bias disproportionately omits studies with estimates below the true 
effect since, ceteris paribus, studies with small estimates are more likely to have small 𝑡-
values. When 𝛼 = 1.0, the Unadjusted estimator overestimates the mean true effect by 
approximately 82 percent. As 𝛼 increases, fewer and fewer studies are affected by publication 
bias. While the table does not show that, further increases in 𝛼 would eventually cause the 
publication bias associated with the Unadjusted estimator to disappear as is the case with the 
results of the Fixed Effects tests. Continuing with the top panel of  Table 4.5, the PET, 
PEESE and FPP do very well compared to the Unadjusted estimator. 
The FE estimator and its near twin, the WLS estimator perform almost as well as the 
PET, PEESE, and FPP estimators, even though they do not explicitly correct for publication 
bias. As before, the explanation lies in how the study estimates are weighted. In one way or 
another, all of these estimators weight by the inverse of the estimated coefficient’s standard 
error. 
The RE estimator consistently overestimates the mean true effect for nonzero value of 
𝛼. Interestingly, it is tailored to match the data environment in which the simulations are 
conducted. Despite that fact, it is the most biased estimator of the six MA estimators. This 
seemingly paradoxical result has been noted by other researchers (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 
2013, p.586; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012, p.83). On the dimension of estimation bias, 
when 0 < 𝛼 < 2, the PET performs best of all MA estimators. For 𝛼 > 2, the PEESE and 
FPP estimators perform best. 
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The middle panel of Table 4.5 focuses on MSE performance, with smaller MSE values 
indicating greater efficiency. The Unadjusted estimator performs poorly compared to the MA 
estimators for all values of 𝛼 > 0. Among MA estimators when 𝛼 > 0 , the PEESE, FPP and 
FE/WLS estimators generally perform best.  
Finally, when it comes to hypothesis testing, the bottom panel of Table 4.5 suggests 
that caution is in order. The FE, WLS, and RE estimators all produce type I error rates that 
are unacceptably large. For example, when 𝛼 = 0.0 , the FE and WLS estimators reject the 
hypothesis that 𝛼 = 0.0 in 89 percent and 47 percent of the tests, despite the fact that the 
hypothesis is true. This compares with an expected rejection rate of 5 percent given the 5 
percent significance level employed in the tests. The PEESE and FPP are substantially better, 
though they also produce Type I error rates larger than 5 percent when 0.5 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1.5. Given 
these unattractive choices, one might easily be tempted to conclude that the PET estimator is 
















Table 4.5: Comparative Performance of Meta-Analysis Estimators (Random Effects/Publication 
Bias against Insignificance) 
α Percent Unadjusted PET PEESE FPP FE WLS RE 
Average Estimate of Mean True Effect 
0.0 27.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.5 28.7 1.01 0.52 0.59 0.55 0.61 0.61 0.89 
1.0 33.0 1.82 1.02 1.12 1.12 1.15 1.15 1.58 
1.5 39.1 2.44 1.48 1.60 1.60 1.63 1.63 2.09 
2.0 45.9 2.94 1.95 2.06 2.06 2.09 2.09 2.53 
2.5 52.8 3.40 2.43 2.52 2.52 2.56 2.56 2.96 
3.0 59.2 3.84 2.93 3.00 3.00 3.04 3.04 3.40 
3.5 65.1 4.28 3.42 3.49 3.49 3.53 3.53 3.84 
4.0 70.4 4.71 3.93 3.99 3.99 4.02 4.02 4.29 
Mean Squared Error 
0.0 27.1 0.026 0.059 0.037 0.051 0.036 0.036 0.012 
0.5 28.7 0.286 0.056 0.043 0.057 0.044 0.044 0.164 
1.0 33.0 0.693 0.049 0.046 0.047 0.050 0.050 0.340 
1.5 39.1 0.888 0.043 0.036 0.037 0.041 0.041 0.352 
2.0 45.9 0.893 0.042 0.028 0.028 0.032 0.032 0.285 
2.5 52.8 0.815 0.046 0.026 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.216 
3.0 59.2 0.711 0.044 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.160 
3.5 65.1 0.609 0.044 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.120 
4.0 70.4 0.511 0.042 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.089 
Type I Error Rates (𝐻0: 𝛽0 = 𝛼) 
0.0 27.1 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.89 0.47 0.03 
0.5 28.7 0.92 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.90 0.55 0.95 
1.0 33.0 1.00 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.92 0.64 1.00 
1.5 39.1 1.00 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.91 0.65 1.00 
2.0 45.9 1.00 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.89 0.61 1.00 
2.5 52.8 1.00 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.88 0.59 1.00 
3.0 59.2 1.00 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.87 0.60 1.00 
3.5 65.1 1.00 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.87 0.59 1.00 




Table 4.6 repeats the preceding analysis for the case when publication bias 
discriminates against negative effect estimates. The Unadjusted estimator again produces 
substantially biased estimates of the mean true effect, now even when 𝛼 = 0. Unlike the 
previous case, the MA estimators also produce biased estimates when 𝛼 is relatively small. 
For example, when 𝛼 = 1, the associated bias ranges from 21 percent to 49 percent. These 
biases get smaller as 𝛼 increases and the proportion of included studies becomes larger. 
Table 4.6 tells a story for MSE performance that is similar to Table 4.5. The FE/WLS 
estimator often performs as well, and sometimes slightly better, than the PET, PEESE and 
FPP estimators. Interestingly, when 𝛼 ≥ 3, the RE estimator is most efficient, despite being 
the most biased. The explanation has to do with the fact that RE estimates have generally 
smaller variances than other MA estimators. 
Finally, as in Table 4.5, Type I error rates for the FE, WLS, and RE estimators are 
unacceptably large. Unlike Table 4.5, the PET, PEESE and FPP estimators now also have 
unacceptably large Type I error rates for small values of 𝛼. 
Summarizing the results for the Random Effects data environment, I find that the MA 
estimators that do not explicitly correct for publication bias often perform as well, if not 
better, than those that do. While the MA estimators always reduce estimation bias in our 
experiments, they do not always eliminate it. In other words, up to this point, there is little 





Table 4.6: Comparative Performance of Meta-Analysis Estimators (Random Effects /Publication 
Bias against Wrong Sign) 
α Percent Unadjusted PET PEESE FPP FE WLS RE 
Average Estimate of Mean True Effect 
0.0 55.0 1.26 0.61 0.66 0.65 0.69 0.69 0.91 
0.5 65.4 1.52 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.97 1.18 
1.0 74.7 1.81 1.21 1.26 1.26 1.29 1.29 1.49 
1.5 82.0 2.12 1.59 1.63 1.62 1.65 1.65 1.85 
2.0 87.4 2.48 2.01 2.05 2.05 2.07 2.07 2.24 
2.5 91.3 2.86 2.49 2.51 2.51 2.53 2.53 2.66 
3.0 94.0 3.27 2.98 3.00 3.00 3.02 3.02 3.11 
3.5 95.9 3.70 3.48 3.50 3.50 3.51 3.51 3.58 
4.0 97.2 4.15 3.99 4.00 4.00 4.01 4.01 4.06 
Mean Squared Error 
0.0 55.0 1.602 0.405 0.461 0.456 0.498 0.498 0.828 
0.5 65.4 1.053 0.184 0.218 0.218 0.241 0.241 0.467 
1.0 74.7 0.654 0.073 0.087 0.088 0.099 0.099 0.245 
1.5 82.0 0.392 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.041 0.041 0.122 
2.0 87.4 0.229 0.032 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.060 
2.5 91.3 0.133 0.033 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.030 
3.0 94.0 0.078 0.035 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.016 
3.5 95.9 0.045 0.035 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.009 
4.0 97.2 0.026 0.035 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.006 
Type I Error Rates (𝐻0: 𝛽0 = 𝛼) 
0.0 55.0 1.00 0.89 0.96 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.5 65.4 1.00 0.74 0.91 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.0 74.7 1.00 0.29 0.53 0.53 0.98 0.96 1.00 
1.5 82.0 1.00 0.10 0.18 0.17 0.91 0.79 1.00 
2.0 87.4 1.00 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.87 0.68 1.00 
2.5 91.3 1.00 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.87 0.65 0.92 
3.0 94.0 1.00 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.87 0.65 0.63 
3.5 95.9 0.94 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.87 0.66 0.36 
4.0 97.2 0.70 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.87 0.66 0.20 
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4.3.3. Panel Random Effects Data Environment 
Experimental Design. The last set of experiments examines the performance of the respective 
MA estimators when each study contains multiple regressions/effect estimates. The true 
effects are modelled as differing both across and within studies. 
There is a debate in the literature as to whether MA studies should include all estimates 
from a study, or just one, or a selected few. To the extent a consensus exists, it is that MA 
estimators should include all the estimates, but correct for error correlation across estimates 
within studies (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012; Ringquist, 2013). 
My Monte Carlo experiments fix the number of pre-publication bias studies at 100, 
each with 10 estimates per study, where each estimate is based upon 100 observations. True 
effects are modelled as differing both within and across studies, with the differences within 
studies, 𝜎1
2, being smaller than the differences across studies, 𝜎2
2, such that 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝛼𝑖𝑗|𝛼𝑖) <
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝛼𝑖).
38 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1 +  𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 100, where                                                            (4.18) 
𝛼𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼𝑖 + 0.5𝑁(0,1), 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 10, and                                                                       (4.19) 
𝛼𝑖 =  𝛼 + 2𝑁(0,1) , 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 100                                                                                 (4.20) 
The different weights on the standard normal variates in (4.19) and (4.20) are designed to 
capture the idea that effects are more likely to be similar within a study than across studies.  
The error terms are modelled similarly, with error variances again differing both within 
and across studies, but with most of the variation occurring across studies. 
𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝜆𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑁𝐼𝐷(0,1) , where                                                                                            (4.21) 
                                                          
38 In my experiments, 𝜎1
2 and 𝜎2
2 are set equal to 0.25 and 4, respectively. 
205 
 
𝜆𝑖𝑗 =  𝜆𝑖 + 𝑈𝐼𝐷(0,1) , and                                                                                                 (4.22) 
𝜆𝑖 = 0.5 + 30 ∙ 𝑈𝐼𝐷(0,1)                                                                                                   (4.23) 
As in the Random Effects data environment, these DGP parameters are designed to 
simultaneously satisfy the four criteria listed above. 
Publication bias is also treated differently in the panel random effects environment. The 
experiments assume that the bias works at the level of the study and not the individual 
estimate. In the case of bias against statistical insignificance, I assume that in order to be 
published, a study must have most of its estimates (at least 7 out of 10) be statistically 
significant. If the study meets that selection criterion, all the estimates from that study are 
“published”. If the study does not meet that criterion, none of the estimates from that study 
are published. An identical “7 out of 10, or more” rule applies to publication bias against 
wrong-signed estimates. 
Another difference has to do with the specification of the MA regressions. I modify 
Equation (4.1) to include multiple estimates per study: 
?̂?𝑖𝑗1 = 𝛽 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗                                                                                                                     (4.24) 
Dividing through by the appropriate standard error (either 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗 or 𝜔𝑖𝑗 = √(𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗)
2
+  𝜏2) 
produces the FE, WLS, and RE estimators as described above. 
The PET estimator follows the recommendation of Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012, 
see (i) Equation 5.5, p.85, and (ii) Equation 5.9, p.101):  
?̂?𝑖𝑗1 =  𝛽 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗                                                                                             (4.25) 
where 𝐷𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for study 𝑖 and 0 for other studies. 





=  𝛽 (
1
𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗
) +  ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝑖 +
(𝑒𝑖𝑗)
𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗
                                                                                       (4.26) 
The panel version of PEESE estimator is given by: 
?̂?𝑖𝑗1
𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗
=  𝛽 (
1
𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗
) +  ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝐷𝑖 +
(𝑒𝑖𝑗)
𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗
                                                                                  (4.27) 
For all estimators except the FE estimator, coefficient standard errors are calculated using a 
clustered robust procedure to allow for within-study correlation of error terms. 
The above experimental design is intended to capture the fact that studies typically 
contain more than one estimate of a given “effect”, perhaps because separate regressions are 
estimated for different subsamples of the data, or because the regression equations differ in 
their specifications or econometric procedures used. Thus, a realistic study of meta-analysis 
performance should incorporate this feature.  
Table 4.7 gives average sample characteristics for a typical meta-analysis sample in the 
Panel Random Effects data environment when 𝛼 = 1, both pre- and post-publication bias. 
The associated parameter values in the DGP above have been chosen to produce a range of 
estimated effects and t-statistics similar to those produced in the Fixed Effects and Random 
Effects data environments (cf. Tables 4.1 and 4.4).  As in Table 4.4, I again report a measure 
of effect heterogeneity, 𝐼2. As mentioned earlier, 𝐼2 values between 70-95% are common in 
meta-analysis studies conducted in economics and business. Table 4.7 makes clear that the 
simulated meta-analysis samples that I use for analysing the performance of the FAT-PET-




           Table 4.7: Sample Characteristics for a Simulated Meta-Analysis Data Set (Panel Data/Random Effects (α = 1)) 
Variable Median Minimum P5% P95% Maximum 
Pre-Publication Bias (100 percent of estimates): 
Estimated effect 0.96 -8.95 -3.51 5.51 10.89 
t-statistic 0.68 -17.76 -2.90 7.05 33.43 
Percent significant 0.34 0.23 0.29 0.40 0.45 
I2 0.91 0.73 0.83 0.97 0.99 
Publication Bias Against Insignificance (21.9 percent of estimates): 
Estimated effect 2.40 -5.34 -3.08 6.02 8.88 
t-statistic 3.68 -17.57 -7.84 16.90 33.42 
Percent signifiant 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.99 1.00 
I2 0.97 0.87 0.94 0.99 1.00 
Publication Bias Against Negative Effects (80.5 percent of estimates): 
Estimated effect 2.23 -5.36 -0.84 6.21 10.85 
t-statistic 1.72 -2.93 -0.50 10.15 33.42 
Percent significant 0.68 0.57 0.62 0.74 0.80 
I2 0.83 0.51 0.69 0.94 0.98 
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Panel Random Effects: Performance Tests. Table 4.8 reports performance measures for 
the respective estimators when publication bias favours estimates that are statistically 
significant. As before, the Unadjusted estimator provides an unbiased estimate of the mean 
true effect when 𝛼 = 0. As 𝛼 increases, publication bias at first worsens, and then eventually 
starts to improve as more studies are “published”. The numerical bias can be quite 
substantial. For example, when 𝛼 = 2.0, the Unadjusted estimator estimates an average value 
of 3.36 for 𝛼. 
With respect to bias, the PET, PEESE and FPP estimators perform best of all MA 
estimators, with the FPP performing marginally better. For example, when 𝛼 = 2.0, the PET 
and PEESE estimators produce a mean estimate of 𝛼 equal to 2.24, compared to 2.37 and 
3.13 for the MA estimators that do not correct for publication bias. The FPP estimator 
produces a least biased estimate of 2.21. 
However, superiority on the dimension of bias does not necessarily translate into 
superiority in MSE performance. While the PET, PEESE, and also FPP estimators are least 
biased, they are also least efficient among the MA estimators, and sometimes even less 
efficient than the Unadjusted estimator (cf. 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1). Among MA estimators, the FE/WLS 
estimators are generally most efficient, though the RE estimator is best for low values of 𝛼. 
Finally, when it comes to hypothesis testing, the lesson from the bottom panel of Table 
4.8 could perhaps be summarized as “don’t”. In almost every case, the Type I error rates are 
so much larger than 5 percent that any results derived from hypothesis testing about the mean 






Table 4.8: Comparative Performance of Meta-Analysis Estimators (Panel Random Effects/Publication 
Bias against Insignificance) 
α Percent Unadjusted PET PEESE FPP FE WLS RE 
Average Estimate of Mean True Effect 
0.0 19.2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
0.5 19.9 1.09 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.66 0.66 1.01 
1.0 22.0 2.05 1.20 1.21 1.18 1.29 1.29 1.90 
1.5 25.2 2.78 1.73 1.74 1.71 1.85 1.85 2.59 
2.0 29.5 3.36 2.24 2.24 2.21 2.37 2.37 3.13 
2.5 34.7 3.84 2.74 2.75 2.73 2.86 2.86 3.60 
3.0 40.4 4.26 3.21 3.21 3.20 3.31 3.31 4.00 
3.5 46.4 4.65 3.66 3.67 3.66 3.76 3.76 4.39 
4.0 52.8 5.03 4.11 4.12 4.11 4.20 4.20 4.77 
Mean Squared Error 
0.0 19.2 0.506 1.765 1.553 1.629 0.874 0.874 0.443 
0.5 19.9 0.796 1.767 1.554 1.628 0.879 0.879 0.655 
1.0 22.0 1.435 1.700 1.506 1.577 0.880 0.880 1.111 
1.5 25.2 1.866 1.673 1.465 1.548 0.851 0.851 1.387 
2.0 29.5 2.000 1.531 1.341 1.415 0.782 0.782 1.428 
2.5 34.7 1.916 1.461 1.277 1.338 0.722 0.722 1.312 
3.0 40.4 1.671 1.415 1.231 1.281 0.652 0.652 1.094 
3.5 46.4 1.397 1.335 1.159 1.198 0.577 0.577 0.874 
4.0 52.8 1.126 1.287 1.107 1.138 0.527 0.527 0.670 
Type I Error Rates (𝐻0: 𝛽0 = 𝛼) 
0.0 19.2 0.05 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.97 0.17 0.05 
0.5 19.9 0.15 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.97 0.17 0.14 
1.0 22.0 0.43 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.97 0.19 0.37 
1.5 25.2 0.71 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.97 0.22 0.62 
2.0 29.5 0.89 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.97 0.23 0.80 
2.5 34.7 0.95 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.97 0.23 0.88 
3.0 40.4 0.98 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.96 0.21 0.90 
3.5 46.4 0.98 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.96 0.18 0.89 




Table 4.9 provides further support that superiority on the dimension of biasedness does 
not imply superiority on efficiency. The RE estimator is now either best or close to best on 
the dimension of MSE for all values of 𝛼. Meanwhile, the Unadjusted estimator is more 
efficient than every MA estimator except the RE estimator. Reliability in hypothesis testing 



























Table 4.9: Comparative Performance of Meta-Analysis Estimators (Panel Random Effects /Publication 
Bias against Wrong Sign) 
α Percent Unadjusted PET PEESE FPP FE WLS RE 
Average Estimate of Mean True Effect 
0.0 38.4 2.01 1.74 1.74 1.69 1.77 1.77 1.88 
0.5 47.7 2.19 1.92 1.92 1.89 1.94 1.94 2.07 
1.0 56.8 2.40 2.14 2.15 2.12 2.17 2.17 2.29 
1.5 65.6 2.63 2.40 2.40 2.38 2.41 2.41 2.53 
2.0 73.6 2.89 2.66 2.66 2.64 2.68 2.68 2.80 
2.5 80.6 3.19 3.00 3.00 2.98 3.01 3.01 3.11 
3.0 86.2 3.51 3.35 3.35 3.34 3.36 3.36 3.45 
3.5 90.6 3.87 3.73 3.73 3.72 3.73 3.73 3.82 
4.0 93.9 4.26 4.14 4.14 4.13 4.14 4.14 4.22 
Mean Squared Error 
0.0 38.4 4.090 3.897 3.664 3.591 3.414 3.414 3.592 
0.5 47.7 2.900 2.884 2.672 2.648 2.388 2.388 2.513 
1.0 56.8 2.002 2.176 1.999 1.997 1.672 1.672 1.709 
1.5 65.6 1.312 1.703 1.522 1.540 1.143 1.143 1.106 
2.0 73.6 0.830 1.362 1.194 1.221 0.796 0.796 0.689 
2.5 80.6 0.507 1.231 1.061 1.084 0.609 0.609 0.418 
3.0 86.2 0.299 1.173 1.004 1.027 0.502 0.502 0.245 
3.5 90.6 0.172 1.143 0.980 1.000 0.445 0.445 0.144 
4.0 93.9 0.105 1.142 0.973 0.989 0.423 0.423 0.092 
Type I Error Rates (𝐻0: 𝛽0 = 𝛼) 
0.0 38.4 1.00 0.78 0.90 0.78 1.00 0.99 1.00 
0.5 47.7 1.00 0.67 0.77 0.75 1.00 0.92 1.00 
1.0 56.8 1.00 0.54 0.61 0.61 1.00 0.77 1.00 
1.5 65.6 1.00 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.99 0.56 1.00 
2.0 73.6 1.00 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.97 0.38 0.98 
2.5 80.6 0.97 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.96 0.28 0.87 
3.0 86.2 0.79 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.96 0.21 0.60 
3.5 90.6 0.49 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.95 0.17 0.34 




4.3.4. Funnel Asymmetry and Precision Effect Tests 
Almost all MRA studies start by testing whether or not there is a publication bias. This helps 
meta-analysts to determine whether accommodating and correcting for publication bias is 




=  𝛽0 (
1
𝑆𝐸𝑖
) + 𝛽1 +  
𝑒𝑖
𝑆𝐸𝑖
                                                                                                  (4.28) 
Further, testing  H0: 𝛽0 = 0 is a test for the presence of a genuine non-zero effect (PET). The 
results from FAT and PET hypothesis testing are reported in Table 4.10. 
As noted above, there are six classes of experiments based on the pairing of: (i) type of 
date environment (Fixed Effects, Random Effects, Panel Randome Effects), and (ii) type of 
publication bias. The table is divided vertically into three panels according to type of data 
environment, from least realistic (Fixed Effects) to most realistic (Panel Random Effects). It 
is divided horizontally into left and right halves based on type of publication bias. The far left 
column reports the true overall effect, 𝛼.  
I start with the Fixed Effects data environment, where each study produces only one 
estimate and there is one population effect underlying all studies. Each cell in the table 
reports the results of testing 10,000, simulated (sp), post-publication bias, meta-analysis 
samples. Each meta-analysis sample starts with 1,000 estimates, but not all of these are 
observed by the meta-analysts due to publication bias.39 For example, when 𝛼 = 0 and 
publication bias is directed against insignificance (cf. left side of the table), the average meta-
analysis sample contains 143 studies/estimates (14.3 percent).  
                                                          
39 Note that, for the FE and RE DGPs, there is one estimate per study. However, for the PRE DGP, there are 100 
studies, each containing 10 estimates. 
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Each of these 10,000 meta-analysis samples is tested for publication bias (FAT). As 
discussed above, under publication bias against insignificance, when 𝛼 = 0, there is no bias 
in the estimate of the overall effect, so that the null hypothesis is true. The FAT performs 
very well in this case, producing a rejection rate of 6 percent--close to its 5 percent 
significance level. In contrast, the PET is oversized with a 16 percent rejection rate. Both the 
FAT and the PET show excellent power. Rejection rates for the null hypotheses of no 
publication bias and no effect are 100 percent whenever 𝛼 > 0.  
Continuing with publication bias against insignificance (left side of the table), I move 
down a panel to the more realistic case of Random Effects. While the rejection rates of 0.08 
for both the FAT and PET are close to their significance levels when 𝛼 = 0, the tests do not 
perform as well when 𝛼 > 0. For example, when 𝛼 = 0.5, the FAT rejects the (false) null of 
no publication bias only about 33 percent of the time. The PET fails to reject the (false) null 
of no effect approximately 35 percent (=1-0.65) of the time. While the performances of the 
FAT and PET generally improve as 𝛼 increases, the tests are not as reliable as they were in 
the Fixed Effects data environment.  
The bottom panel reports results for the most realistic data environment, Panel Random 
Effects, where studies contain more than one estimate and there is heterogeneity in true 
effects both within and across studies. Both the FAT and the PET perform substantially 
worse.40 When 𝛼 = 0 and publication bias is directed towards statistical insignificance, the 
FAT rejects the (true) null of no publication bias over half of the time (55 percent). The PET 
rejects the true null 29 percent of the time, and that rejection rate increases slowly as 𝛼 gets 
larger.  
                                                          
40 Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors were used when testing hypotheses in the FE and RE cases. 
Clustered robust standard errors were used in the PRE case. 
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Moving to the right side of the table and beginning again with the top panel, I see that 
the FAT again does well within the Fixed Effects data environment. When publication bias is 
directed against negatively signed estimates and 𝛼 = 0, so that approximately half of all 
estimates are wrong signed, the FAT rejects the null of no publication bias 100 percent of the 
time. As 𝛼 increases, fewer and fewer estimates are eliminated via publication bias, so that 
publication bias diminishes. Correspondingly the rejection rate from the FAT also falls.  
The PET also performs well. When 𝛼 = 0, 45 percent (=100-55) of the estimates are 
eliminated because of negative signs. This causes the remaining estimates to have a strong 
positive bias. Even so, the PET is not fooled, and generally leads to the correct conclusion of 
no effect: The rejection rate of 8 percent is close to its 5 percent significance level. Further, 
the PET accurately identifies the existence of a nonzero effect 100 percent of the time for all 
𝛼 > 0. 
As before, the performances of the FAT and PET decline as the data environments 
become more realistic. Compared to the 100 percent rejection rate for the FAT when 𝛼 = 0 
in the Fixed Effects environment, the FAT falls to 62 percent for the same scenario in the 
Random Effects data environment. Likewise, the PET finds evidence of an effect 90 percent 
of the time under Random Effects when there is, in fact, no effect (𝛼 = 0). Things decline 
further still in the most realistic environment of Panel Random Effects. The FAT is largely 
insensitive to changes in the degree of publication bias, and the ability of the PET to identify 
an effect when there really is one is worse. In summary, while the FPP procedure does very 
well in the basic, unrealistic case of a Fixed Effects data environment, its performance 






Table 4.10: Funnel Asymmetry Testing (FAT) and Precision Effect Testing (PET) 
 Publication Bias against Insignificant Publication Bias against Wrong Sign 
Fixed Effects Data Environments 
α Percent FAT PET Percent FAT PET 
0.0 14.3 0.06 0.16 55.0 1.00 0.08 
0.5 23.0 1.00 1.00 71.7 1.00 1.00 
1.0 31.8 1.00 1.00 80.6 1.00 1.00 
1.5 40.0 1.00 1.00 86.5 1.00 1.00 
2.0 47.6 1.00 1.00 90.6 1.00 1.00 
2.5 54.6 1.00 1.00 93.5 0.98 1.00 
3.0 61.1 1.00 1.00 95.5 0.81 1.00 
3.5 67.0 1.00 1.00 97.0 0.53 1.00 
4.0 72.2 1.00 1.00 98.0 0.30 1.00 
Random Effects Data Environments 
α Percent FAT PET Percent FAT PET 
0.0 27.1 0.08 0.08 55.0 0.62 0.90 
0.5 28.7 0.33 0.65 65.4 0.62 1.00 
1.0 33.0 0.67 0.99 74.7 0.56 1.00 
1.5 39.1 0.79 1.00 82.0 0.48 1.00 
2.0 45.9 0.79 1.00 87.4 0.35 1.00 
2.5 52.8 0.75 1.00 91.3 0.24 1.00 
3.0 59.2 0.69 1.00 94.0 0.17 1.00 
3.5 65.1 0.61 1.00 95.9 0.13 1.00 
4.0 70.4 0.55 1.00 97.2 0.10 1.00 
Panel Random Effects Data Environments 
α Percent FAT PET Percent FAT PET 
0.0 19.2 0.55 0.29 38.4 0.45 0.78 
0.5 19.9 0.58 0.34 47.7 0.47 0.84 
1.0 22.0 0.66 0.46 56.8 0.44 0.87 
1.5 25.2 0.72 0.60 65.6 0.43 0.91 
2.0 29.5 0.66 0.73 73.6 0.46 0.93 
2.5 34.7 0.59 0.83 80.6 0.50 0.95 
3.0 40.4 0.66 0.90 86.2 0.46 0.97 
3.5 46.4 0.69 0.94 90.6 0.45 0.98 





This section reports on a Monte Carlo simulation used to evaluate the performance of 
the FAT-PET-PEESE (FPP) procedure, a commonly employed approach for detecting and 
correcting publication bias in economics and business meta-analyses. The FPP procedure 
addresses three main objectives: (i) testing whether the sample of estimates is influenced by 
publication selection bias; (ii) testing whether there is a genuine non-zero true effect of 
estimates once the publication bias is accommodated and corrected; and (iii) obtaining an 
estimate of the overall mean effect. 
My analysis investigated two types of publication bias: (i) publication bias against 
insignificant results and (ii) publication bias against wrong-signs. I also considered three data 
environments: (i) the Fixed Effects data environment where each study only contains one 
estimated effect, and where there is one true effect underlying all studies, so that all 
differences in estimated effects are due to sampling error; (ii) the Random Effects data 
environment where each study still only has one estimated effect, but where there is a 
distribution of true effects across studies; and (iii) the Panel Random Effects data 
environment where studies contain multiple estimates and there is heterogeneity in true 
effects both across estimates and within studies. The Panel Random Effects data environment 
is the data environment that most realistically models what meta-analysts in business and 
economics are likely to encounter in their research.  
My findings indicate that the FPP procedure performs very well in the basic 
environment of Fixed Effects. However, in more realistic data environments, where there is 
heterogeneity in true effects both across and within studies, the FPP procedure’s performance 
is generally poor. It is unreliable for the first two objectives, and less efficient than some 
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other estimators that are not particularly designed to correct for publication bias. Further, 
hypothesis tests about the overall mean effect cannot be trusted.  
I attempt to corroborate these findings by recreating the simulation framework of 
Stanley and Doucouliagos (2017) and repeat my tests using their framework. This is an 
undergoing project, however, the preliminary results confirm the main findings with one 
exception: in the S&D data environments, the FPP procedure performs better in testing 
hypothesis about the overall mean. However, this is not surprising given that, the “Panel 
Random Effects” data environment has a very different error structure than S&D, making 
hypothesis testing more challenging.The main conclusions I draw from thie research in this 
chapter are as follows. First, meta-analyses should routinely report measures of heterogeneity 
such as 𝐼2. This is not standard practice in the economics and business literatures and should 
be. Second, future research should more intensively explore the conditions under which FPP 
performs well. As noted elsewhere (Stanley, 2008; Moreno et al., 2009; Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2014a), publication bias is a serious problem and the FPP procedure has 
shown great promise in mitigating its deleterious consequences in some cases. Having a 
better understanding of where the FPP procedure can be successfully applied is an important 
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Appendix 4.1: Codes 
.do file for TABLES 4.2 & 4.3 – Part A 
 
set more off 
program drop _all 
program define FEpbias, rclass 
version 13.1 
 
syntax, alpha(real) studies(integer) select(real) obs(integer) 
 
// Remove existing variables 
drop _all 
 
//We first create the matrix to store the results of each study 
set matsize 5000 
matrix A = J(`studies',1,0) 
matrix B = J(`studies',1,0) 
matrix C = J(`studies',1,0) 
   
forvalues i = 1/`studies' { 
clear 
// STEP ONE: Create the data for each study and estimate an effect 
set obs `obs' 
generate x = rnormal() 
scalar lambda = 0.2 + 30*runiform() 
// Note that each "study" has the same number of observations (100) 
// but differ in the variance of their respective error terms.  This 
// causes the estimate of the effect to be estimated with varying degrees  
// of precision 
generate e = lambda*rnormal() 
generate y = 1 + `alpha'*x + e 
quietly regress y x  
scalar coef = _b[x] 
scalar secoef = _se[x] 
scalar tcoef = coef/secoef 
  
//if abs(tcoef) < 2 { 
// An alternative criterion is that results that show a negative effect 
// have a harder time getting published.  To study that case, substitute 
// the line below for the line above 
if coef < 0 { 
scalar dummy = cond(runiform()<`select',1,.) 
// The statement above creates a dummy variable that randomly selects which 
// studies will get "published" if they fail to meet the "publication criterion" 
// either (i) abs(tcoef) >= 2 or (ii) if coef >= 0.  Studies that are not "published" 
// receive missing values and thus are not included in the "meta-analysis." 
scalar coef = dummy*coef 
scalar secoef = dummy*secoef 
scalar tcoef = dummy*tcoef 
} 
 
matrix A[`i',1] = coef 
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matrix B[`i',1] = secoef 
matrix C[`i',1] = tcoef 
} 
   
// The next set of commands moves the data out of matrices and reformats them as  
// standard Stata data series.  We have now completed generating our individual 
// studies and we now move into the "meta-analysis" stage. 
matrix bob = A,B,C  
svmat bob 
rename bob1 effect  
rename bob2 seeffect  
rename bob3 teffect  
generate pet = (1/seeffect) 
  
// This estimate produces the OLS estimate of the effect 
regress effect  
return scalar effect_OLS = _b[_cons] 
test _b[_cons] = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_OLS = r(p) 
  
// This estimate produces the PET version of the "publication bias"-  
// corrected effect estimate 
regress teffect pet, vce(robust) 
return scalar effect_PET = _b[pet] 
scalar effect_PET = _b[pet] 
test _b[_cons] = 0 
return scalar pvalue_FAT = r(p) 
scalar pvalue_FAT = r(p) 
test pet = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_PET = r(p) 
scalar pvalue_PET = r(p) 
test pet = 0 
return scalar pvalue_PETFPP = r(p) 
scalar pvalue_PETFPP = r(p) 
 
// This estimate produces the PEESE version of the "publication bias"-  
// corrected effect estimate 
regress teffect seeffect pet, noc vce(robust) 
return scalar effect_PEESE = _b[pet] 
scalar effect_PEESE = _b[pet] 
test pet = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_PEESE = r(p) 
scalar pvalue_PEESE = r(p) 
  
// This estimate produces the FE estimate of the effect 
generate constant = 1 
vwls effect constant, sd(seeffect) nocon 
return scalar effect_FE = _b[constant] 
test _b[constant] = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_FE = r(p) 
   
// This estimate produces the WLS estimate of the effect 
regress teffect pet, noc 
return scalar effect_WLS = _b[pet] 
test pet = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_WLS = r(p) 
// This estimate produces the RE estimate of the effect 
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// NOTE: We use the Method of Moments (mm) option of metareg 
// because the maximum likelihood procedure had too many instances 
// of failure to optimize.  Method of Moments does not require 
// iteration and thus avoids this problem. 
metareg effect , wsse(seeffect) mm 
matrix bill = e(b) 
return scalar effect_RE = bill[1,1] 
test _cons = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_RE = r(p) 
 
return scalar effect_FPP = effect_PET 
return scalar pvalue_FPP = pvalue_PET 
 
if pvalue_PETFPP < 0.05 { 
return scalar effect_FPP = effect_PEESE 
return scalar pvalue_FPP = pvalue_PEESE 
}  
   
// This last command keeps track of how many studies are in our "meta-analysis" 






















.do file for TABLE 4.2 & 4.3 – Part B 
 




graph drop _all 
set more off 
set seed 13 
matrix FAT = J(9,2,0) 
matrix PETFPP = J(9,2,0) 
matrix EFFECT = J(9,8,0) 
matrix MSE = J(9,8,0) 
matrix TEST = J(9,8,0) 
local studies = 1000 
// Select is used to set the probability of being included in the data set 
// when the study is subject to publication bias, either because (i) abs(tstat) < 2, or 
// coef < 0.  
local select = 0.10 
local obs = 100 
 
local i = 1 
foreach alpha in 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 { 
simulate effect_OLS = r(effect_OLS) effect_FE = r(effect_FE) effect_RE = r(effect_RE) /// 
 effect_PET = r(effect_PET) effect_PEESE = r(effect_PEESE)  /// 
 pvalue_OLS = r(pvalue_OLS) pvalue_FE = r(pvalue_FE) pvalue_RE = r(pvalue_RE) /// 
 pvalue_PET = r(pvalue_PET) pvalue_PEESE = r(pvalue_PEESE) N = r(N) /// 
 effect_WLS = r(effect_WLS) pvalue_WLS = r(pvalue_WLS) pvalue_FAT = r(pvalue_FAT) /// 
pvalue_PETFPP = r(pvalue_PETFPP) effect_FPP = r(effect_FPP) pvalue_FPP = r(pvalue_FPP) , /// 
                reps(10000): FEpbias, alpha(`alpha') studies(`studies') select(`select') obs(`obs')  
 
summ N, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',1] = r(mean) 
summ effect_OLS, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',2] = r(mean) 
summ effect_PET, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',3] = r(mean) 
summ effect_PEESE, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',4] = r(mean) 
summ effect_FE, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',5] = r(mean) 
summ effect_WLS, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',6] = r(mean) 
summ effect_RE, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',7] = r(mean) 
summ effect_FPP, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',8] = r(mean) 
     
summ N, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',1] = r(mean) 
generate mse_OLS = (effect_OLS - `alpha')^2 
summ mse_OLS, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',2] = r(mean) 
generate mse_PET = (effect_PET - `alpha')^2 
summ mse_PET, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',3] = r(mean) 
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generate mse_PEESE = (effect_PEESE - `alpha')^2 
summ mse_PEESE, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',4] = r(mean) 
generate mse_FE = (effect_FE - `alpha')^2 
summ mse_FE, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',5] = r(mean) 
generate mse_WLS = (effect_WLS - `alpha')^2 
summ mse_WLS, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',6] = r(mean) 
generate mse_RE = (effect_RE - `alpha')^2 
summ mse_RE, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',7] = r(mean) 
generate mse_FPP = (effect_FPP - `alpha')^2 
summ mse_FPP, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',8] = r(mean) 
     
summ N, meanonly 
matrix FAT[`i',1] = r(mean) 
generate RRFAT = 0 
replace RRFAT = cond(pvalue_FAT<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRFAT, meanonly 
matrix FAT[`i',2] = r(mean) 
 
summ N, meanonly 
matrix PETFPP[`i',1] = r(mean) 
generate RRPETFPP = 0 
replace RRPETFPP = cond(pvalue_PETFPP<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRPETFPP, meanonly 
matrix PETFPP[`i',2] = r(mean) 
 
summ N, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',1] = r(mean) 
generate RROLS = 0 
replace RROLS = cond(pvalue_OLS<0.05,1,0)  
summ RROLS, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',2] = r(mean) 
generate RRPET = 0 
replace RRPET = cond(pvalue_PET<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRPET, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',3] = r(mean)  
generate RRPEESE = 0 
replace RRPEESE = cond(pvalue_PEESE<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRPEESE, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',4] = r(mean) 
generate RRFE = 0 
replace RRFE = cond(pvalue_FE<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRFE, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',5] = r(mean)  
generate RRWLS = 0 
replace RRWLS = cond(pvalue_WLS<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRWLS, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',6] = r(mean)  
generate RRRE = 0 
replace RRRE = cond(pvalue_RE<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRRE, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',7] = r(mean)  
generate RRFPP = 0 
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replace RRFPP = cond(pvalue_FPP<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRFPP, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',8] = r(mean)  
 




matrix colnames FAT = FAT 
matrix rownames FAT = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix colnames PETFPP = PETFPP 
matrix rownames PETFPP = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix colnames EFFECT = N OLS PET PEESE FE WLS RE  FPP 
matrix rownames EFFECT = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix colnames MSE = N OLS PET PEESE FE WLS RE FPP 
matrix rownames MSE = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix colnames TEST = N OLS PET PEESE FE WLS RE FPP 
matrix rownames TEST = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix list FAT 
matrix list PETFPP 
matrix list EFFECT 
matrix list MSE 























.do file for TABLES 4.5 & 4.6 – Part A 
 
set more off 
program drop _all 
program define REpbias, rclass 
version 13.1 
 
syntax, alpha(real) studies(integer) select(real) obs(integer) 
 
// Remove existing variables 
drop _all 
 
//We first create the matrix to store the results of each study 
matrix A = J(`studies',1,0) 
matrix B = J(`studies',1,0) 
matrix C = J(`studies',1,0) 
   
forvalues i = 1/`studies' { 
clear 
// STEP ONE: Create the data for each study and estimate an effect 
set obs `obs' 
generate x = rnormal() 
// Note that each "study" has the same number of observations (100) 
// but differ in the variance of their respective error terms.  This 
// causes the estimate of the effect to be estimated with varying degrees  
// of precision 
scalar lambdai = 0.5+30*runiform() 
generate e = lambdai*rnormal() 
scalar alphai = `alpha' + rnormal() 
generate y = 1 + alphai*x + e 
quietly regress y x  
scalar coef = _b[x] 
scalar secoef = _se[x] 
scalar tcoef = coef/secoef 
  
//if abs(tcoef) < 2 { 
// An alternative criterion is that results that show a negative effect 
// have a harder time getting published.  To study that case, substitute 
// the line below for the line above 
if coef < 0 { 
scalar dummy = cond(runiform()<`select',1,.) 
// The statement above creates a dummy variable that randomly selects which 
// studies will get "published" if they fail to meet the "publication criterion" 
// either (i) abs(tcoef) >= 2 or (ii) if coef >= 0.  Studies that are not "published" 
// receive missing values and thus are not included in the "meta-analysis." 
 scalar coef = dummy*coef 
scalar secoef = dummy*secoef 
scalar tcoef = dummy*tcoef 
} 
 
matrix A[`i',1] = coef 
matrix B[`i',1] = secoef 
matrix C[`i',1] = tcoef 
} 
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// The next set of commands moves the data out of matrices and reformats them as  
// standard Stata data series.  We have now completed generating our individual 
// studies and we now move into the "meta-analysis" stage. 
matrix bob = A,B,C  
svmat bob 
rename bob1 effect  
rename bob2 seeffect  
rename bob3 teffect  
generate pet = (1/seeffect) 
  
// This estimate produces the OLS estimate of the effect 
regress effect  
return scalar effect_OLS = _b[_cons] 
test _b[_cons] = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_OLS = r(p) 
  
// This estimate produces the PET version of the "publication bias"- 
// corrected effect estimate 
regress teffect pet, vce(robust) 
return scalar effect_PET = _b[pet] 
scalar effect_PET = _b[pet] 
test _b[_cons] = 0 
return scalar pvalue_FAT = r(p) 
scalar pvalue_FAT = r(p) 
test pet = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_PET = r(p) 
scalar pvalue_PET = r(p) 
test pet = 0 
return scalar pvalue_PETFPP = r(p) 
scalar pvalue_PETFPP = r(p) 
 
// This estimate produces the PEESE version of the "publication bias"- 
// corrected effect estimate 
regress teffect seeffect pet, noc vce(robust) 
return scalar effect_PEESE = _b[pet] 
scalar effect_PEESE = _b[pet] 
test pet = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_PEESE = r(p) 
scalar pvalue_PEESE = r(p) 
  
// This estimate produces the FE estimate of the effect 
generate constant = 1 
vwls effect constant, sd(seeffect) nocon 
return scalar effect_FE = _b[constant] 
test _b[constant] = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_FE = r(p) 
   
// This estimate produces the WLS estimate of the effect 
regress teffect pet, noc 
return scalar effect_WLS = _b[pet] 
test pet = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_WLS = r(p) 
// This estimate produces the RE estimate of the effect 
// NOTE: We use the Method of Moments (mm) option of metareg 
// because the maximum likelihood procedure had too many instances 
// of failure to optimize.  Method of Moments does not require 
// iteration and thus avoids this problem. 
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metareg effect , wsse(seeffect) mm 
matrix bill = e(b) 
return scalar effect_RE = bill[1,1] 
test _cons = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_RE = r(p) 
 
return scalar effect_FPP = effect_PET 
return scalar pvalue_FPP = pvalue_PET 
 
if pvalue_PETFPP < 0.05 { 
return scalar effect_FPP = effect_PEESE 
return scalar pvalue_FPP = pvalue_PEESE 
}  
 
// This last command keeps track of how many studies are in our "meta-analysis" 
























.do file for TABLE 4.5 & 4.6 – Part B 
 




graph drop _all 
set more off 
set seed 13 
set matsize 5000 
matrix FAT = J(9,2,0) 
matrix PETFPP = J(9,2,0) 
matrix EFFECT = J(9,8,0) 
matrix MSE = J(9,8,0) 
matrix TEST = J(9,8,0) 
local studies = 1000 
// Select is used to set the probability of being included in the data set 
// when the study is subject to publication bias, either because (i) abs(tstat) < 2, or 
// coef < 0.  
local select = 0.10 
local obs = 100 
 
local i = 1 
foreach alpha in 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 { 
simulate effect_OLS = r(effect_OLS) effect_FE = r(effect_FE) effect_RE = r(effect_RE) /// 
 effect_PET = r(effect_PET) effect_PEESE = r(effect_PEESE)  /// 
 pvalue_OLS = r(pvalue_OLS) pvalue_FE = r(pvalue_FE) pvalue_RE = r(pvalue_RE) /// 
 pvalue_PET = r(pvalue_PET) pvalue_PEESE = r(pvalue_PEESE) N = r(N) /// 
 effect_WLS = r(effect_WLS) pvalue_WLS = r(pvalue_WLS) pvalue_FAT = r(pvalue_FAT) /// 
pvalue_PETFPP = r(pvalue_PETFPP) effect_FPP = r(effect_FPP) pvalue_FPP = r(pvalue_FPP) , /// 
                reps(10000): REpbias, alpha(`alpha') studies(`studies') select(`select') obs(`obs')  
        
summ N, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',1] = r(mean) 
summ effect_OLS, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',2] = r(mean) 
summ effect_PET, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',3] = r(mean) 
summ effect_PEESE, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',4] = r(mean) 
summ effect_FE, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',5] = r(mean) 
summ effect_WLS, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',6] = r(mean) 
summ effect_RE, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',7] = r(mean) 
summ effect_FPP, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',8] = r(mean) 
     
summ N, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',1] = r(mean) 
generate mse_OLS = (effect_OLS - `alpha')^2 
summ mse_OLS, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',2] = r(mean) 
generate mse_PET = (effect_PET - `alpha')^2 
summ mse_PET, meanonly 
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matrix MSE[`i',3] = r(mean) 
generate mse_PEESE = (effect_PEESE - `alpha')^2 
summ mse_PEESE, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',4] = r(mean) 
generate mse_FE = (effect_FE - `alpha')^2 
summ mse_FE, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',5] = r(mean) 
generate mse_WLS = (effect_WLS - `alpha')^2 
summ mse_WLS, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',6] = r(mean) 
generate mse_RE = (effect_RE - `alpha')^2 
summ mse_RE, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',7] = r(mean) 
generate mse_FPP = (effect_FPP - `alpha')^2 
summ mse_FPP, meanonly 
matrix MSE[`i',8] = r(mean) 
 
summ N, meanonly 
matrix FAT[`i',1] = r(mean) 
generate RRFAT = 0 
replace RRFAT = cond(pvalue_FAT<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRFAT, meanonly 
matrix FAT[`i',2] = r(mean) 
 
summ N, meanonly 
matrix PETFPP[`i',1] = r(mean) 
generate RRPETFPP = 0 
replace RRPETFPP = cond(pvalue_PETFPP<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRPETFPP, meanonly 
matrix PETFPP[`i',2] = r(mean) 
     
summ N, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',1] = r(mean) 
generate RROLS = 0 
replace RROLS = cond(pvalue_OLS<0.05,1,0)  
summ RROLS, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',2] = r(mean) 
generate RRPET = 0 
replace RRPET = cond(pvalue_PET<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRPET, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',3] = r(mean)  
generate RRPEESE = 0 
replace RRPEESE = cond(pvalue_PEESE<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRPEESE, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',4] = r(mean) 
generate RRFE = 0 
replace RRFE = cond(pvalue_FE<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRFE, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',5] = r(mean)  
generate RRWLS = 0 
replace RRWLS = cond(pvalue_WLS<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRWLS, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',6] = r(mean)  
generate RRRE = 0 
replace RRRE = cond(pvalue_RE<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRRE, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',7] = r(mean) 
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generate RRFPP = 0 
replace RRFPP = cond(pvalue_FPP<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRFPP, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',8] = r(mean)  




matrix colnames FAT = FAT 
matrix rownames FAT = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix colnames PETFPP = PETFPP 
matrix rownames PETFPP = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix colnames EFFECT = N OLS PET PEESE FE WLS RE  FPP 
matrix rownames EFFECT = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix colnames MSE = N OLS PET PEESE FE WLS RE FPP 
matrix rownames MSE = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix colnames TEST = N OLS PET PEESE FE WLS RE FPP 
matrix rownames TEST = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix list FAT 
matrix list PETFPP 
matrix list EFFECT 
matrix list MSE 























.do file for TABLES 4.8 & 4.9 – Part A 
 
program drop _all 
program define PANELpbias, rclass 
version 13.1 
 
syntax, studies(integer) estperstudy(integer) totalobs(integer) alpha(real) /// 
theta(real) obs(integer) 
         
// Remove existing variables 
drop _all 
 
//We first create the matrix to store the results of each study 
set matsize 5000 
matrix A = J(`totalobs',1,.) 
matrix B = J(`totalobs',1,.) 
matrix C = J(`totalobs',1,.) 
matrix D = J(`totalobs',1,.) 
   
forvalues i = 1/`studies' { 
scalar lambdai = 0.5+30*runiform() 
scalar alphai = `alpha'+2*rnormal() 
forvalues j = 1/`estperstudy' { 
// STEP ONE: Create the data for each study and estimate an effect 
clear 
set obs 100 
generate x = rnormal() 
// Note that each "study" has a difference error variance, causing the estimate  
// of the effect to be estimated with varying degrees of precision 
// This is for random effects 
scalar lambdaij = lambdai+`theta'*runiform() 
scalar alphaij = alphai+0.5*rnormal() 
generate e = lambdaij*rnormal() 
generate y = 1 + alphaij*x + e 
// This is for fixed effects 
// scalar lambda = 0.2+30*runiform() 
// generate e = lambda*rnormal() 
// generate y = 1 + `alpha'*x + e 
quietly regress y x  
scalar coef = _b[x] 
scalar secoef = _se[x] 
scalar tcoef = coef/secoef 
scalar ID = `i' 
scalar obsno = (`i'-1)*`estperstudy'+`j' 
  
// First run this program once to get the pre-publication study sample data 
// To get post-publication study sample data, uncomment one of the two sections 
// below. 
matrix A[obsno,1] = coef 
matrix B[obsno,1] = secoef 
 
matrix C[obsno,1] = tcoef 






// The next set of commands moves the data out of matrices and reformats them as  
// standard Stata data series.  We have now completed generating our individual 
// studies and we now move into the "meta-analysis" stage. 
matrix bob = A,B,C,D 
svmat bob 
rename bob1 effect  
rename bob2 seeffect  
rename bob3 teffect  
rename bob4 ID 
generate pet = (1/seeffect) 
 
// This set of commands imposese the publication bias, where the publication criterion 
// is either that (i) the t-stat must be greater than or equal to 2, or (ii) the  
// estimated effect is positive.  The commands below implement the assumption that a 
// study must have at least 7 out of 10 estimates that satisfy the publication  
// criterion in order for the study to be "published." 
generate dummy = 1 
//replace dummy = 0 if abs(teffect) < 2 
replace dummy = 0 if effect < 0 
by ID, sort: egen select = mean(dummy) 
// Not sure why this happens, but if I put select<0.70, it kicks out the studies that 
// have 7 estimates that satisfy the publication criterion.  So I set select<0.65.   
// Studies are omitted from the "meta-analysis" sample by replacing the relevant variables 
// with missing values. 
replace effect = cond(select<0.65,.,effect) 
replace seeffect = cond(select<0.65,.,seeffect) 
replace teffect = cond(select<0.65,.,teffect) 
replace pet = cond(select<0.65,.,pet) 
  
// This creates dummy variables for each of the 100 studies 
// The dummy variables take names dum1 to dum100 
tab ID, gen(dum) 
  
// This creates study-specific SE terms for use in the PEESE 
// according to equation 5.7 on page 85 of S&D 
forvalues i = 1/100 { 
generate SE`i' = seeffect*dum`i' 
} 
  
// This estimate produces the OLS estimate of the effect 
regress effect, vce(cluster ID) 
return scalar effect_OLS = _b[_cons] 
test _b[_cons] = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_OLS = r(p) 
   
// This estimate produces the PET version of the "publication bias"-  
// corrected effect estimate 
// NOTE1:  According to equation 5.6 on page 85 of S&D, the bias-corrected 
// effect is given by the coefficients on the respective precision terms, pet*. 
// The specification below forces all the effects to be the same, while 
// allowing for fixed effects to correct for bias-associated with estimate SEs. 
// NOTE2: Also note that while all the dummy variables will not be included in the 
// meta-analysis sample, this is not a problem because STATA will automatically 
// kick out the ones that don't belong. 
regress teffect dum1-dum100 pet, vce(cluster ID) 
return scalar effect_PET = _b[pet] 
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scalar effect_PET = _b[pet] 
test _b[_cons] = 0 
return scalar pvalue_FAT = r(p) 
scalar pvalue_FAT = r(p) 
test pet = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_PET = r(p) 
scalar pvalue_PET = r(p) 
test pet = 0 
return scalar pvalue_PETFPP = r(p) 
scalar pvalue_PETFPP = r(p) 
   
// This estimate produces the PEESE version of the "publication bias"-  
// corrected effect estimate.  It is based on equation 5.7 on page 85 of S&D. 
// See notes from above. 
regress teffect SE1-SE100 pet, noc vce(cluster ID) 
return scalar effect_PEESE = _b[pet] 
scalar effect_PEESE = _b[pet] 
test pet = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_PEESE = r(p) 
scalar pvalue_PEESE = r(p) 
  
// This estimate produces the FE estimate of the effect 
// Note that the FE estimator cannot do cluster robust 
generate constant = 1 
vwls effect constant, sd(seeffect) nocon 
return scalar effect_FE = _b[constant] 
test _b[constant] = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_FE = r(p) 
  
// This estimate produces the WLS estimate of the effect 
regress teffect pet, noc vce(cluster ID) 
return scalar effect_WLS = _b[pet] 
test pet = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_WLS = r(p) 
   
// This estimate produces the RE estimate of the effect 
// NOTE: We use the Method of Moments (mm) option of metareg 
// because the maximum likelihood procedure had too many instances 
// of failure to optimize.  Method of Moments does not require 
// iteration and thus avoids this problem. 
quietly metareg effect, wsse(seeffect) mm 
scalar tau2 = e(tau2) 
gen revarR= seeffect^2 + tau2 
gen reseR = sqrt(revarR) 
gen reteffect = effect/reseR 
gen repet = 1/reseR 
regress reteffect repet, noc vce(cluster ID) 
return scalar effect_RE = _b[repet] 
test repet = `alpha' 
return scalar pvalue_RE = r(p)  
  
return scalar effect_FPP = effect_PET 
return scalar pvalue_FPP = pvalue_PET 
if pvalue_PETFPP < 0.05 { 
return scalar effect_FPP = effect_PEESE 





// This last command keeps track of how many studies are in our "meta-analysis" 
































.do file for TABLE 4.8 & 4.9 – Part B 
 




graph drop _all 
set more off 
set seed 13 
set matsize 5000 
matrix FAT = J(9,2,0) 
matrix PETFPP = J(9,2,0) 
matrix EFFECT = J(9,8,0) 
matrix MSE = J(9,8,0) 
matrix TEST = J(9,8,0) 
local studies = 100 
local estperstudy = 10 
local totalobs = `studies'*`estperstudy' 
local theta = 1 
local obs = 100 
 
local i = 1 
foreach alpha in 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 { 
                simulate effect_OLS = r(effect_OLS) effect_FE = r(effect_FE) effect_RE = r(effect_RE) /// 
 effect_PET = r(effect_PET) effect_PEESE = r(effect_PEESE)  /// 
 pvalue_OLS = r(pvalue_OLS) pvalue_FE = r(pvalue_FE) pvalue_RE = r(pvalue_RE) /// 
 pvalue_PET = r(pvalue_PET) pvalue_PEESE = r(pvalue_PEESE) N = r(N) /// 
 effect_WLS = r(effect_WLS) pvalue_WLS = r(pvalue_WLS) pvalue_FAT = r(pvalue_FAT) /// 
pvalue_PETFPP = r(pvalue_PETFPP) effect_FPP = r(effect_FPP) pvalue_FPP = r(pvalue_FPP) , /// 
                reps(10000): PANELpbias, studies(`studies') estperstudy(`estperstudy') totalobs(`totalobs') ///
 alpha(`alpha') theta(`theta') obs(`obs') 
        
                summ N, meanonly 
                matrix EFFECT[`i',1] = r(mean) 
 summ effect_OLS, meanonly 
                matrix EFFECT[`i',2] = r(mean) 
                summ effect_PET, meanonly 
                matrix EFFECT[`i',3] = r(mean) 
                summ effect_PEESE, meanonly 
                matrix EFFECT[`i',4] = r(mean) 
 summ effect_FE, meanonly 
                matrix EFFECT[`i',5] = r(mean) 
                summ effect_WLS, meanonly 
                matrix EFFECT[`i',6] = r(mean) 
                summ effect_RE, meanonly 
                matrix EFFECT[`i',7] = r(mean) 
summ effect_FPP, meanonly 
matrix EFFECT[`i',8] = r(mean) 
                 
 summ N, meanonly 
                matrix MSE[`i',1] = r(mean) 
 generate mse_OLS = (effect_OLS - `alpha')^2 
                summ mse_OLS, meanonly 
                matrix MSE[`i',2] = r(mean) 
 generate mse_PET = (effect_PET - `alpha')^2 
 summ mse_PET, meanonly 
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matrix MSE[`i',3] = r(mean) 
 generate mse_PEESE = (effect_PEESE - `alpha')^2 
                summ mse_PEESE, meanonly 
                matrix MSE[`i',4] = r(mean) 
 generate mse_FE = (effect_FE - `alpha')^2 
                summ mse_FE, meanonly 
                matrix MSE[`i',5] = r(mean) 
 generate mse_WLS = (effect_WLS - `alpha')^2 
                summ mse_WLS, meanonly 
                matrix MSE[`i',6] = r(mean) 
 generate mse_RE = (effect_RE - `alpha')^2 
                summ mse_RE, meanonly 
                matrix MSE[`i',7] = r(mean) 
        generate mse_FPP = (effect_FPP - `alpha')^2 
                summ mse_FPP, meanonly 
                matrix MSE[`i',8] = r(mean) 
 
summ N, meanonly 
matrix FAT[`i',1] = r(mean) 
generate RRFAT = 0 
replace RRFAT = cond(pvalue_FAT<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRFAT, meanonly 
matrix FAT[`i',2] = r(mean) 
 
summ N, meanonly 
matrix PETFPP[`i',1] = r(mean) 
generate RRPETFPP = 0 
replace RRPETFPP = cond(pvalue_PETFPP<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRPETFPP, meanonly 
matrix PETFPP[`i',2] = r(mean) 
     
                summ N, meanonly 
                matrix TEST[`i',1] = r(mean) 
 generate RROLS = 0 
 replace RROLS = cond(pvalue_OLS<0.05,1,0)  
 summ RROLS, meanonly 
                matrix TEST[`i',2] = r(mean) 
 generate RRPET = 0 
 replace RRPET = cond(pvalue_PET<0.05,1,0)  
 summ RRPET, meanonly 
                matrix TEST[`i',3] = r(mean)  
 generate RRPEESE = 0 
 replace RRPEESE = cond(pvalue_PEESE<0.05,1,0)  
 summ RRPEESE, meanonly 
                matrix TEST[`i',4] = r(mean) 
 generate RRFE = 0 
 replace RRFE = cond(pvalue_FE<0.05,1,0)  
 summ RRFE, meanonly 
                matrix TEST[`i',5] = r(mean)  
 generate RRWLS = 0 
 replace RRWLS = cond(pvalue_WLS<0.05,1,0)  
 summ RRWLS, meanonly 
                matrix TEST[`i',6] = r(mean)  
 generate RRRE = 0 
 replace RRRE = cond(pvalue_RE<0.05,1,0)  
 summ RRRE, meanonly 
                matrix TEST[`i',7] = r(mean) 
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generate RRFPP = 0 
replace RRFPP = cond(pvalue_FPP<0.05,1,0)  
summ RRFPP, meanonly 
matrix TEST[`i',8] = r(mean) 
      
               local `++i' 
} 
 
matrix colnames FAT = FAT 
matrix rownames FAT = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix colnames PETFPP = PETFPP 
matrix rownames PETFPP = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix colnames EFFECT = N OLS PET PEESE FE WLS RE FPP 
matrix rownames EFFECT = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix colnames MSE = N OLS PET PEESE FE WLS RE FPP 
matrix rownames MSE = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix colnames TEST = N OLS PET PEESE FE WLS RE FPP 
matrix rownames TEST = A0 A0P5 A1 A1P5 A2 A2P5 A3 A3P5 A4 
matrix list FAT 
matrix list PETFPP 
matrix list EFFECT 
matrix list MSE 








































In this thesis I undertake three studies which are linked together by the methodology of meta- 
analysis. The first part of my thesis investigates the effect of taxes on economic growth, 
which continues to be a much-studied subject. Both policy makers and researchers have long 
been interested to know whether taxes exert an important influence on economic growth and, 
if they do, how large the effect might be. Despite the large number of studies devoted to this 
topic, there has hitherto not been a consensus among researchers on the size, nor even the 
direction, of the effect.  
In an attempt to provide a clear picture of existing literature, I conduct two meta-
regression analyses to compare and aggregate estimates across studies. To do so, I carefully 
track the factors that can cause tax effects to differ. My analyses address a number of 
important coding issues. These include but are not limited to the implications of the 
government budget constraint for the interpretation of tax effects, how to integrate different 
units of measurement for economic growth rates and tax rates, the empirical implications of 
equation specifications that measure short-, medium-, and long-run effects, and how to deal 
with different lengths of time periods (annual data versus multi-year periods).  
Chapters 2 and 3 study the effects of taxes on economic growth by looking at two 
different literatures. Chapter 2 focuses on OECD countries where the economies are regarded 
as fairly homogeneous but institutionally and culturally diverse. Chapter 3 focuses on U.S. 
states. When it comes to American states, there are many common features such as language 
and legal systems. But within this set of common institutional features, each state sets an 
independent tax policy and therefore this provides 50 “laboratories” to evaluate the 
consequence of different tax policies.  
In Chapter 2, I combine 713 estimates derived from 42 empirical studies, all which 
endeavour to estimate the effect of taxes on economic growth in OECD countries. After 
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dropping extreme estimates from both ends of the sample range, I apply meta-analysis 
procedures to analyse a final sample of 641 estimates. My results suggest that there is a 
publication bias towards negative estimates in the literature. After controlling for publication 
bias, I find that the overall effect of taxes on economic growth is statistically insignificant and 
negligibly small. However, this measure of the overall effect of taxes combines estimates that 
measure different net effects, and thus is not particularly meaningful. When I tease out the 
various net effects of taxes, I find general statistical support in favour of the predictions of 
growth theory. Further, the estimates indicate that there is scope for tax-based fiscal policy to 
increase economic growth amongst OECD countries.  
However, I obtain very different results when I analyse tax effects in the literature on 
U.S. states. In Chapter 3, I combine the results from 29 empirical studies containing 966 
estimates, all of which investigate the effect of taxes on economic growth in U.S. states. As in 
Chapter 2, I drop extreme estimates from both ends of the sample range, producing a final 
meta-analysis sample of 868 estimates. As in Chapter 2, I find evidence that estimates are 
characterized by significant negative publication bias. However, unlike Chapter 2, I do not 
find that the estimates support the predictions of growth theory.  Nor do I find evidence to 
support a role for tax-based fiscal policy to contribute to economic growth in U.S. states.  The 
reasons for the different results between Chapter 2 and 3 are not clear.  In both chapters I 
followed identical procedures. This is a topic I hope to pursue in further research. 
The second part of my thesis is concerned with the issue of publication bias. In 
particular, I study the performance of the FAT-PET-PEESE (FPP) procedure, a commonly 
employed approach for addressing publication selection bias in meta-analysis studies in 
economics and business. I use Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the performance of the 
FPP procedure, comparing it to other common meta-analysis estimators. The three primary 
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objectives of the FPP procedure are: (i) Funnel Asymmetry Testing (FAT) to test whether the 
sample of estimates is influenced by publication selection bias; (ii) Precision Effect Testing 
(PET) to test whether there is a genuine non-zero true effect of estimates once publication 
bias is accommodated and corrected; and (iii) an estimate of the true effect. In my 
simulations, I model two types of publication bias. These are publication bias against 
insignificant results and publication bias against wrong-signed estimates. I do this in a variety 
of data environments.  
My findings indicate that the FPP procedure performs well in the basic but unrealistic 
environment of “Fixed Effects,” where studies contain only one estimate, and there is a 
single, true effect underlying all studies. However, when I study the performance of the FPP 
procedure in more realistic data environments, where there is a distribution of true effects and 
studies contain multiple estimates, I find that the performance of the FPP procedure 
deteriorates substantially. The FAT and PET procedures become unreliable, and the FPP 
estimate of the overall effect is not substantially better, and sometimes worse, than other 
meta-analysis estimators that do not correct for publication bias. I further find that hypothesis 
testing across all meta-analysis estimators is unreliable and cannot be trusted.  
There are two main conclusions I draw from the second part of my study. The first is 
that meta-analyses should routinely report measures of heterogeneity such as 𝐼2. This is not 
standard practice in the economics and business literature and should be. The second 
conclusion I draw from my study is that future research should more intensively explore the 
conditions under which FPP performs well. Publication bias is a well known problem and the 
FPP procedure has elsewhere shown promise in mitigating its deleterious consequences. 
Having a better understanding of where the FPP procedure can be successfully applied is an 
important topic for future research. 
